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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation I seek to answer the question: when, how, and under what conditions does the 
Supreme Court make or influence policy and politics in the United States? In working to answer 
this question, I demonstrate that the Supreme Court has significantly more power and influence 
than scholars have typically given it credit for. I argue that the nature of the Court’s power is 
interpretive: it is the power to say what the law is. This power gives the Court the ability to make 
policy routinely, in every case that comes before it. Often the exercise of this policymaking 
power is mundane, but sometimes it is profound. By shifting focus away from compliance—the 
dominant focus in the empirical literature on Court power—and towards interpretation, I 
significantly extend the range of cases and the scope of outcomes of decisions covered by the 
theory of power. Finally, this theory of power allows me to develop a theory of judicial impact. I 
contend that judicial impact has two key sources: judicial power, and indirect judicial influence, 
by which I mean any action which is attributable to an exercise of judicial power, but which is 
not a direct outcome of any power relationship. For example, political elites respond to Court 
decisions, other institutions rationally anticipate Court action, and judicial decisions can 
incentivize or discourage activism, lobbying, legislation, litigation, and more. In short, this points 
to the utility of expanding the study of judicial impact to encompass all policy-relevant outcomes 
of judicial action, and the theory offered here provides an anchor for this approach as well as a 
framework for systematizing a wide range of different impacts. I go on to show that the Court’s 
indirect influence can be seen in that its decisions routinely affect media coverage of the issues 
on which it speaks, as well the policymaking agendas of the president and the political parties. In 
other words, I show that the Court indirectly influences policy in a number of ways, one of 
which is to alter the political agenda of the public and of other policymaking institutions in the 
United States. 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction: The Supreme Court in American Politics 
 
In February of 2016 the Supreme Court’s conservative stalwart, Justice Antonin Scalia, 
passed away unexpectedly while vacationing in Texas. Justice Scalia’s untimely passing ignited 
a political firestorm in Washington as partisan elites began to position themselves for the ensuing 
battle over who would fill Scalia’s now-vacant seat on the Supreme Court. In relatively short 
order, President Barack Obama nominated the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit, Merrick Garland, to fill the empty seat. Garland was a well-respected jurist 
and a political moderate—in many ways, he seemed to be a safe pick for the outgoing 
administration.  
Republicans in the U.S. Senate were not content with Obama’s moderate appointment, 
however. Senate Republicans, led by Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, took the highly unusual 
step of refusing to even hold confirmation hearings for Garland. Senators were clear that this 
move was not about Garland’s fitness for office, but about politics. McConnell set the tone for 
the party line on this issue, arguing that “this nomination should not be filled, this vacancy 
should not be filled by this lame duck president” (quoted in Kelly 2016). Democrats, on the other 
hand, pointed out the historical oddity of the Republicans’ position, and urged their counterparts 
to give Garland full consideration for the seat to which he had been nominated.  
Clearly at stake in this recent partisan controversy was the political balance of the United 
States Supreme Court. Justice Scalia was perhaps the Court’s most conservative member during 
most of the term of his service. Thus replacing him with a moderate like Garland would have 
shifted the Court’s ideological center of gravity considerably to the left. Republicans naturally 
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sought to resist this change, and did so by arguing that “the People” should decide who would fill 
Scalia’s seat. Democrats, who were thrilled at the opportunity to move the Court to the left, 
pointed out that “the People” had already answered that question by electing Barack Obama 
twice, and that as the sitting president, he had the constitutional right to fill court vacancies that 
arise while he is in office, and that the Senate had a constitutional duty to fully consider his 
nominees. In other words, both parties were using all of the tools at their disposal to ensure that 
they would be the ones to choose Justice Scalia’s successor.  
This battle was in part about scoring political points with voters, to be sure, but there is 
more to it than that. A key component of the president’s choice as to who to nominate to the 
Supreme Court is the direction in which that nominee is expected to move the law. Indeed, 
today, both parties have various formal and informal “litmus tests” for nominees, concerning 
their jurisprudential and political commitments. For this reason, the president’s co-partisans have 
strong incentives to support the nominee, and the president’s opponents have strong incentives to 
try to leverage their political strength (however much or little) in order to win concessions from 
the president—that is, to induce him to nominate a candidate that is acceptable to members of 
both parties (see generally Yalof 1999; Epstein and Segal 2005; Nemacheck 2007). In this light, 
the controversy over Republicans’ refusal to consider Merrick Garland’s nomination was just an 
example—if a rather extreme one—of partisan politicking over control of the future development 
of the Supreme Court. The heat generated by this controversy indicates the tremendous 
importance of the Court’s makeup as recognized by the president, Senators, and partisans (both 
elite and otherwise) on both sides of the issue.  
The importance of this vacated seat on the nation’s highest court, then, points to the 
importance of the Court as an institution in American politics. That is, the intense political 
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battles surrounding recent Supreme Court nominations implicitly recognize that the Court’s 
decisions are important and politically consequential. Why else would political elites expend 
scarce resources—time, money, and political capital—fighting for and against judicial 
nominees? 
Considering the fact that nominations to the Supreme Court have become increasingly 
polarizing, and confirmation battles increasingly acrimonious, one might suspect that it is 
conventional wisdom that the Supreme Court powerfully shapes politics and policy in the United 
States. Interestingly, though, this is not the case. Many scholars contend that the Supreme Court 
is a fundamentally weak institution which has little—if any—power to make public policy. 
Gerald Rosenberg (1991; 2008) has famously described the Supreme Court as a “hollow hope” 
for activists who seek to change policy through litigation, because, on his account, it lacks any 
real power to directly alter policy on the ground.  
American thinkers have debated the power and importance of the Supreme Court since 
before it even came into existence. In what is undoubtedly the most cited Federalist Paper 
(among Public Law scholars, at least), Alexander Hamilton famously wrote: 
“…the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of 
power; that it can never attack with success either of the other two; and that all 
possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks. It 
equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from 
the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered 
from that quarter…” (Hamilton, in Rossiter 2003: 464). 
 
This basic weakness, Hamilton continues, is attributable to the fact that the Court has “no 
influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of 
the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither 
FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the 
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments” (Hamilton, in Rossiter 2003: 464). Far 
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from being a potent policymaker, Hamilton assures his readers that the Court will have virtually 
no ability to move policy without help from at least one of the “political” branches of 
government.  
 This position was not universally accepted, however, even in the run up to the ratification 
conventions. Many Anti-Federalists were deeply suspicious of the proposed court, fearing that it 
would run roughshod over the representative branches. Brutus opined at length on the problems 
the Court would present for the young republic: 
 “the supreme court under this constitution would be exalted above all other 
power in the government, and subject to no control. …There is no power above 
them that can correct their errors or control their decisions—The adjudications of 
this court are final and irreversible… They cannot be removed from office or 
suffer a dimunition of their salaries for any error in judgment or want of capacity. 
…The power of this court is in many cases superior to that of the legislature. I 
have showed, in a former paper, that this court will be authorized to decide upon 
the meaning of the constitution, and that, not only according to the natural and 
ob[vious] meaning of the words, but also according to the spirit and intention of 
it. In the exercise of this power they will not be subordinate to, but above the 
legislature.” (Brutus XV, in Ketcham 1986: 307). 
 
Thus Brutus contends that the proposed court’s power to interpret the law, including the 
Constitution itself, would be wholly unchecked and that the Court therefore is a threat to liberty 
and self-government. Hamilton, as Publius, counters that the Court can interpret the law in any 
way it wants, but its interpretations will be meaningless unless one of the representative branches 
agrees to implement its decision with the “sword or the purse.”  
 The famous activism of the Warren Court in the 1950s and 1960s—the advent of the so-
called “rights revolution”—gave legal scholars impetus and opportunity to test these competing 
hypotheses in order to find out whether these landmark decisions were having the real-world 
effects that liberals hoped for. This question was typically addressed by assessing the extent to 
which real-world practices lived up to the dictates of the Court; in other words, the extent to 
5 
 
which outside actors complied with the Court’s rulings. Empirical studies of these questions 
became known as judicial “impact studies.”1 The premise of this body of scholarship is simple: if 
the Court’s decisions significantly alter policy on-the-ground, then the Court is powerful, its 
decisions impactful; otherwise, it is not.  
 Today, despite more than six decades of study, there is little consensus among scholars 
on this important point. Many scholars have concluded that the Court (or courts more generally) 
can directly and significantly influence policy development, and thus imply that it is powerful 
(e.g. McCann 1994; Feeley and Rubin 1998; Frymer 2003; Keck 2009; Keck 2014). However, 
the more common perspective seems to be that the Court’s power to alter public policy is quite 
limited due to its institutional context and the checks other branches can impose upon it (e.g. 
Horowitz 1977; Rosenberg 1991, 2008; Pickerill 2004; Klarman 2004; Irons 2006; Sweet 2010). 
Others have sought to carve a middle ground, arguing that the questions of judicial power and 
impact are context bound, and thus recast the question to focus on the various institutional and 
political contexts in which Court power waxes and wanes (e.g. Andersen 2006; Hall 2011; Hall 
and Windett 2015).  
  This state of affairs presents an interesting puzzle. If the Supreme Court rarely influences 
politics or policy, or, in other words, if its decisions have little impact in the real world, why do 
Supreme Court vacancies matter at all? Or to put it differently, if the Supreme Court lacks force 
and will, if it is a hollow hope for those seeking political change, then does the Supreme Court 
really matter in American politics? Politicians in Washington, at least, seem to think that the 
Court does matter: they expend substantial time and energy working to staff the Court with 
ideological fellow-travelers, as the brief description of the Garland nomination above attests (see 
                                                 
1 Some scholars came to facetiously refer to these as “gap studies” because they routinely identified significant gaps 
between “law on the books” and “law on the street” (e.g. Sarat 1985; Gould and Barclay 2012).  
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Yalof 1999); they campaign on the Court’s importance (e.g. Busch 2007; Stephenson 1999); and 
they routinely respond to the substance of Supreme Court decisions both rhetorically and by 
initiating their own policy responses (e.g. Barnes 2004; Keck 2014; Eshbaugh-Soha and Collins 
2015). The American public also views the Court as an important policymaking institution, and 
expects it to authoritatively address important questions of constitutional politics (e.g. Marshall 
1989; Bybee 2011).  
 To restate the question then, if the Supreme Court’s decisions have little impact, why do 
American politicians and citizens care about the Court at all? Why do they expend scarce 
resources trying to influence the Court by shaping its personnel, or by responding to its decisions 
with statutes, executive orders, and the like? One possible answer to this question is that political 
elites and the American public are simply misguided—that they wrongly believe that the Court’s 
decisions matter, and are thus willing to devote resources to shaping those decisions. 
Alternatively, it could be the case that the long line of scholars who have contended that the 
Supreme Court is fundamentally weak have overstated their case, and that the Court is actually 
rather more influential in our politics than is typically recognized in the empirical literature on 
judicial impact. A key goal of this dissertation is to adjudicate this question.  
 In a broad sense, the purpose of this dissertation is to answer the question, “How 
powerful is the Supreme Court?” In the following pages, I will argue that the Supreme Court is 
much more powerful and influential in American politics than the judicial impact literature 
typically admits—that is, that these scholars have indeed overstated their case for the “weak 
Court” hypothesis. At the same time, though, I will argue that the Court is not the all-powerful 
policymaker that members of the public sometimes think it is, and that Brutus feared. Rather, I 
will make the case that the Supreme Court is an important policy-making institution, but one that 
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is subject to all of the travails of our checks-and-balances system. The Court is at once more 
powerful than it usually gets credit for being, but far less powerful than is frequently feared.   
The Study of Judicial Power and Judicial Impact 
 I contend that much of the heat generated by debates over judicial impact is attributable 
to imprecise definition of terms and divergent perspectives on what counts as impact (Keck and 
Strother 2016; see also Gould and Barclay 2012; McCann 1992, 1996; Rosenberg 1992, 1996). 
“Judicial impact” is a broad, ambiguous term—almost a catchall—that is widely used, but which 
has no widely agreed-upon definition (Becker and Feeley 1973). For many, judicial impact is 
synonymous with compliance with judicial orders (e.g. Horowitz 1977; Rosenberg 1991; Hall 
2011), to some judicial impact means transmission of Supreme Court precedent through the 
judicial hierarchy (e.g. Hansford and Spriggs 2006), while for others judicial impact 
encompasses things like spurring subsequent legal or political activism (e.g. McCann 1994; Keck 
2009). These disagreements have been further inflamed by divergent epistemologies and 
conceptions of the law itself among these different camps.  
 Rosenberg’s (1991) famous claim that the Court is but a “hollow hope” for reform-
minded activists opened up an exchange with McCann that would span the next five years 
(McCann 1992; Rosenberg 1992; McCann 1994; Rosenberg 1996; McCann 1996). In this 
exchange, Rosenberg (1996) argues that the disparate conclusions reached by he (and other 
positivists) and McCann (and other socio-legal scholars) come down to perceptions of whether 
the glass is half full or half empty. McCann famously responded that he “must respectfully 
disagree...Such an accounting—typically in quantitative images—obscures our qualitatively very 
different points of reference and terms of understanding the issues at stake; we are not viewing 
the same glass of water” (1996: 479).  
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This snippet from the McCann-Rosenberg exchange highlights two important differences 
in the then-mainstream impact literature and the socio-legal literature. First, the impact literature 
was, by the 1990s, largely quantitative, and thus took a positivist view of what “impact” could 
be—namely, it could be measured and counted. Socio-legal scholars, on the other hand, were 
frequently interested in forms of impact that do not lend themselves to easy measurement, such 
as changes in identity, legal consciousness, and the like. In other words, this difference was 
epistemological, which then implied divergent methodological approaches (McCann and March 
1996). Second, McCann points to a more fundamental difference in the two schools of thought: 
the positivist approach to the study of impact frequently misses “a wide range of arguably 
important, often unintended ‘effects’ of legal rulings” because it takes a top-down view of 
impact and ignores bottom-up forces (1996: 480; see also McCann 1994: 290-293). These effects 
are, in essence, downstream effects of law or legal decisions on the strategic choices of citizens, 
litigators, and interest groups, and on politics more generally. In this dissertation, I will argue 
that McCann is right: scholars motivated by questions of judicial impact or court power have 
long been looking at different glasses. Moreover, I argue that each glass that has been so far 
considered is in itself incomplete. Each comprehends an important aspect of Court power (and/or 
impact), but none has offered a complete and nuanced theory of Court power, because each 
ignores or marginalizes other important aspects of power. A truly general theory of Supreme 
Court power must comprehend all aspects of its power. Similarly, a general theory of judicial 
impact must comprehend the whole range of impacts that court decisions can have. To be clear, I 
am arguing that a necessary first step in the effort to gain clarity on questions of judicial power 
and impact, is to explicitly define both, and to clearly distinguish between the two.   
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My Argument 
 First, I argue that we should conceptualize judicial impact as all policy-relevant outcomes 
of judicial behavior. This understanding of judicial impact is intended to capture the full range of 
changes in policy that are attributable to Court decisions; in other words, to provide a 
comprehensive account of judicial influence on politics and policy. The very breadth of this 
conceptualization of impact raises its own set of problems, chiefly, the problem of specifying 
expectations regarding a wide range of impacts ex ante, and of rigorously studying a potentially 
huge variety of types of impact. Indeed, it may well be the case that is impossible to predict with 
any precision the full range of impacts that any given decision may have. Rather, we may have to 
settle for the far less satisfying recognition of the reality that the range of impacts a decision may 
have is contingent on numerous variables of political context, including the level of interest from 
political elites, the relevance of the decision to issues currently on the political agenda, the 
creativity of interested policy entrepreneurs, the activity of interest groups working in the area, 
and variations in the media cycle, to name a few.  
 While it may be impossible to predict the full extent of any given decision’s impact ex 
ante, it is still possible to predict some types of impacts of decisions. That is to say, there are 
basic features which all Court decisions share, and which can thus be used as a foundation for a 
theory of impact. Furthermore, some types of impacts are relatively common, such as responses 
from other political agents, which can help to guide theory-building as well. To this end, I 
contend that there are two sources of judicial impact, broadly speaking: the Court’s direct power 
to make policy, and the indirect influence that emanates from that power. The Supreme Court’s 
power is fundamentally the same in all of its decisions (even if political context can shape its 
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ability to effectuate that power)—as such, we can predict the impact of the Court’s direct power 
exercised in any give case.  
 Understanding the nature of the Court’s power is clearly central to this endeavor. Indeed, 
we cannot possibly understand or rigorously study judicial impact if we harbor inaccurate or 
incomplete theories of judicial power. The typical view of judicial power in the literature is 
coercive: the Court is powerful to the extent that it causes other actors to do things they would 
not otherwise have done. Most studies in the impact tradition have concluded that the Court is 
weak, then, because it frequently fails to cause outside actors to change their behavior in 
accordance with its orders. In contrast to most scholarship in the impact vein, however, I argue 
that the nature of the Court’s power is interpretive; the Court’s power is the power to say what 
the law is, what it means, and how it applies in concrete cases.2 In other words, this theory 
explicitly recognizes the fact that law is policy.  
Because written law is indeterminate, courts make policy when they interpret and flesh 
out law for application in particular cases. This power is especially important in the realm of 
constitutional law because the language of the Constitution is frequently ambiguous, and because 
many of its provisions are fundamentally contested. Thus the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
cases provide it ample opportunity to make policy. The very ambiguity of the constitution’s text 
means that the constitution-in-practice is shaped almost entirely by Supreme Court interpretation 
(of course Congress and the president frequently influence the Court’s decisions and 
interpretations in very meaningful ways). In this dissertation, I aim to show that the Court’s 
ability to give meaning to the Constitution, not its ability to change the behavior of non-court 
                                                 
2 In a way, it seems that this definition of Court power should be uncontroversial, as this is what generations of 
jurists and legal scholars considered the judicial power to be, at least until the Realist revolution of the early 
twentieth century. In any event, this theory is a significant departure from the theories of Court power that have 
dominated the empirical Public Law literature for the last 50 years or so.  
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actors, is its fundamental power. Moreover, I intend to show that this understanding of judicial 
power illuminates a wide range of outcomes of judicial decisions that have too frequently been 
omitted from academic discussions of judicial power.  
The theory advanced here improves upon compliance-based theories in two ways: first, it 
incorporates a far wider range of direct outcomes of judicial action than do the compliance 
oriented theories, and second, it provides leverage for understanding judicial power in all cases 
the Court decides. As I show in chapter two, the conventional compliance-oriented theories of 
judicial power consider only one type of power, and apply only to a very small subset of cases. 
As such, I argue that the power to induce compliance must be nested within a broader theory of 
judicial power. By extension, I argue that the study of compliance with judicial decisions that 
typifies the study of judicial impact needs to be nested within a wider-ranging study of the ways 
in which Court decisions alter policy in politics. Put differently, I do not argue that we should 
abandon compliance studies or attempts to theorize compliance with courts, but rather that we 
should recognize explicitly that compliance is only part of the story, and our efforts to theorize 
and study judicial power and impact must recognize that fact.  
In the following chapters I show that this conceptualization of judicial power as 
fundamentally interpretive provides substantial new leverage to understand the many ways that 
the Supreme Court shapes public policy and politics in the American political system. The most 
straightforward effect of this power is the direct policy changes that new interpretations of the 
law sometimes require. In other words, doctrine—legal policy—in many contexts is public 
policy that has direct and unambiguous effects on various groups and institutions in politics. For 
example, in its landmark decision in Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court 
reinterpreted the First Amendment, which is to say it created a new legal rule for deciding Free 
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Exercise cases; and it did so without formally overturning precedent or invalidating any statute. 
However, the simple act of reinterpreting the law of the First Amendment significantly altered 
the political landscape of Free Exercise—in particular, it made it much more difficult for 
individuals and groups bringing Free Exercise challenges in federal courts to win their cases. In 
practical terms, this means that Smith significantly expanded the scope of governmental authority 
to regulate public activities in ways that—at least arguably—impinge on some citizens’ religious 
liberty.  
 Even this brief example points to the importance of attending to the second source of 
judicial impact: the indirect influences Court decisions have on subsequent politics and policy 
development. Supreme Court decisions, including Smith, are only final insofar as there is no 
higher court to whom the losing litigant can appeal. There are a wide range of actors that have 
the ability to alter, mitigate, stymie, and even overturn Supreme Court decisions—but they can 
also entrench, expand, and build upon those decisions. That is to say Supreme Court decisions, 
even its landmark decisions, are just one component of the much larger politics of policy 
development in the American political system. Perhaps the Court’s most famous case of the 20th 
century, Brown v. Board of Education, did not begin nor end the process of desegregating public 
schools. Yet Brown was undoubtedly an important step in that process: implementation was 
imperfect and it led to backlash in parts of the old South, certainly, but it also directly resulted in 
desegregation in a large number of school districts around the country, and greatly energized 
subsequent activism as people continued the fight in the following years. A key argument that I 
advance in this dissertation, then, is that the full impact of Supreme Court decisions can only be 
observed by focusing on policy development itself, and then locating the Court’s influence 
within that developmental story.  
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 This approach to impact has a methodological implication: taking “the long view” is 
critical to understanding the full range and extent of judicial influence on policy and politics. Far 
too often impact studies take a “snapshot view” that emphasizes the environments or conditions 
under which Court decisions effectively alter the behavior of other actors. This approach to the 
study of the aftermath of Court decisions obscures or entirely misses important categories of 
outcomes of those decisions. In reality, politics are “moving pictures” of which snapshots can 
account for only a fraction. The growing movement toward a developmental study of politics and 
policy, which attends to dynamic, iterative, and conflictual nature of the American political 
system, reflects recognition of this fact. That is, by focusing on policy development over time, 
we can see how courts, legislatures, interest groups, and other actors interact to continually 
produce new politics and policies. 
 In light of the above observations, the theory advanced in this dissertation is supported by 
a wide variety of data sources, both primary and secondary. I examine judicial power and 
influence by situating a case or a series of cases within the context of the policy issue to which it 
speaks: rather than studying the impact of Furman v. Georgia, I study the impact of Supreme 
Court decisions on law and policy of capital punishment. By taking a developmental view, I am 
able to show how Court decisions influence policy immediately, but also how those decisions 
spark responses from Congress or politicking by interest groups, and how these responses from 
other actors and institutions themselves shape policy. Ultimately, by attending to the political 
push-and-pull between a wide range of actors in the policy arena, the approach offered here 
provides a more complete, more nuanced, and more realistic picture of the Supreme Court’s role 
in American politics.  
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The Plan of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation proceeds in two broad parts, which correspond to the two sources of 
judicial impact discussed above. In the first part of the dissertation I focus on Supreme Court 
power. I begin in chapter two by discussing existing theories of judicial power and judicial 
impact. I then offer a new synthesis of these bodies of scholarship, and contend that by 
integrating these works we can begin to see patterns of types of impacts from Supreme Court 
decisions. I then present my theory of judicial power and judicial impact, and contend that the 
approach offered here promises new insights into the role the Court plays in American politics. 
 I build on these arguments in chapter three by presenting a series of case studies aimed at 
explicitly demonstrating the limitations of the conventional approach and theories derived 
therefrom, and which in turn point to the utility of the theory offered here. Defending this theory 
of Court power requires a departure from the conventional approach to the study of impact. As 
discussed above, taking “the long view” is critical to understanding the full range and extent of 
judicial influence on policy and politics. The growing movement toward a developmental study 
of politics and policy, which attends to dynamic, iterative, and conflictual nature of the American 
political system, reflects recognition of this fact (Hacker and Pierson 2014; Keck 2014; Strother 
2017b). Here, by focusing on policy development over time, I show how courts, legislatures, 
interest groups, and other actors interact to continually produce new politics and policies. 
 Next, in chapter four, I tease out an implication of my theory: in brief, because the 
Supreme Court has substantial power to make policy by interpreting the law, it should be largely 
unconstrained in its decision-making on the merits of cases. I then test this hypothesis against a 
sample of more than six-thousand Supreme Court decisions, using both time-series and cross-
sectional econometric approaches. I conclude that the Court is much less constrained than most 
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leading studies have suggested. Indeed, I find that the Supreme Court is only significantly 
influenced in its decisions on the merits of cases in the context of judicial review of federal 
statutes, or when it issues highly salient decisions that cannot be implemented by lower courts. 
Taken together with chapter three, the findings from this first part of the dissertation strongly 
suggest that Public Law scholars have long been underestimating Supreme Court power.  
 In the second part of the dissertation I build on the arguments in chapter three regarding 
the importance of indirect judicial influence over policy in any study of judicial impact. I focus 
in this part of the project on one particularly important type of indirect influence: the Court’s role 
as a national agenda setter. I begin in chapter five by assessing the Court’s ability to influence 
the political agenda of the American public. This is accomplished by conducting time-series 
Box-Tiao intervention analyses on twenty sets of serial observations of media coverage on issues 
on which the Court issued at least one important decision. These analyses show that the Court 
regularly exerts significant influence over the public’s political agenda by increasing media 
attention to issues on which it speaks. Even so, my analyses of these significant Court 
interventions in the agenda do not get us very far down the road toward predicting which cases 
might have these import agenda-influencing effects ex ante.  
 In chapters six and seven, I turn my attention to the agenda of some of America’s 
policymakers. In chapter six, I examine Supreme Court influence on the agenda of the sitting 
president. I use a rare-events (Firth) logistic regression approach to show that the Supreme Court 
can and does significantly affect the president’s agenda in theoretically predictable ways: the 
political and legal importance as well as the salience of a given decision, and mobilizability of 
the larger issue all significantly increase the probability that a president will respond to a given 
decision. Importantly, putting issues on the president’s agenda can have important policy effects, 
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such as George H.W. Bush’s advocacy for what would ultimately become the Flag Protection 
Act of 1989.  
In chapter seven, I utilize qualitative content analysis to examine the influence of the 
Supreme Court on the official agendas of America’s two major political parties. The research 
presented in this chapter indicates that the parties tend to include Supreme Court decisions in the 
official agendas when doing so provides them with an opportunity to mobilize their base by 
reminding voters about the important policy stakes of Supreme Court decisions—and by 
extension, the importance of electing co-partisans to nominate and confirm justices. However, I 
also find that the parties respond to the Supreme Court differently, with Republicans being much 
more responsive than Democrats, especially over the last twenty years or so.  
 Taken together, chapters five, six, and seven indicate that the Supreme Court regularly 
influences the American political agenda, and does so in a number of different ways. These 
findings strongly suggest that agenda influence is a key pathway by which the Court indirectly 
influences public policy. Put differently, these chapters utilize a variety of methodological 
approaches and data sources to show that the Supreme Court has significant impact in American 
politics that is not directly attributable to outcomes of exercises of its power. I conclude this 
work in chapter eight: I summarize my findings, restate the argument, and draw out some of its 
key implications for the study of the Supreme Court, public policy making, and American 
politics more generally. 
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Chapter 2: 
A Theory of Judicial Power and Impact 
 
Judicial Impact and the Limits of Compliance Studies 
In many ways, the theories of judicial power that we have today are legacies of the 
historiography of judicial impact. The activism of the Warren Court in the 1950s induced many 
students of the Supreme Court to ask whether its landmark decisions early in the “Rights 
Revolution,” such as Brown v. Board of Education and Miranda v. Arizona, were having the 
real-world effects that liberals hoped for. Empirical studies of these questions became known as 
judicial “impact studies.” Decades worth of research in this tradition has taught us much about 
the conditions under which the Supreme Court of the United States is able to meaningfully alter 
public policy. Even so, the literature suffers from a number of significant limitations. Prominent 
among these is the tendency toward case studies focusing on unusual cases, in nearly all of 
which the Supreme Court has reversed a policy decision made by another state actor and issued a 
corresponding order (e.g. Sarat 1985; see generally Martens 2007). Additionally, the literature on 
impact has increasingly defined “impact” as essentially synonymous with behavioral compliance 
of non-court actors with judicial decisions (e.g. Rosenberg 1991; Hall 2011). In this dissertation, 
I argue that in order to advance our understanding of judicial impact, and to deepen our 
knowledge of the role of the Supreme Court in American politics, we must significantly broaden 
both our conceptualization of impact and the range of cases we study. Specifically, I argue that in 
order to fully appreciate the ways that the Court affects and influences American politics and 
policy we should define judicial impact as all policy-relevant effects of a given decision.  
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What is “Judicial Impact”? 
The Rights Revolution sparked significant scholarly interest in the real-world impact of 
Supreme Court decisions. As the study of impact developed, it increasingly came to be defined 
as essentially synonymous with “compliance.” Compliance studies typically formulate impact as 
follows: the Supreme Court ordered X, we should thus expect to see X in the real world; scholars 
would then look for X in the real world, and report the extent to which real-world political 
practice lived up to the dictates of the Court. These studies, then, interrogate the extent to which 
the Court is able to exercise power over the behavior of a wide range of political actors. 
For example, Birkby (1970) assessed the impact of Abington School District v. Shempp 
(1963), in which the Court held that mandatory religious activities in public schools violated the 
Establishment Clause, by surveying school administrators in Tennessee, asking whether they 
stopped holding school-sponsored Bible readings. Birkby found that fewer than half (51 of 121) 
of the districts in his sample altered their policies to comply with the Court’s ruling. Other 
notable examples of first-generation impact studies assessed the effects of Miranda v. Arizona on 
coercive interrogation tactics of local police (e.g. Seeburger and Wettick 1973; Wald, et al. 
1970), and the effects of Baker v. Carr (1962), Reynolds v. Sims (1964) and other landmark 
decisions on legislative districting (e.g. Hacker 1965; Erikson 1971; Hanson and Crew 1973). 
Many notable recent studies take this approach as well, including Rosenberg’s influential 
The Hollow Hope (1991; 2008), Sweet’s (2010) study of City of Richmond v. Croson (1989), and 
Hall’s (2011) study of the impact of fifty-four landmark Supreme Court decisions. The sum 
finding of these studies is rather mixed: some, such as Feeley and Rubin (1998) and Frymer 
(2003) argue that courts significantly shape policy outcomes, while others such as Sweet (2010), 
Silverstein (2007), and Gould (2005) demonstrate that actors responsible for implementation of 
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judicial decisions are frequently able to evade those rulings. Hall (2011) persuasively argues that 
the key insight of the compliance literature is that the Supreme Court is sometimes able to induce 
compliance with its decisions: it succeeds when its rulings can be implemented directly by lower 
federal courts or when the decision is not too unpopular amongst the public. Put differently, Hall 
(2011) describes the conditions under which the Court can successfully exercise power over 
different actors charged with implementing its decisions (see also Hall 2015; Hall and Windett 
2015). 
Hall’s (2011) study is persuasive with regards to the cases that it covers, but like many 
scholars studying compliance with judicial decisions, he only looks at cases in which the Court 
struck down some statute or practice on constitutional grounds. Such cases are undoubtedly 
important but they constitute only a fraction of the Court’s work. Cases in which the Court 
declines to exercise its power to impose constitutional limits on other state actors are also 
important and politically and legally consequential (Casper 1976). For example, the Court 
declined to strike down Oregon’s ban on the use of peyote in Employment Division v. Smith 
(1990), but in doing so affected a sea-change in free exercise doctrine and led to a decades-long 
battle with Congress over religious free exercise that produced several important policy changes, 
including the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). 
This emphasis on Court reversals of policies is probably attributable in large part to the 
disciplinary fascination with the “countermajoritarian difficulty” (Martens 2007), but it leaves a 
large fraction of the Court’s cases virtually untapped. In many studies in the compliance vein, 
scholars are interested at least in part in discerning the extent to which the presumptively non-
democratic Court can enforce its preferences in a democratic polity. This move has the 
unintended effect of blurring the line between judicial power on the one hand, and impact on the 
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other. This distinction merits discussion. Many scholars working in the compliance vein use the 
terms somewhat interchangeably; Hall (2011) on the other hand, is careful to frame his study as 
one of judicial power. Disentangling these important concepts is difficult because of the obvious 
valence between them. 
Here I define impact judicial impact as all policy-related consequences of a court 
decision. Supreme Court power—the ability to affect the decisions and behaviors of other 
institutions and actors—will clearly cause its decisions to have impact. That is, as Court power 
grows, so should grow the impact of is decisions, but the inverse is not necessarily true. Thus 
judicial impact is a concept that will encompass a wider array of real-world phenomena than will 
power; it allows for both direct and indirect effects, so long as they are policy-relevant. Blurring 
this line has caused some substantial degree of disagreement in the literature as to the efficacy of 
courts. As I will show in the following sections, many of the “gap” studies which purported to 
examine “impact” were actually examining Court power (a rather higher bar)—and when they 
found little or no power, declared that courts had little impact (e.g. Rosenberg 1991, 2008; Sweet 
2010). Many critics of these gap studies demonstrate the impact of courts by looking beyond 
power, focusing instead on second-order effects of decision, such as on mobilization of activists 
or influence on the political agenda (e.g. McCann 1994; Keck 2009). Hall’s (2011) study is 
commendable then, in that it rigorously explores Supreme Court power without yielding to the 
temptation to make broader claims about impact. Thus I turn next to establishing a definition of 
Supreme Court power, which is the necessary first step to establish a theory of judicial impact. 
The Nature of Supreme Court Power 
Power is a crucial concept in political science. The power of persons, groups, and 
institutions vis-à-vis other persons, groups, and institutions can be fairly said to animate virtually 
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all scholarly work in the study of politics. Students of the Supreme Court are no exception to this 
rule: a huge literature in the Public Law subfield seeks to understand the power the Court has to 
make or alter public policy (Keck 2014; Hall 2011; Rosenberg 2008; Frymer 2003; Becker and 
Feeley 1973). I depart from most works in the empirical Public Law literature in defining judicial 
power not as synonymous with compliance, but rather as fundamentally interpretive.  
Echoing Chief Justice Marshall’s famous line in Marbury v. Madison, I argue that the 
judicial power is in its essence the power “to say what the law is” (1803: 177; see also Pound 
1922). This power, even when used modestly, necessarily includes the power to legislate (that is, 
to create law) “‘incidentally and in a subsidiary way’ under the formula of declaring what the 
law is and forever has been” (Pound 1922: 790, quoting Thayer 1898: 319; see also Brutus XV). 
Put differently, the Court “legislates”—it creates law or makes policy—simply by authoritatively 
declaring what existing law (common, statutory, or constitutional) means. This understanding of 
the judicial power is couched in a recognition that written law is fundamentally indeterminate of 
a wide range of questions (Pound 1908; Cardozo 1921; Llewellyn 1931; see generally 
Whittington 1999a). Put differently, the law—whether it be the Constitution, Congressional 
statute, or some municipal ordinance—is incapable of providing objectively correct answers to 
all questions that might arise in practical application. This fundamental indeterminacy means that 
judges must make policy, even if only in a mundane way, when applying law to particular cases 
(Thayer 1898; Tamanaha 2006).  
To be clear, I am arguing that the nature of the Court’s power is to create authoritative 
legal rules—to announce the rule of law—which most often have binding precedential value. 
The legal rules developed by the Court in its Constitutional law decisions define the terms of the 
“constitution-in-practice,” and in doing so outline the boundaries of legitimate political authority 
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in the United States. Most “landmark” decisions involve some significant change in the rule of 
law as interpreted by the Supreme Court which alters the scope or balance of power in the 
American political system. For example, in Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court interpreted the 
Fourteenth Amendment as protective of a woman’s autonomy during the first trimester of 
pregnancy; in doing so, that decision prohibited governments around the country from interfering 
with her decisions regarding her pregnancy during that time. As a result of this new rule, the 
abortion policies of 46 states were upset, including many which were invalidated. However, it is 
very important to note that the Court can substantially alter legal policy without invalidating any 
statute or otherwise reversing the policy decisions of other units of government. Consider the 
example of Employment Division v. Smith: in that case, the Court significantly altered Free 
Exercise Doctrine by ruling that the First Amendment did not necessarily protect individuals 
from adverse effects of “neutral” and “generally applicable” laws in order to uphold an Oregon 
drug statute. In other words, the Smith Court substantially revised the law of Free Exercise and 
announced a wholly new legal rule for such cases even as it upheld the statute in question in the 
case. 
Thus I argue that the Court’s power to authoritatively interpret the law, and in doing so to 
create binding legal rules, is its fundamental power, and that any other power it might have is 
derived from or pursuant to this basic power. For example, the power to invalidate statutes (such 
as the restrictions on abortion discussed above) is simply the power to interpret the Constitution 
as not permitting some activity embodied in statute. The power to invalidate a statute is the 
strongest form of its interpretive power, but is not a wholly separate or distinctive thing from its 
general interpretative power (Barnett 2004b).  
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Furthermore, the power to compel implementation through lower courts is pursuant to 
this fundamental power; that is, the Court’s hierarchical control over the judiciary is not the 
nature of its power, but rather is a chief site of the implementation of its power. The extent of 
implementation or compliance with Court decisions (that is, the rules of law announced in those 
decisions) clearly speaks to the real-world impact of the Court, and has for this reason garnered 
much scholarly attention. But reliance on the compliance approach to develop theories of judicial 
power (e.g. Hall 2011; Rosenberg 2008) marks a subtle shift in focus that confuses the study. We 
must ask, what is it that lower courts (or even outside actors) are to comply with? The answer, of 
course, is the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the law, and the accompanying order regarding 
the execution of its decision. In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court interpreted the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments as a prohibition on capital punishment as it 
was then practiced, and thus ordered a moratorium on “imposition and carrying out of the death 
penalty” (1970: 239-240). In cases like Furman, compliance with the Court order is a reasonable 
proxy for compliance with the Court’s basic interpretation of the law. In Employment Division v. 
Smith, however, the Court interpreted the First Amendment’s free exercise clause as permitting a 
potentially wide range of legislation that could cramp individuals’ religious practices, so long as 
those laws were not written intentionally to harm religious practitioners. The only order issued in 
Smith was that federal courts use this interpretation of the free exercise clause (and the new 
doctrinal rule of “neutrality and general applicability”) in subsequent cases. 
To make the point in another way, imagine a Supreme Court that is the same in every 
way as the one we know except that it may not invalidate or nullify statutes. This hypothetical 
Court remains vested by Article III with “the judicial power” which is commonly understood to 
be the ability to interpret the law so as to apply it to particular disputes, and in doing so to set 
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precedent for future similar disputes. This counterfactual Court may still “say what the law is” up 
to the point of invalidating a statute. History demonstrates that this practice can be 
transformative (think of McCulloch v. Maryland, US v. Carolene Products, Wickard v. Filburn, 
Employment Division v. Smith, etc.; see for example, Ackerman 2014; Barnett 2004a; Gillman 
1992). Further, this counterfactual Court would still sit atop the federal judicial hierarchy, 
allowing it wide latitude to shape policy within the more distinctively juricentric sphere of 
policy, such as criminal procedure and rights of the accused. It could, for example, still 
command lower courts not to admit certain kinds of evidence, not to issue warrants under some 
given conditions, and the like (see, for example, Hall 2011; Westerland, et al. 2010; Songer, 
Segal, and Cameron 1994). Finally, take the perspective of a party to the case being decided: 
whether the Court can invalidate a statute or not, it will still definitively resolve the conflict at 
hand with one party winning and the other losing. This is a clear exercise of power, especially 
when one remembers that governments, including the national government, can lose a case 
without a statute being invalidated. 
Synthesizing Power and Impact to Understand the Supreme Court in American Politics 
 From the above discussion it should be clear that judicial power and judicial impact are 
fundamentally distinct, yet they correlate highly enough that it is valuable to theorize about and 
study them together. Indeed, the very term “power” implies impact. However, there are impacts 
of Court decisions that are directly attributable to the reality of the Court’s power, but that are 
not direct outcomes of exercises of that power. For example, legislative responses to Supreme 
Court decisions implicitly recognize the power the Court has over policy: if Court decisions were 
inefficacious or could be stripped of their force simply by being ignored, then legislatures would 
have little reason to expend scarce resources on response legislation.  
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Returning to the example of Employment Division v. Smith, it is clearly the case that the 
Court did not intend for Congress to statutorily overturn its decision and in doing so alter policy 
in the area of religious free exercise, which is to say that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
was not a product of the Court’s power over Congress. However, it is equally clear that RFRA 
was a direct response to the Court’s power to change policy itself. That is, RFRA was necessary, 
from the viewpoint of the 103rd Congress, precisely because the Court was able to significantly 
alter free exercise policy in Smith. Or to put it differently, the reality of the Court’s power to 
make policy necessitated a policy response from Congress. On this view, RFRA is attributable to 
the Court’s decision in Smith—it is an “impact” of the Smith decision—and it is directly 
traceable to the Court’s power to make policy. However, RFRA is not a direct outcome of the 
Court’s power to alter policy by interpreting the law. Rather, RFRA is a directly traceable 
second-order effect of the Court’s power. 
 The example of RFRA in response to the Court’s decision in the Smith case highlights 
some of the complications of the study of judicial impact. In Smith, the Court reinterpreted the 
requirements of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and in doing so, dramatically 
altered federal free exercise policy. Lower courts implemented the new doctrinal rule articulated 
by the Smith Court, making it much harder for free exercise claimants to win their cases in 
federal courts. This is the direct policy outcome of the Court’s interpretive power in this 
particular case: the Court’s power to interpret the law has direct, unambiguous impacts on real-
world policy (this case will be discussed at length, and this argument bolstered with empirical 
evidence, in chapter 3). As such, we can correctly speak of the “impact” of Supreme Court 
decisions in terms of the changes in policy articulated by the Court in its decisions. Such impacts 
are the necessary outcomes of exercises of Court power. Impact, as I have argued, is more than 
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just the necessary outcomes of exercises of judicial power, however. The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act illustrates the point. RFRA was a direct Congressional response to the Court’s 
Smith decision, but it was certainly not a necessary outcome of the Court’s interpretive power as 
exercised in Smith. Yet to define “impact” in such a way as to miss policy responses such as 
RFRA makes little sense, as such responses can profoundly influence politics and policy—and 
are directly traceable to the Court’s action. This reality points to the necessity of conceptualizing 
of impact as all policy-relevant outcomes, and to the importance of cleanly distinguishing 
between direct power and indirect impact. I further elaborate on these themes in the following 
section.  
Leading Alternative Theories of Supreme Court Power 
The power to reverse a policy decision made by another branch or unit of government has 
been aptly described as the Supreme Court’s “most potent” power (Keith 2008). It is perhaps 
also the Court’s most clearly observable power. The disciplinary fascination with the 
“countermajoritarian difficulty” has led scholars to disproportionately focus on cases in which 
the Court exercises this power to invalidate statutes or otherwise reverse policies, as they seem to 
represent the clearest instantiation of the Court’s power to act as a deviant institution in a largely 
democratic polity (Bickel 1962; Martens 2007; Friedman 2009; Hall 2016). These features have 
led compliance-oriented scholars to focus on these relatively rare but important actions, and to 
largely ignore many other operations of Court power which are subtler, but no less real. Scholars 
working in other research traditions have studied some of the other types of Court power, but 
have yet to integrate their insights into a comprehensive theory of Court power (see Gould and 
Barclay 2012).  
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 As noted above, compliance studies typically formulate judicial impact as follows: the 
Supreme Court ordered X, we should thus expect to see X in the real world; scholars would then 
look for X in the real world, and report the extent to which real-world political practice lived up 
to the dictates of the Court. As such, the compliance formula, as I call it, interrogates the extent 
to which the Court is able to exercise power over a wide range of political actors. Five-plus 
decades of research in this vein demonstrates that the Court is sometimes able to induce 
compliance with its decisions.  
Hall (2011) persuasively argues that the Court succeeds in inducing compliance when its 
rulings can be implemented directly by lower federal courts or when the decision is not too 
unpopular among the public at large.3 This approach, for all that it has taught us, can provide at 
best a partial picture of Court power, however: the compliance formula can only work if the 
Court issues an order requiring an actor to alter its behavior in an observable way—if this 
condition is not satisfied, “compliance” becomes non-falsifiable. As such, this approach can 
speak only to a fraction of the Court’s decisions: those in which it invalidates a statute or 
practice, or those in which it significantly alters precedent. Additionally, prior works in 
numerous scholarly traditions have documented a huge array of downstream effects of court 
decisions which are missed entirely by the compliance approach, even in cases to which the 
formula can be applied (Dahl 1957b; Scheingold 1974; Casper 1976; Brigham 1987a; McCann 
1994; Melnick 1994; Barnes 2004; Keck 2009; see generally Keck and Strother 2016). Unless 
none of these effects are attributable to Court power, then the compliance approach clearly 
considers only a limited portion of the Supreme Court’s power. 
 
                                                 
3 One can reasonably question whether “power” is appropriately invoked if compliance depends on popularity in 
some category of cases.  
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Why the Focus on Compliance? 
The compliance orientation of much of the judicial impact literature seems to be borne of 
Hamilton’s famous claim in the 78th Federalist, that the Court “may be truly said to have neither 
FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the 
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments” (Rossiter 2003: 464). That is, Hamilton 
claimed that the Supreme Court would be the “least dangerous” branch because it lacked the 
power to enforce its decisions. Compliance studies seek to test Hamilton’s thesis (Horowitz 
1977; Rosenberg 2008; Hall 2011).  
Hamilton’s claim is at least partially right: it is true that the Court’s fundamental power is 
“judgment.” As an empirical matter, however, it is not the case that the Court is wholly 
dependent on outside actors for implementation of its judgments. In Hamilton’s defense, the 
literature on judicial power suggests he may actually have been correct in his observation at the 
time that he made it: leading works on Court power strongly suggest that the Court’s chief source 
of implementation power comes from its substantial hierarchical control over lower federal 
courts (Hall 2011; Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994; Lax 2003; Westerland, Segal, Epstein, 
Cameron, and Comparato 2010). When Hamilton made his claim no lower federal courts yet 
existed, as the then-prospective Constitution only provided for a “supreme Court” (though it did 
vest Congress with the power to create lower federal courts; see generally Crowe 2012). In short, 
a key source of the Supreme Court’s power to induce compliance comes from its hierarchical 
control over lower federal courts; that being the case, Hamilton’s famous claim may well have 
been correct when he made it, as the Court had (and still has) no power to force Congress or the 
president to enforce its judgments. A key takeaway here, though, is that the Court does have 
substantial hierarchical control over lower federal courts, and thus it can enforce its own 
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decisions insofar as the legal rules it announces are binding on lower courts. To restate the 
argument: the nature of Supreme Court power is the power to interpret the law; the Court’s 
ability to ensure implementation of its interpretations is contingent on its hierarchical control 
over the federal judiciary.  
The Court’s basic interpretive power is distinct from its power to force other actors to 
comply with its judgments or implement its orders. A large literature in policy studies 
interrogates implementation of policies (e.g. Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Van Meter and Van 
Horn 1975; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983). Mazamanian and Sabatier define implementation 
simply as “[t]he carrying out of basic policy decisions” (1983: 20).4 That is, these studies are 
concerned with “the degree to which the actions of implementing officials and target groups 
coincide with the goals embodied in an authoritative decision” (Matland 1995: 146). A 
substantial body of scholarship in the implementation tradition has found that “street-level” 
actors are often able to shape policy-in-action to a substantial degree (May and Winter 2009; 
Canon and Johnson 1999; Matland 1995; Lipsky 1980; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). As such, 
I argue that compliance studies tell us less about the nature of Supreme Court power than they 
do about the nature of policy implementation in a complex state with separated institutions. Few 
scholars, for example, point to the imperfect implementation of legislation, such as of the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as evidence that Congress is impotent; rather, they 
typically point to various principal-agent problems in explaining limited compliance (e.g. 
Cortner 1976; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973).  
                                                 
4 Another related issue with the judicial compliance literature is highlighted by the implementation literature in 
Policy Studies. The top-down approach to judicial compliance has two key problems: it focuses on the Court 
decision as the starting point (without considering how pre-existing policy might condition/constrain/influence 
implementation); and compliance studies emphasize the Court as the key actor, and ignore the discretion of street-
level implementers (see generally Matland 1995). 
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In short, a key motivation of the compliance literature is to address the “so what” 
question in the study of the courts. If Hamilton is right that the Court cannot enforce its 
decisions, then the countermajoritarian question may not be all that important. Put differently, if 
the Court is beholden to outside actors for the force of its decisions, then the content of those 
decisions is of relatively less importance than if the Court can unilaterally impose its will. If 
Hamilton is wrong, however, and the Court does have some degree of power to see its decisions 
implemented, then the content of its decisions, the processes by which it arrives at those 
decisions, etc., are crucially important to the broader study of American politics. To put it very 
clearly, I am arguing here that compliance with judicial decisions is important, but that 
compliance is not “the judicial power.” Rather, compliance is tied up with questions of 
implementation, which is a notable concern for all units of government. Compliance with 
Supreme Court decisions has important normative and empirical implications, but both are 
incidental to its more fundamental power, which is the power to interpret the law and create 
binding legal rules.  
Problems with the “Power Over” View 
 There are significant theoretical and empirical problems with a theory of Supreme Court 
power based entirely on the Court’s ability to induce compliance. First, as noted above, the 
compliance approach typically elides the basic distinction between power and policy 
implementation. Theoretically, scholars have long pointed to numerous types, or faces, of power, 
which operate in distinct ways. Empirically, large and well developed literatures have pointed 
more or less directly to types of Court power that are wholly distinct from its ability to induce 
compliance. I take up both varieties of problems in turn.  
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 Power is a concept that is notoriously difficult to pin down (Baldwin 1989). Early power 
analysts viewed power as the ability of one actor to make decisions or control outcomes that 
affect another actor (Dahl 1957a; Nagel 1975). Scholars soon pointed out that this was an overly 
narrow conception of power, and highlighted its other “faces” which are subtler and perhaps 
more invidious (Schattschneider 1960; Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Lukes 1974; Gaventa 1982). 
The “first face” of power is typically formulated as “power over” or “power to.” Dahl’s classic 
formulation of power fits this mold: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do” (1957a: 203). Jack Nagel defines power in a similar 
fashion: “A power relation, actual or potential, is an actual or potential causal relation between 
the preferences of an actor regarding an outcome and the outcome itself” (1975: 29). In short, 
first face power consists of an actor’s ability to shape behavior. Because exercises of first face 
power tend to be fairly explicit (A issues an order), and its operation is generally observable (B 
complies or does not), analyses of first face power relations tend to be relatively easy. It is this 
face of power which compliance studies examine: can the Court (A) unilaterally cause some 
other actor (B)—a police force, a school board, a lower court—to change its behavior? 
The “second face” of power is subtler; it is the ability to define (or confine) the scope of 
decision-making—it is power over the political agenda. In their classic essay on power, 
Bachrach and Baratz note “Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of 
decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or 
reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the 
political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous 
to A” (1962: 948). Put differently, second face power is the power to act as a veto point before 
outright contest occurs—and is thus perhaps the surest way to preserve the status quo. Or as 
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Schattschneider puts it, “All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the 
exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organization is the 
mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out,” 
(1960: 71). Schattschneider goes so far as to argue that the definition of alternatives is the 
“supreme instrument of power” (1960: 68). 
An example of the operation of the Court’s “second face” power can be seen in the 
failure of the Religious Liberty Protection Act. Despite significant pressure from interest groups 
to act in response to the Court’s invalidation of RFRA as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. 
Flores, the RLPA died in the Senate Judiciary Committee, as committee members were divided 
over the constitutionality of the act in light of the Court’s recent federalism decisions (Boerne v. 
Flores, Printz v. United States; United States v. Lopez).5 In introducing the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Senator Orrin Hatch noted that “Our bill deals with 
just two areas where religious freedom has been threatened—land use regulation and persons in 
prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes and similar institutions. …It is no secret that I would 
have preferred a broader bill than the one before us today. Recognizing, however, the hurdles 
facing passage of such a bill, supporters have… agreed to move forward on this more limited, 
albeit critical, effort” (Congressional Record S7774, July 27, 2000). In short, despite broad 
support for the substance of the proposed RLPA, proponents of that act settled on the much 
narrower RLUIPA in light of concerns that RLPA would not survive judicial scrutiny. Put 
differently, members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and then members of Congress more 
                                                 
5 Like RFRA, the RLPA would have required courts to use the strict scrutiny standard outlined in Sherbert v. Verner 
(1963). Senators seemed largely unworried about the possibility of RLPA of being construed as protecting racial or 
ethnic discrimination, as the Court had previously recognized that preventing discrimination on those lines 
constitutes a compelling state interest. Sexuality, and to a lesser extent, gender, raised a harder question for 
proponents of RLPA). Additionally, it should be noted that some groups raised concerns about the RLPA’s 
implications for gays and lesbians. 
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generally, adopted RLUIPA instead of RLPA at least in part because they rationally anticipated 
the likely outcome of subsequent judicial review of the legislation. In this case, at least, it 
appears that they anticipated rightly, as the RLUIPA was unanimously upheld by the Supreme 
Court in Cutter v. Wilkinson (2005).  
Another example of a somewhat different type of second face operation of the Court’s 
power can be seen in the flip-side of the Court’s “passive virtues” (see generally Bickel 1962). 
Staszak (2015) demonstrates that over the last forty years there has been a dramatic decline in the 
number of civil rights class action lawsuits filed, and in the number of civil rights cases that 
reach trial in federal courts. She argues that this precipitous drop is directly attributable to 
“judicial retrenchment”—reforms internal and external to the judiciary which seek to alter 
institutional rules to constrict access to the courts (Staszak 2015: 5-6). She offers an example in 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Betty Dukes, et al. (2011), holding that 
the group of all women employed in Wal-Mart stores nationwide lacked the “commonality” 
necessary for class certification. This decision highlights the power the Court has to “confine the 
scope of decisionmaking” by bounding the set of cases (that is, the type of disputes) that can be 
raised in courts around the nation. Numerous bodies of Supreme Court doctrine, including those 
respecting standing and class certification at issue in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, allow the Court to 
organize some issues out of the realm of judicial contestation, to borrow from Schattschneider.  
Scholars critiquing the compliance genre have documented a number of effects of Court 
decisions that can be understood as operations of second face power. For example, Scheingold 
(1974) argues that court victories serve as catalysts for political mobilization. An observed 
victory may embolden potential activists by endowing them with purpose and confidence. 
Similarly, McCann argues that federal courts generally lacked the will and the capacity to correct 
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discriminatory wage practices, but that legal norms “significantly shaped the terrain of the 
struggle... [and] that litigation and other legal tactics provided movement activists an important 
resource for advancing their cause” (1994: 4). For McCann, legal mobilization occurs when 
members of a social movement, sharing a general legal consciousness, understand their rights to 
have been violated and thus utilize courts as at least part of their strategy to fight policy battles 
and advance their goals (see also Zemans 1983). With respect to the pay equity movement in 
particular, McCann argues that “legal rights discourse provided reform activists with a 
compelling normative language for identifying, interpreting, and challenging the unjust logic of 
wage discrimination”; and that movement litigation served as an important tactical resource to 
raise expectations among working women that wage reform was possible (McCann 1994: 48). 
Legal challenges in state courts served most importantly to raise consciousness and offer a 
course for action, and were cited as highly important by movement activists in both these regards 
despite the failure of any of these cases to win past the trial-court level (McCann 1994: 74-77). 
Scholars have made similar claims in studies of a wide range of issue domains, consistently 
finding that both victories and defeats in court can spur subsequent activism (McCann 1992; 
O’Brien 1996; Kelly and Dobbin 1999; Keck 2004b; Andersen 2006; Keck 2009). 
A separate body of scholarship has examined the many ways the Supreme Court interacts 
with Congress and the president. Dahl (1957a) famously argued that the Court was a political 
institution that routinely makes policy in concert with the dominant governing coalition. Some 
Court decisions come to pass because legislators punt hot-button or otherwise costly issues to the 
judiciary (Graber 1993; Whittington 2005). Similarly, elected officials might seek to consolidate 
or entrench legislative policies in the Court (Gillman 2002). Or courts and their decisions may 
simply serve the general electoral and political interests of legislators (Powe 2009; Engel 2011; 
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Crowe 2012). In short, the “political branches” routinely seek to capture and utilize judicial 
power for their own ends—though they do so at some risk (Whittington 2005). And in fact, the 
Court regularly exercises its power in ways that upset the coordinate branches. The fact that 
Congress or the president respond to the Court’s decisions suggests that those branches 
understand and appreciate the significance of the Court’s power—and those responses point to 
ways in which its power operates.  
Because the Court is a potent policymaking institution, the elected branches must take its 
decisions seriously. Most scholars agree that the justices of the Supreme Court rationally 
anticipate reactions to prospective decisions by Congress, and thus rarely issue decisions that 
they think are likely to provoke Congressional responses (Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 
2011; Clark 2009; Harvey and Friedman 2009; Harvey and Friedman 2006; Ferejohn and Shipan 
1990). That Congress or the president might rationally anticipate Court action is less appreciated. 
Further, the fact that Congress frequently responds to the Court’s decisions by altering policy 
(Blackstone 2013; Barnes 2004; Pickerill 2004; Eskridge 1991) does not suggest that the Court is 
impotent—only that it, like Congress and the president, does not have a free hand to make or 
alter policy, but rather that it operates in a separated institutional context in which it shares 
power over policy with the other branches. In other words, scholars have too often inferred that 
the Court has little or no institutional power simply because it does not have absolute power to 
shape public policy. 
 Lukes (1974) extended the argument of Bachrach and Baratz by identifying a third face 
of power which operates even more subtly, and as such, is even more difficult to neatly observe, 
measure, and analyze. Third-face power is the ability to manipulate others by altering their 
attitudes or preferences. Gaventa (1982) argues that third-face power can be observed when 
36 
 
people are unaware of their own interests. Such power takes the form that A exercises power 
over B when A convinces B that B’s interests are the same as A’s interests. The Marxian 
formulation of this face of power as offered by Lukes and Gaventa amounts in its essence to 
false consciousness. A major empirical problem is presented by the normative assumptions of 
both Lukes’ and Gaventa’s formulations of this form of power: both require the researcher (or 
theorist) to know what other people (i.e. “B”) really ought to want. That is, study of this face of 
power would have researchers infer its operation whenever some party B believes some thing Y 
is in her interests when the researcher believes that Y is not in B’s best interest. For example, a 
Lukesian might conclude that low-income, religious whites who affiliate with the Tea Party are 
acting against their own interests by resisting downwardly redistributive social policies, and thus 
infer that they are operating on the basis a false ideology (that is, that they’ve been had by A’s 
third-face power). Research in this vein requires that the researcher have some normative 
baseline developed ex ante against which to judge the beliefs of others. In the example above, it 
is taken for granted that redistributive policies would benefit low-income Tea Partiers, and thus 
that their stated beliefs in free enterprise and government non-intervention are invalid. In short, 
study of this third face of power assumes the priority of the researcher’s normative biases.  
I argue, however, that the Marxian overtones of Lukes and Gaventa notwithstanding, 
their insights into the nature of power relations can be fruitfully used to inform our 
understanding of Supreme Court power.6 Specifically, I argue that it is not necessary to assume 
                                                 
6 As the above literature suggests, some of these classic accounts view power primarily as interactive, or agentic, 
while others view it as relational, or constitutive. The former is often referred to as “power over” – that is, that 
which points to the exercise of control over others; the latter is often referred to as “power to” – which emphasizes 
“how social relations define who actors are and what capabilities and practices they are socially empowered to 
undertake” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 466). These fundamental ontological differences in what power is suggest 
different ways to observe its effects. Those taking the interactive view look for the effects of power in terms of the 
behavior of the object of that power (e.g. Dahl 1957a). Those taking the constitutive view see power as producing 
effects in terms of the identities of individuals (or perhaps groups) occupying social positions (e.g. Gaventa 1982). 
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that some decision caused people to have the “wrong” interest, but instead, one can document 
how a Supreme Court decision altered the way that people think about issues, policies, or 
themselves without respect to any normative benchmark. In this formulation, one does not have 
to infer any sort of false consciousness, or “false ideology” (patriotism, capitalism, etc.) 
operating on individuals. Rather, one conceptualizes the ideology of the Supreme Court itself to 
be the ideology which acts upon the affected individuals. By “ideology of the Supreme Court” I 
do not mean how conservative or how liberal the Court is (in the conventional realist-
attitudinalist sense), but rather that the Court’s own institutional aura, its public legitimacy, is the 
relevant ideology. Brigham (1987) calls this “the cult of the Court.” I contend that one could 
infer the operation of this “ideology of the Court” when public opinion moves toward the Court’s 
position after it announces a decision, when individuals internalize the Court’s holding, or when 
individuals accept a policy outcome they disagree with precisely because the Court announced it. 
And the operation of this legitimacy can be seen, though not expressed in these terms, in the 
literature above. Brigham (1987), McCann (1992), Bumiller (1992), and others, are clearly 
seeking to understand how law influences individuals’ and groups’ identities, and the ways that 
they interact with outside actors.  
Similarly, a long-standing literature on “judicial legitimation” suggests that the Court can 
significantly influence public opinion about issues on which the Court speaks, and can influence 
public acquiescence to policies with which people disagree (e.g. Easton 1965; Jaros and Roper 
                                                 
There are other difficulties in the study of power. For example, much agenda setting power appears to be accidental 
(or at least, incidental) – which raises the question of intentionality (i.e., does an outcome have to be an intended 
outcome to constitute an act of power?).  Baldwin (1989) argues that the study of power is difficult, and afflicted 
with many apparent analytical paradoxes. Even so, he argues that there is a core of agreement of among “large 
numbers of power analysts” that includes: 1) agreement that power should be treated as a relationship between two 
actors, not a property of one of them; 2) agreement that “the bases of powers are many and varied”; and 3) 
agreement that “power is a multidimensional phenomenon that varies in scope, weight, domain, and cost” (Baldwin 
1989: 3). 
38 
 
1980; Tyler and Rasinski 1991; Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Mondak 1994; Gibson, Caldeira, and 
Spence 2005; Bartels and Mutz 2009; Gibson, Lodge, and Woodson 2014; Christenson and 
Glick 2015; Linos and Twist 2016). In short, I argue that diverse literatures suggest that the 
Court can powerfully affect individual and group opinions, identities, and behavior; and that 
understanding these effects of judicial action as manifestations of the Court’s power (operating 
in the “third face”) allows us to think systematically about these effects, and to incorporate them 
into the broader study of judicial power (that is, synthesizing them with the “first-” and “second-
face” instantiations of Court power).  
The literature discussed above points to a key conclusion: the Supreme Court’s 
fundamental power, which is to interpret the law, has multiple “faces.”  This power operates in 
the first face, as the compliance literature demonstrates, when it requires other actors, including 
lower courts, to alter their behavior by implementing new legal rules and, occasionally, more 
explicit policy ramifications of those rules. The second face of the Court’s power can be seen 
when the Court influences the decisions of other institutions or precludes certain kinds of 
challenges from being heard, by restricting standing, for example. Finally, the Court’s power to 
interpret the law operates in the third face when it shapes individuals’ or groups’ opinions, 
identities, and decisions to participate in politics. Importantly, it should be noted that a decision 
can do all of these things simultaneously—and that the effects of power operations in one face 
may interact with operations in another face. For example, by restricting standing the Court not 
only restricts some cases from being heard, but may also influence individuals’ willingness to 
make rights-based claims, or even to think of their situation in terms of right and remedy. In 
short, I argue that these empirical literatures map on to the three faces of power reasonably well, 
and as such, they point to a promising avenue forward in the study of the nature of judicial 
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power, in that this perspective allows us to synthesize largely disparate understandings of the 
Court, and to systematize the wide range of effects caused by Court action. 
Empirical Problems with Alternative Theories of Court Power 
 With these theoretical shortcomings noted, I now turn to some of the empirical problems 
with a theory of Court power rooted in an external (non-court) policy-compliance (or a limited 
first-face power) perspective.7 Compliance studies are essentially “actor success” models of 
policy change (see generally Grossmann 2014). Actor success models “focus on how 
circumstances might influence the success of the particular actor[]” in obtaining some desired 
policy change (Grossmann 2014: 155; see also Matland 1995). This approach is problematic for 
two primary reasons. First, understanding policymaking in the US requires attention to 
interactions among numerous actors over time, as no single actor can unilaterally make policy 
(Grossmann 2014; Hacker and Pierson 2014; Keck 2014; Barnes 2007). Second, this approach 
implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) assumes that Supreme Court justices are motivated 
primarily by their desire to make public policy. As such, compliance studies have generally 
assumed that the practice of judicial review is fundamentally undemocratic, and that the Court 
exercises that power in order to shift policy toward its own preferences. Much scholarship in the 
area of judicial politics, though, has shown that Justices have many motivations, of which policy 
is only one: justices also care about the law, about doing their job well, about their party, and 
even about their prospective historical legacies (e.g. Bybee 2010; Keck 2007; Pacelle, Marshall, 
and Curry 2007; Keck 2004a; Clayton and Gillman 1999). Finally, the compliance approach 
assumes that the principal component of a judicial decision is the order the Court issues which 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that there may be even more empirical problems with second- and third-face power perspectives, 
as many operations of power (or elements of power) in these faces may be fundamentally unobservable (see 
Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Anzia and Jackman 2013).  
40 
 
requires some actor to change its behavior in an observable way (e.g. to stop condemning 
convicts under constitutionally invalid capital punishment statutes in Furman v. Georgia). This 
move, however, assumes that the Court is only exercising power when it invalidates a statute or 
reverses a policy decision.  
With respect to the compliance literature, the first point means that such studies are 
myopic, or that they set an extremely high standard by which to judge the Court, because they 
will only find compliance (and thus “impact” or “power” depending upon the author) when the 
Court succeeds, for some period of time, in unilaterally altering policy. The second point 
suggests that the assumption that the Court was necessarily motivated by a desire to change 
policy is off-center: even if the Court did change policy (such as by invalidating a statute), it 
does not follow that changing the policy, for example, by striking down the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act as it applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, was the proximal goal 
motivating the decision. Rather, it may well be that the Court majority’s fundamental goal in 
Boerne was to assert the Court’s preeminence in constitutional interpretation, and that 
invalidation of RFRA was somewhat incidental to that primary goal. This does not mean, of 
course, that a compliance study of the Boerne decision is in some sense wrong, or unhelpful, but 
only that assuming in general that the proximal policy outcome of cases is the most important 
outcome (to the justices, to the Court as a whole, or as a general matter) is problematic. The final 
point suggests that theories of Court power derived from compliance-oriented studies are 
inherently biased because they cannot account for Court power outside of the context of judicial 
review.  
To take another example, consider Pickerill’s (2004) account of United States v. Lopez 
(1995). In Lopez, a 5-4 Court invalidated the Gun Free School Zones Act (GFSZA) on the 
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grounds that the mere possession of a gun within a single state cannot be considered interstate 
commerce. Pickerill (2004) persuasively argues that the primary goal of the justices in the 
majority in Lopez was to find a limit to Congress’ commerce power—not to make it easier to 
possess guns in school zones (2004: 116-131). And indeed, Congress modestly modified the 
GFSZA in 1996, preserving all of the policy features of the original statute but stipulating that 
the government must prove that the firearm “moved in or the possession of such firearm 
otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce.”8 The Court has allowed this modified version 
of the GFSZA to stand for two decades, strongly suggesting that the constitutional question, and 
not the particular gun policy, was the key focus of the justices in the majority. These cases 
demonstrate that the actor success approach that compliance studies typify is misguided, in both 
its assumptions about the nature of judicial decisions, and its assumptions about the nature of 
policy change in the American political system. 
In sum, I have argued that existing approaches to the study of judicial impact have taught 
us much about the real-world consequences of judicial decisions. A number of scholars have 
demonstrated that the Court can directly cause (Frymer 2003; Feeley and Rubin 1998) or 
significantly influence (Keck 2009; Grossmann and Swedlow 2015) major changes in public 
policy. More recently, we have begun to develop a fuller understanding of the particular political 
contexts in which such Court-induced policy change is possible or likely (Hall 2011; Grossmann 
and Swedlow 2015). Additionally, many scholars have shown ways in which judicial actions 
indirectly influence policy developments by provoking responses from other political institutions 
                                                 
8 Public Law 104-208, 110 Statute 3009 (1996). 
See also: President Bill Clinton, “Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation to Amend the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990,” May 10, 1995. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American 
Presidency Project.  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51344. 
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(Pickerill 2004), spurring (or quashing) subsequent litigation and activism (McCann 1994; 
Andersen 2006; Bennett 2017), and even by influencing public opinion on important policy 
questions (Franklin and Kosaki 1989; Christenson and Glick 2016).  
The problem, I have argued, is not so much lack of attention to some key aspect of 
judicial impact on politics, but rather that each of the literatures referenced above has developed 
more-or-less independently from each of the others. As a result, we have today a number of 
robust bodies of scholarship that examine Court power and influence in some particular domain, 
but which are almost entirely self-referential. In one important sense, the goal of this dissertation 
is synthetic: I intend to bring together the theoretical and empirical insights of these generally 
disparate literatures in order to shed new light on the nature of judicial power and scope of 
judicial impact in American politics. By synthesizing the prevailing approaches to judicial 
impact I will show the utility—as well as the limitations—of each approach; in doing so, I will 
make the claim that for all their contributions, the existing approaches to the study of judicial 
impact have failed to produce a general theory of Supreme Court power (or impact). Providing 
such a theory is the chief goal of this project.  
A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Impact 
I have argued that the limitations of existing theories of judicial power in the empirical 
literature stem from two primary sources. First the conventional, compliance-based mode of 
study excludes types of power that are orthogonal to compliance, such as agenda influence or 
control. Further, these studies have frequently fixated on only one aspect of a judicial decision—
the “order”—and ignored how changes in legal policy (doctrine) themselves can profoundly 
influence policy on the ground. Second, the method and focus of the compliance approach 
discounts judicial power in non-invalidation cases (i.e. in the majority of Supreme Court cases); 
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and even with respect to the cases for which it works, the compliance approach cannot capture a 
huge range of downstream effects of judicial power, such as responses from other branches, 
subsequent interest group action, or changes in public opinion, even though these effects are 
often traceable to the Court’s decision. The many existing critiques of the compliance literature 
have rightly pointed out the limitations of compliance studies, but have yet to offer a compelling 
theory of judicial power or impact that could supplant the compliance theories.  
To conclude this chapter I will briefly restate the argument and describe the expected 
payoff of the proposed theoretical perspective. First, I have argued that the fundamental power of 
the Supreme Court is the power to interpret the law, and in doing so, to create binding legal 
rules. Second, but relatedly, I have argued that scholars should understand judicial impact as all 
policy-relevant effects of judicial action. The definitions offered explicitly differentiate between 
two cognate concepts that have been frequently muddled in the extant literature, and thus allow 
us to theoretically and empirically distinguish between the two. Moreover, the definitions 
provided are intended to synthesize the diverse insights that scholars working in a variety of 
research traditions have generated regarding the impact of judicial decisions. In doing so, I hope 
also that these conceptualizations of Court power and impact will lay the foundation for a new 
generation of judicial impact scholarship. 
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Chapter 3: 
Supreme Court Power and Impact 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that existing bodies of scholarship concerning 
compliance with judicial orders, transmission of legal precedent, and Court-induced activism and 
opinion change all point to aspects of judicial power and judicial impact. In this chapter I begin 
the task of demonstrating the utility of the theoretical and empirical perspective outlined in the 
previous chapter, as well as the limitations of existing alternative perspectives on judicial power 
and impact. Here I focus especially on the literature on judicial compliance, because it represents 
the historical genesis of the study of judicial impact, and because compliance today remains the 
dominant mode of the empirical study of real-world effects of judicial behavior.  
In this chapter I will show that the prevailing mode of studying both judicial impact and 
judicial power—the study of compliance with judicial decisions—is significantly limited in ways 
that have not been previously appreciated. Critics of the compliance approach have long noted 
that there are other “types” of impact that are not adequately captured by the compliance 
approach. Here, however, I argue that these critics have at once gone too far and not far enough 
in their critique of this literature: they have gone too far in rejecting this approach and its insights 
outright; yet they have stopped short of identifying the fundamental limitations of that approach. 
I agree with critics of the compliance approach that there is far more to judicial impact than 
compliance can comprehend—but I do so, at least at first, by assessing the compliance approach 
on its own terms. To this end, I show that the compliance approach relies, however implicitly, on 
a methodological approach that provides little to no analytical leverage on outcomes in the 
majority of Supreme Court decisions. At the same time, the case studies presented in this chapter 
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demonstrate that focusing on the Court’s ability to shape legal rules via its interpretive power 
greatly expands the applicability of the compliance approach. I then show that even in the cases 
to which the compliance formula can be fruitfully applied, it accounts for only a fraction of the 
politically relevant outcomes of Court action. As such, even the refocused understanding of 
power that I defend here points to the need for a broader understanding of judicial impact.  
In this chapter I defend these arguments in several parts. I first walk through the logic of 
the compliance approach to the study of power and impact in order to show that compliance 
studies consider only judicial power and not broader judicial impact, and that they do so for only 
a limited range of Supreme Court cases. I then argue that by shifting focus to legal rules, the 
scope of the compliance approach can be greatly expanded, and indeed can speak to Supreme 
Court power in all of its decisions. I then present five case studies which concretely demonstrate 
both the utility and the limitations of compliance studies, even given my broadened 
conceptualization of compliance. The case studies also show that there are a wide range of 
downstream effects of Supreme Court decisions which cannot be captured by the concept of 
compliance; in other words, they show the need for a broader theory of impact than compliance 
can provide. I conclude with a discussion of the findings, and their implications for the study of 
judicial power and judicial impact.  
The Limited Applicability of the Compliance Formula 
The compliance approach, discussed at length in chapter two, remains the dominant mode 
of studying judicial impact, though the sum of the findings of research in this vein is quite 
inconsistent. This approach, for all that it has taught us, can provide at best a partial picture of 
Court power, however: the compliance formula can only work if the Court issues an order 
requiring an actor to alter its behavior in an observable way—if this condition is not satisfied, 
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compliance becomes non-falsifiable. As such, this approach can speak only to a fraction of the 
Court’s decisions: those in which it invalidates a statute or practice, or those in which it 
significantly alters precedent. This defect in the approach has not been noticed, it seems, because 
the vast majority of self-described impact studies consider only judicial review cases.9 
 Hall (2011) synthesizes existing accounts of impact and persuasively argues that the 
Court succeeds in inducing compliance when its rulings can be implemented directly by lower 
federal courts or when the decision is not too unpopular among the public at large. Even so, 
Hall’s (2011) study of Court power is limited by its focus on constitutional invalidations (see 
also Casper 1976). Goldman’s (2005) study of landmark cases identified twenty-eight cases in 
which the Court invalidated a statute or practice, and twenty-five in which it upheld the statute or 
practice at issue. Similarly, Hall’s (2011) “two-sweeps” approach generates a list of two-
hundred-three “landmark cases,” of which at least sixty-five are validations of challenged 
statutes.10 In short, in two key studies aiming to identify landmark constitutional decisions, 
between one-third and one-half of the cases identified are judicial validations of statutes or 
practices. Thus any theory of impact, or of Supreme Court power, derived solely from cases in 
which it invalidates statutes is incomplete at best, and is likely to be substantially biased—unless, 
                                                 
9 To think about this in another way, imagine what something like this compliance approach would look like if 
applied to the study of Congressional or executive power. Taking Congress as an example, this approach would 
require us to examine compliance with statutes (among other things); we might look at the extent to which patterns 
of narcotic consumption change after Congress passes prohibitory legislation. This example points to two of the 
major problems with the compliance approach. First, many people continue to possess and consume prohibited 
narcotics, which would require the compliance theorist to conclude that Congress’ power is “limited” despite the 
reality Congress has spent billions of dollars and directed millions of hours of work toward the goal of prohibition, 
has jailed millions and killed thousands of people in pursuit of that goal, etc. Second, the compliance approach 
cannot easily distinguish among people who do not consume narcotics because it is illegal, and those who would not 
consumer narcotics in any event. More generally, the compliance approach cannot tell us anything about Congress’ 
behavior in incentivizing or disincentivizing behavior via appropriation, causing backlashes, etc.—and of course, no 
one studies Congressional power in this way. Yet this is exactly what judicial impact scholars do when they limit 
study to “compliance.” 
10 I say “at least” because there are approximately two dozen cases in which the coding is ambiguous. This number 
includes cases in which part of some statute was invalidated and part upheld, e.g. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
Buckley v. Valeo, etc.  
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of course, one assumes that the Supreme Court is not actually doing anything except when it 
exercises its power to invalidate. 
Conceptualizing Compliance in “Restraintist” Decisions 
 In order to extend the coverage of conventional compliance studies to include cases in 
which the Supreme Court declined to exercise its power to invalidate a statute, we must consider 
the ways in which validations and invalidations are alike as well as different as classes of 
phenomena. First we should note that in both types of decisions the Court is doing something 
that is politically consequential (Casper 1976). Clearly, when it strikes down a law, the Court is 
explicitly attempting to upset the status quo and thus to rearrange politics on that issue (e.g. 
Keith 2008; Hall 2011). When the Court does not strike down a law, it might affirmatively 
validate the work of a coordinate branch, an administrative agency, or a state government; but so 
might it simply defer to the “political” actor by declining to declare it unconstitutional (but 
declining also to expressly validate the practice at hand) (e.g. Bickel 1962; Silverstein 2009). 
Further, the Court might (but does not necessarily) upset the status quo when it upholds statutes, 
just as when it reverses them. Returning to the example of Employment Division v. Smith, it is 
clear that though the Court declined to overturn Oregon’s ban on ingestion of peyote, it still 
significantly altered the status quo ante by issuing a new doctrinal rule that would govern 
subsequent federal free exercise litigation.  
When the Court reverses a policy it necessarily commands some actor to change the way 
it is doing things (start throwing out evidence collected in illegal searches; stop banning 
contraceptives; etc.). There is more variation in the nature of the Court’s behavior when it 
upholds statutes, however. In all cases, non-invalidations result in a command to lower courts to 
issue decisions consistent with the Court’s holding, but these decisions may or may not represent 
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deviations from the status quo. For example, in its decision in Employment Division v. Smith, the 
Court significantly altered its free exercise doctrine, and thus lower courts had to change their 
behavior to comply. In Kelo v. New London, however, the Court essentially reaffirmed several 
decades worth of precedent in its Public Use doctrine to uphold a series of takings against 
constitutional challenge. Thus lower courts did not have to alter their behavior to comply with 
Kelo. In short, while all cases in which the Court invalidates statutes represent departures from 
the status quo, not all cases in which the Court declines to invalidate represent continuations of 
the status quo. To the extent that the Court seeks to impose some change in behavior in these 
non-invalidation cases, they are ripe for study in the conventional compliance vein. Figure 3.1 
graphically depicts the applicability of the compliance formula to different types of cases. As 
you move from left to right on the continuum, the compliance formula becomes increasingly 
problematic to apply to actual cases.  
Figure 3.1. The Compliance Continuum 
 
One more important difference must be considered. Court orders can be directed toward 
two types of actors: lower courts, or non-court government actors such as Congress, the Social 
Security Administration, or local school boards (Hall 2011). Hall refers to these as “vertical” and 
“lateral” implementers, respectively. In vertical issues, the Court usually identifies “a group of 
potential criminal defendants as constitutionally immune from criminal prosecution” (such as 
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abortionists or flag burners), and orders lower courts not to convict these persons (Hall 2011: 
16). In lateral cases implementation is controlled by non-court actors: the Court might order local 
public school districts to discontinue practices that include prayers, or command Congress to 
cease using the “legislative veto.” In these cases, only the non-court actor can directly comply 
with the Court’s order. The relevant difference, then, is that when the Court declines to impose 
some constitutional limitation on other government institutions, it does not issue orders to so-
called lateral actors. Rather, orders in such cases are always directed to lower courts (vertical 
actors).  
As noted above, the compliance formula takes the following form: the Supreme Court 
ordered X, we should thus expect to see X in the real world; we then look for X in the real world, 
and report the extent of compliance. The order from the Court and the actor responsible for 
implementing that order are clearly crucial in this formula. To summarize my argument, there 
can be important differences in judicial reversal and non-reversal decisions. Reversals of policies 
set by other institutions always compel a change in the status quo that is to be implemented by 
either a lower court or a non-court government actor. Non-reversals are always directly 
implemented by lower courts, but do not always compel a change in the status quo (though they 
may also allow other actors to decide whether to maintain or deviate from the status quo within 
some prescribed parameters). 
Developments in capital punishment policy in the 1970s illustrate the complexities in 
these distinctions in historical practice. In Furman v. Georgia (1972) the Supreme Court 
invalidated Georgia’s capital punishment statute on the grounds that it violated the prohibition on 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment found in the 8th Amendment. In Furman the Court issued an 
unambiguous order to lower federal courts not to sentence criminal defendants to death under 
50 
 
existing capital punishment statutes. Lower courts complied with this order, thus the immediate 
impact of the decision was the significant reduction of the number of inmates on death row in 
American prisons (Hall 2011). In short, the Court’s order required the observed outcome:  a 
reduction in death sentences as well as commutations for unconstitutionally sentenced convicts. 
Four years later the Court upheld Georgia’s newly refined capital punishment statute in Gregg v. 
Georgia (1976). The Court held in Gregg that the death penalty was not inherently cruel or 
unusual, and thus that it was permissible so long as its imposition was not wanton, arbitrary, or 
capricious. Pursuant to this holding, the Court instructed lower federal courts to uphold death 
sentences that were imposed fairly (that is, those that meet requirements to assure that they were 
neither arbitrary nor capricious).  We see then in Gregg the Court announced that it would 
permit, but not require, departures from the post-Furman status quo (by legislatures), provided 
that those departures met conditions outlined by the Court in Furman and Gregg. In short, after 
Furman states were required to cease issuing capital sentences; after Gregg states were permitted 
to begin issuing capital sentences provided they met certain requirements.   
Table 3.1. Example of Compliance in Application to Cases  
Case Pre-decision 
Status quo 
Change Subsequent 
Policy 
Furman v. Georgia Death 
penalty 
Required No death penalty 
w/out revision 
Gregg v. Georgia  No death 
penalty 
Permitted Death penalty 
acceptable if 
adequately 
revised 
 
In both instances lower courts would be compelled to issue judgments in subsequent 
cases challenging the constitutionality of death penalty statutes consistent with the Court’s 
holdings. Thus the Court’s preference, as stated in Gregg (just as in Furman), would be carried 
out directly by lower Courts, but in terms of its indirect effects both reinstatement of capital 
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punishment and continued abstention from capital punishment can be reasonably considered as 
consistent with the Court’s ruling in Gregg. Put differently, studying the extent to which states 
reinstated the death penalty would be a perverse test of Court power, as the Court does not 
command that outcome; yet the reinstatement of the death penalty in many states is inarguably an 
impact of Gregg (and of Furman!). 
The upshot of this is that in Hall’s (2011) terms, all constitutional cases in which the 
Court upholds statutes should be understood as “vertical cases” implying that we should expect a 
very high degree of compliance with all such decisions. Compliance will be difficult to measure 
in some cases, though, as in many such cases the expectation is that the behavior of the 
implementer should not change after a decision is implemented. For example, the Court’s 
decision in Employment Division v. Smith did not include an order to ban the use of peyote 
everywhere, but rather stated that such bans were not unconstitutional (and thus permissible) 
provided that they were not intended to single out religious practices. What these examples from 
capital punishment and free exercise demonstrate is that the conventional compliance “formula” 
only makes sense if the Court orders a deviation from the status quo ante. 
To summarize, I make two key claims in this chapter. First, the Supreme Court can and 
does exercise power outside of the context of judicially imposed constitutional limitations on 
non-court actors. Second, too narrow a focus on power (operationalized as compliance) misses 
much of the impact that Court decisions have in the real world—and even misses much of the 
Court’s power. In the following sections, I elaborate and empirically test these claims. I examine 
the first claim by selecting five landmark Supreme Court cases in which the Court declined to 
reverse a policy challenged on constitutional grounds, but in which it still somehow ordered a 
deviation from the status quo ante. I show, unsurprisingly, that when the Court issues such an 
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order, lower Courts comply just as they do in the context of invalidations. Moreover, I show that 
emphasis on the Court’s interpretive power sheds new light on the ways in which the Court 
shapes public policy and subsequent politics when deciding cases.  
Case Studies 
On Case Selection  
 To identify cases, I use the list of landmark cases generated by Hall’s (2011) “two 
sweeps” approach. Hall utilized Goldman’s (2005) list of “important” Supreme Court cases, 
which are deemed so by inclusion in a majority of constitutional law textbooks, complemented 
by cases discussed in the New York Times and Washington Post’s annual end-of-term write-up.11 
This list captures two complementary conceptions of landmark status. Lawyers generally 
understand landmark cases to be those in which the Court establishes a new and significant legal 
principle or concept, or which otherwise substantially alters the existing state of law; such cases 
are captured by Goldman’s (2005) study of constitutional law casebooks (see also Wiecek 2000). 
Landmark means something a little different to historians and political scientists, who are 
perhaps less interested in new legal tests, but more interested in the political and social 
importance of a decision; this contemporary importance is captured by Hall’s (2011) sweep of 
leading newspapers. The cases included were decided between the Court’s 1954 and 2005 terms; 
1954 was chosen as the lower bound because it is remarkably difficult to find reliable data from 
earlier times, and 2005 was chosen as the upper bound in order to allow for sufficient time to 
have passed for compliance and non-compliance, policy responses, political mobilizations, 
resistance, etc. to have occurred. This procedure produced a list of two-hundred-three important 
cases, including sixty-five in which the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a statute (i.e. 
                                                 
11 For details, see Hall (2011) pp. 21-27, 167-172. 
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upheld a statute or practice against a constitutional challenge). A complete list of cases can be 
found in the supplementary materials at the end of this chapter.  
From these cases, five were chosen for close study because of the values they take on the 
key independent variable—the extent to which they compelled an observable behavioral change 
in lower courts. These cases are Gregg v. Georgia (1976), Employment Division v. Smith (1990), 
Agostini v. Felton (1997), Hill v. Colorado (2000), and Kelo v. New London (2005). I chose to 
study five cases in order to have variation across time and institutional context which a single 
case-study would not provide. It is worth noting also the majority of non-reversals do not upset 
the status quo, which significantly constrains the range of cases from which to choose for 
analysis. These cases run the gamut from ideal examples of classical compliance study type 
cases to cases for which the compliance formula is utterly useless. This variation in the 
applicability of the compliance approach—with respect to both non-court implementation of 
orders and court implementation of legal policies—allows me to demonstrate the fundamentally 
limited nature of that approach to the study of judicial impact. Employment Division v. Smith and 
Agostini v. Felton are cases in which the Court’s decision requires a fairly clear deviation in 
behavior, in that both significantly altered doctrine. Gregg v. Georgia, Hill v. Colorado, and 
Kelo v. New London are cases in in which the Court permits but does not require an observable 
change in behavior. The differences between these cases illustrate how quickly the compliance 
formula breaks down when moving away from the judicial reversal paradigm. 
Each of the studies of the particular cases listed above are embedded within the broader 
context of the development of the relevant policy area. That is, I argue that the impact of Gregg 
v. Georgia cannot be understood outside of the context of the politics of capital punishment in 
the 1970s, which then also requires discussion of Furman v. Georgia. Similarly, some scholars 
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have studied the impact of City of Boerne v. Flores on Free Exercise policy, but I argue here that 
the impact of Boerne cannot be understood when divorced from the larger context of the politics 
of religious practice in the 1990s, including Employment Division v. Smith and the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act. In short, by embedding my case studies in the larger policy debates of 
which they are part, I show that there is far more to judicial impact than a compliance story can 
tell, even in the best of circumstances.  
I first briefly discuss a canonical case in the impact literature: Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954). In Brown v. Board the Court issued an order requiring an observable behavior 
change from non-court actors—the desegregation of public primary schools—which is one 
reason that it has received much attention from scholars working in the compliance tradition. 
After summarizing leading accounts of Brown’s impact, I argue that even in this ideal case for a 
compliance study, focus on compliance misses much of the point, and has even led to 
problematic theories of judicial power broadly considered.  
The Canonical Impact Study: Brown v. Board of Education  
 The impacts of Brown v. Board of Education (1954) has received a tremendous amount 
of scholarly attention. The story of Brown v. Board is familiar. On May 17, 1954, the Supreme 
Court handed down its decision in Brown v. Board of Education (I), which unanimously 
overturned Plessy v. Ferguson, holding that separate accommodations are inherently unequal—at 
least with respect to primary schools. Because racial segregation was found to have a tangible, 
detrimental effect on black children, state-enforced racial segregation in public schools was ruled 
unconstitutional. This ruling was accompanied by an order to desegregate public schools 
nationwide. The Court followed up a little more than a year later in Brown v. Board of Education 
(II), holding that that the substance of Brown (I) should be implemented by local school 
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authorities under the supervision of federal courts “with all deliberate speed.” In other words, in 
Brown the Court significantly altered policy by invalidating a widely-used discriminatory 
practice (“separate but equal”), and in doing so also significantly altered the landscape of equal 
protection doctrine by revamping the way the federal courts would interpret the requirements of 
the 14th Amendment.  
 The practical impact of Brown has been the subject of much debate—indeed, Brown is 
probably the single most-studied case in the impact literature. Rosenberg (2008) argues that 
Brown had little practical importance in terms of altering the status quo. On Rosenberg’s 
account, desegregation in schools did not get underway until Congress and the Eisenhower 
administration inserted themselves into the issue several years after Brown was decided. 
Historian Michael Klarman takes a much stronger view of the impact of Brown, arguing that its 
primary outcome was to provoke a massive backlash in the deep South. Indeed, he argues that 
Brown “radicalized southern politics” and led to “fire-breathing” segregationist rhetoric and 
increased racialized violence (Klarman 2004: 385).  
Resistance to Court-ordered desegregation in the South was not a great surprise; at least 
two Supreme Court justices countenanced such a reaction when they discussed Brown I at 
conference. Chief Justice Vinson explicitly stated that the possibility of resistance was real—he 
argued in deliberation that the Court should not “close our eyes” to the “serious” possibility of 
the “complete abolition of public schools in some areas” if the Court were to invalidate 
segregation (quoted in Klarman 2004: 294). Justice Black concurred, and even went as far as to 
predict “violence if [the] court holds segregation unlawful” (quoted in Klarman 2004: 294). 
These predictions proved to be prescient. Because Brown II put the onus of desegregation 
on school boards, and because school boards are largely beholden to local communities, the local 
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popular will could stymie desegregation with relative ease. Indeed, enforcement of Brown 
essentially required litigation from black parents (almost always with the support of the 
NAACP). Southerners apparently recognized the necessity of this judicial support structure for 
the enforcement of desegregation, and thus sought to dismantle it. Several states moved to forbid 
the NAACP from operating within their borders and to require it to publish its membership rolls, 
potentially opening individuals to personal reprisal (Klarman 2004: 383). Harassment and 
intimidation of NAACP officials and lawyers, as well as of litigants and their families, also 
served to disrupt enforcement litigation (Klarman 2004: 352-353). Even when litigation did 
reach federal courts, the judges hearing those cases were Southerners, and were subject to the 
same harassment and social opprobrium as litigators and litigants, thus lower courts had little 
incentive to press desegregation. 
Additionally, there was significant civil unrest in parts of the deep South as whites 
mobilized to prevent their schools from being desegregated. As noted above, Klarman (2004) 
argues that the primary direct result of Brown was the radicalization of southern politics. On this 
account, Southerners resented federal interference with Jim Crow, especially with regard to their 
schools, and were willing to mobilize to pursue their policy goals. Many diehard segregationists 
even proved willing to employ extremely violent tactics, including bombing Black churches and 
killing Black protesters, to suppress attempts at desegregation. Importantly, more than 100 
prominent Southern politicians signed the “Southern Manifesto,” promising to resist attempts by 
the federal government to interfere in Southern race relations. 
This rich and detailed account of Southern politics after Brown led Klarman to conclude 
that the “1964 Civil Rights Act, not Brown, was plainly the proximate cause of most school 
desegregation in the South” (2004: 363). In a roundabout sort of way, Klarman attributes the 
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1964 Civil Rights Act to Brown, however, arguing that “it was the brutality of southern whites 
resisting desegregation that ultimately rallied national opinion behind the enforcement of Brown 
and the enactment of civil rights legislation” (Klarman 2004: 385). 
However, available evidence suggest that Klarman overstates the strength of this 
argument. Perhaps most telling is the fact that the six border states and the District of Columbia 
moved to desegregate their schools almost immediately after Brown (I) was handed down 
(Klarman 2004; Rosenberg 2008; Hall 2011). As a result, more than half of black school children 
in these states were attending public schools with white children by 1963 (Rosenberg 2008: 50). 
Hall’s (2011) analysis suggests that Brown had a meaningful direct impact on desegregation in 
the border states, as the percentage of black children in school with whites jumped from just over 
ten percent in 1955 to about forty percent in 1956. Even Klarman acknowledges that “Brown 
easily desegregated schools in border-state cities” (2004: 346). In Maryland, Missouri, Delaware, 
Kentucky, Oklahoma, and West Virginia, compliance was fairly quick (if not total), and most 
prominent politicians publicly acknowledged their intent to comply with the Court’s ruling. 
Additionally, Rosenberg’s data suggests that Brown did spur some increased egalitarian-minded 
activism, including increased membership rolls and donations to groups such as the NAACP, and 
increasing public support among whites (outside of the deep South) for more racially egalitarian 
policies (see for example McCann 1992). In sum, Klarman’s account seems to gloss over 
important parts of the Brown story, especially the pattern of subsequent political development in 
border states, and a significant amount of genuine desegregation that occurred in direct response 
to the Court’s decision. 
Even so, as with Furman, this story of successful (or at least partially successful) 
implementation misses much of the impact of that decision. Scholars, including some discussed 
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above, have acknowledged the importance of Brown in bringing renewed attention to segregation 
and related racial disparities in American public life, as well as in spurring new activism among 
blacks and whites alike (and on both sides of the issue; see Klarman 2004; McCann 1992; Keck 
2004b). While accounts such as these rightly highlight the importance of Brown in spurring 
subsequent activism as an important impact of that decision, they too deemphasize a key feature 
of Brown’s impact, which was its remaking of the doctrinal landscape in the area of Equal 
Protection. In other words, they downplay changes in legal policy and emphasize instead more 
expressly “political” outcomes of the decision, both direct (compliance) and indirect (subsequent 
activism, etc.). As Hall (2011) has argued, Brown was a “lateral” decision, which means the 
implementation of the Court’s order requires the cooperation of non-court actors—in this case, 
local school boards. As such, the Court has no direct ability to enforce its decision; this fact, on 
Hall’s account, explains the uneven implementation of the Court’s desegregation directive prior 
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Indeed, Hall contends that the struggle to desegregate schools 
“highlights the distinction between the Court’s power when issuing popular and unpopular 
rulings.”   
It seems strange, though, to contend that power depends on popularity in some category 
of cases. Hall defines power as the ability to cause actors to do something they otherwise would 
not—but then argues that in “lateral” cases that power relies on public acquiescence; this is 
clearly a very weak conceptualization of power. Indeed, if power is predicated on acquiescence, 
then Hall’s theory essentially holds that Court power only exists in “vertical” cases (those 
implemented by lower courts), and it has none in “lateral” cases, which are only implemented 
when the relevant actors are willing to comply. As I argued in the previous chapter, however, 
Hall’s order-oriented view of Supreme Court decisions obscures the fact that the rule of law—the 
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legal policy—announced in all decisions is implemented by lower courts. Which is to say, the 
legal policy in all cases is by definition “vertical,” whereas the vertical/lateral distinction is only 
relevant with respect to the Court’s order. This implies that changes in policy which run through 
the legal policy announced in Court decisions should always have substantial impact, whereas 
changes which run through the Court’s order are significantly dependent on political context as 
described by Hall. 
 The legal policy espoused by the Court in Brown was (and is) implemented by federal 
courts, over which the Supreme Court has significant control. As such, Brown’s impact on legal 
policy was much more certain and still highly politically consequential. As noted above, in 
Brown the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that “separate but equal” facilities are inherently 
unequal, and thus violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, 
the Court overruled a longstanding precedent, established in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), that 
segregation of public facilities is not per se unlawful discrimination, and is constitutionally 
permissible so long as the separate facilities for the races were basically equal in quality (the 
phrase “separate but equal” did not actually appear in this decision though it established the 
doctrine that is known by that name). In other words, Plessy established judicially enforced 
constitutional protection for racial discrimination. To be clear, I am not making the claim that the 
Plessy Court caused Jim Crow, but rather that the Court in Plessy declared that the federal 
judiciary would not interfere with segregationist policies (see also Cumming v. Richmond County 
Board of Education [1899]). Overturning this long-standing legal policy is what made Brown a 
“landmark” decision; the fact that Brown led to more black kids going to school with white kids 
is a downstream effect of the decision, however direct.  
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Capital Punishment: Furman v. Georgia & Gregg v. Georgia 
In 1972 the Supreme Court radically altered capital punishment policy nationwide. In a 
landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia, the Court interpreted the 8th Amendment’s prohibition 
on “cruel and unusual punishment” as forbidding the death penalty as it was then practiced. This 
decision was accompanied by an unambiguous order to lower federal courts not to sentence 
criminal defendants to death under the then-current capital punishment. The Furman decision 
was unpopular among the public and political elites; as such, it instigated a flurry of legislative 
action aimed at reinstating the death penalty—yet for a time, that decision was complied with by 
the lower courts, and the number of convicts sentenced to die was greatly reduced (Hall 2011). 
This was not the only outcome of the Furman decision, however. Legislatures around the 
country moved to respond to the decision, often by reinstating capital punishment provisions that 
might be constitutional in light of the Court’s new ruling. In 1976, the Supreme Court upheld a 
newly revised capital punishment statute in Gregg v. Georgia.12 In Gregg and its companion 
cases the Court held that the death penalty did not constitute a per se violation of the Eight 
Amendment, and thus that its use could be appropriate in some circumstances. The Court 
determined that Georgia’s revised capital punishment statute, as well as those of Texas and 
Florida, had sufficiently responded to the concerns outlined in Furman and could thus withstand 
constitutional scrutiny. For example, Georgia’s statute required a bifurcated proceeding wherein 
the trial and sentencing were separate, jury findings as to the severity of the crime, and automatic 
review of death sentences by the Supreme Court of Georgia to establish that the imposition of the 
death penalty was reasonable when compared to similar cases. As a result, Gregg effectively 
                                                 
12 Gregg affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia (Gregg v. State [1974]). 
Gregg was decided along with four companion cases; the others were Jurek v. Texas, Roberts v. Louisiana, Proffitt 
v. Florida, and Woodson v. North Carolina.  
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reinstated the death penalty and provided legislators with basic guidelines for crafting legal 
capital punishment statutes. Put differently, the Court’s decisions in Furman and Gregg—that is, 
its interpretation of the 8th Amendment’s requirements in each case—effectively bounded the 
range of constitutionally permissible death penalty policies that were available for legislatures to 
choose from. 
 Figure 3.2 paints a complicated picture of the effects of Furman and Gregg on capital 
punishment practices in the U.S. It is true, as Hall (2011) points out, that hundreds of death row 
inmates had their sentences commuted after Furman. But figure four clearly indicates that the 
downward turn began before Furman was decided. After 1973 the number of persons sentenced 
to death began to climb again, these having been sentenced under newly enacted death penalty 
statutes. The constitutionality of many of these new statutes were affirmed in Gregg and its 
companion cases, which validated the upward trend that began in 1973. It is important to note 
also that no state directly defied Furman by executing a convict—executions did not resume 
until after Gregg. In short, the compliance stories of Furman and Gregg are not as clear-cut as 
one might hope; both appear to have had effects on larger trends in capital punishment, but 
neither can tell the whole story of the observed changes in capital sentencing or executions. 
Of course, it is clear that the Gregg Court did not intend to compel states to adopt capital 
punishment. Rather, the justices recognized in the reaction to Furman clear signs that they had 
strayed too far from the mainstream of public opinion on that issue (Friedman 2009). Thus in 
Gregg the Court articulated that capital punishment statutes could be upheld provided they took 
pains to avoid arbitrariness and caprice. One way to examine compliance with Gregg, then, is to 
look at the extent to which lower courts upheld revised death penalty statutes consistent with the 
Court’s holding. Shepard’s reveals that federal courts have treated Gregg positively (followed) 
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462 times, while treating it negatively only 32 times (31 times distinguished, once questioned). 
In short, federal courts have largely followed the guidelines set down in Gregg when considering 
constitutional challenges to capital punishment statutes. 
Figure 3.2. Death Row Inmates in the US 
 
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics: Capital Punishment.   
But as I have argued, compliance tells at best a partial story. The Court exercised 
significant power in both Furman and Gregg by offering authoritative interpretations of what 
constitutes constitutionally-acceptable policy. These declarations powerfully shaped both the 
scope and extent of death penalty laws in the US in ways that cannot be captured by emphasis on 
compliance. For example, while many states moved to reinstate capital punishment after 
Furman, some did not. In other words, a number of states declined to take any action to reinstate 
the death penalty after Furman (and Gregg), thus functionally allowing the Supreme Court’s 
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Gregg) until 1994—and it has never executed anyone under this recently revived statute. 
Washington D.C. also declined to reinstate its death penalty after nullification in Furman, and 
the city council formally repealed its death penalty ordinance in 1981. Vermont also made no 
effort to reinstate the death penalty after nullification in Furman. New Hampshire reinstated the 
death penalty in 1991 (though it has never used it), but this reinstatement is sufficiently removed 
from the Furman-Gregg era that reinstatement can hardly be attributed to those cases.13  
A significant number of states only nominally reinstated the death penalty after 
Furman—by which I mean they formally adopted revised capital punishment statutes, but did 
not execute any convicts for some extended period of time (if ever). Idaho, Nebraska, and Ohio 
reenacted the death penalty in 1973, but Idaho and Nebraska did not execute anyone until 1994, 
and Ohio did not until 1999.14 Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee reinstituted the death 
penalty in 1974, but did not execute convicts until 1992, 1995, and 2000, respectively. 
Washington, Colorado, and Connecticut each reenacted capital punishment statutes in 1975, but 
did not execute any convict for nearly 20 years (1993 in Washington, 1997 in Colorado, and 
2005 in Connecticut). Wyoming reinstated capital punishment in 1977 but has only executed on 
person since then, and not until 1992. Oregon and South Dakota restored capital punishment in 
1978, but Oregon did not execute any person until 1996, and South Dakota has never executed 
anyone under its new statute. Finally, New Mexico reenacted in 1979 but has only executed on 
person since then, in 2001. By the same token, the federal government formally reinstated capital 
punishment in 1987 but did not execute anyone until 2001—and has done only two more since 
                                                 
13 Death Penalty Information Center State-by-State Database: http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state 
14 New York also passed a revised statute in 1973, but this statute was quickly invalidated by the state supreme court 
(called the New York Court of Appeals). Several more unsuccessful attempts to pass death penalty statutes failed 
over the next two decades before the state formally reinstated the death penalty in 1995. The 1995 statute was 
invalidated by the state high court in 2004. New York has not executed anyone in the post-Furman era.  
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that time; the US military reinstated capital punishment in 1983, but has never executed under 
the reinstated policy. In short, 13 states plus the federal government and United States military 
nominally adopted revised capital punishment statutes in the decade or so after Furman, but none 
executed a convict for at least 14 years after formal reinstatement of the policy—and for many 
states it was much longer than that. In total, these 13 states have executed a total of 98 prisoners, 
but 53 of those were in Ohio, and another 16 were in Delaware; four of these states have 
executed only one person (CO, CT, NM, WY), Oregon has executed only two, and four more 
have executed only three convicts in the whole span of the new capital punishment regime (ID, 
NE, PA, and SD).15  
Rhode Island quickly reinstated the death penalty after Furman (in June of 1973), but that 
law was declared unconstitutional by the state supreme court before anyone was executed in 
State v. Cline (1979).16 The Rhode Island legislature formally forbade the death penalty in 1984. 
Massachusetts passed an amendment that allowed the death penalty in 1982, but the law was 
immediately challenged and ultimately nullified in 1984 by the state supreme court in 
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz,17 on the grounds that it was unfairly applied (in that only those 
tried for murder were eligible, while those that plead guilty were not), and no one was executed 
while the law was in force. New Jersey also reinstituted capital punishment in 1982, but never 
executed anyone under the revised statute, which the state legislature formally repealed in 2007. 
Additionally, it should be noted that the impetus for revision of death penalty statutes 
after Furman did not in all cases lead to reinstatement: until Furman, North Dakota law made 
capital punishment an option in cases of murder by a person already serving a life sentence, as 
                                                 
15 Death Penalty Information Center State-by-State Database: http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state 
16 State v. Cline, 39 A.2d 270 (1979) 
17 Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150 (1984) 
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well as treason. In 1973, however, the North Dakota legislature revised its criminal code to make 
no crimes eligible for the death penalty. And of course, the revival of death penalty statutes 
around the country, and the swell of popular support for such policies, resulted in the 
introduction of death penalty statutes in state legislatures even in places were the death penalty 
had been abolished pre-Furman, such as in Hawai’i, Maine, and Wisconsin, though these 
measures failed in all states except for Oregon. 
The narrative here paints an uneven picture of the impact of the Supreme Court’s 
landmark death penalty cases: there was an immediate and complete moratorium on executions 
and hundreds of convicts had their sentences commuted. At the same time, however, public 
support for the death penalty increased, as did the salience of the policy, and many states adopted 
new capital punishment legislation in the decade or so following Furman. But I have argued that 
simply counting the number of death penalty statutes on the books may be misleading, as in 
many states the new statutes were extremely restrictive (in that the only permitted capital 
punishment in an extremely narrow set of circumstances, as in New Mexico and Rhode Island), 
and many cases these states did not convict or execute prisoners under these revised statutes for 
many years (and some never have). 
Finally, even among states that reinstated the death penalty after Furman, and which have 
used that punishment with some regularity or consistency, Furman and Gregg meaningfully 
changed the substance of capital punishment statutes in force. These decisions (and many others 
on the topic since then) have produced policies which are—however imperfect—significant 
improvements on their pre-Furman predecessors. As legislators and lawyers sought to feel out 
the boundaries imposed by the Furman Court, one element of statutes that received attention was 
their discretionary nature—and the concomitant possibility that juries would assign the death 
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penalty in a biased fashion. In a challenge to North Carolina’s first revised capital punishment 
statute, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in State v. Waddell (1973)18 that Furman 
outlawed jury discretion in capital cases, but otherwise upheld the statute, effectively making the 
death penalty mandatory for some crimes (the NC legislature formalized this rule the following 
year). Other states sought to address the problem of discretion by following President Nixon’s 
suggestion to utilize the American Law Institute’s recommended code: these statutes typically 
included a bifurcated trial with guilt and sentencing determined separately, and many clearly 
specified “aggravating” or “mitigating” circumstances that should figure into the decision 
making of judges and juries at sentencing. As noted above, it was this approach that was 
ultimately upheld in Gregg v. Georgia.  
Thus a key outcome of Gregg is the clarification of the requirements for non-arbitrariness 
imposed in Furman. And while the revised statutes are far from satisfying to abolitionists (e.g. 
Epstein and Kobylka 1992; Baumgartner et al. 2008), the Court’s decisions in Furman and 
Gregg did restrict the scope of capital punishment in the United States, and contributed 
significantly to the general downward trend in the practice that continued over the next few 
decades, especially to the increasing number of judicially imposed restrictions on the practice.19 
In the five years following Gregg, the Supreme Court itself decided five other capital 
punishment statutes: in Woodson v. North Carolina (1976), the Court held that mandatory 
imposition of the death penalty for first-degree murder violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments; in Coker v. Georgia (1977) the Court held that the death penalty was an 
                                                 
18 State v. Waddell, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973) 
19 Nationally, there was a considerable up-tick in the number of executions performed between the late 1980s and 
the mid-2000s. Close examination of the data, however, reveals that this upward trend is driven almost entirely by 
the state of Texas, which has conducted more than one-third of all executions since Gregg was decided. See 
generally Baumgartner et al. (2008) and the Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC).  
Relatedly, the upward trend in public support for the death penalty after Furman was likely driven primarily by fear 
that a major “crime wave” was sweeping the nation in the 1970s and 1980s—see Enns (2016).  
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unconstitutional punishment for rape of an adult woman when the woman is not killed; in 
Lockett v. Ohio (1978) the Court held that sentencing authorities (juries or panels) must be 
permitted the discretion to consider every possible mitigating factor when considering the death 
penalty; in Beck v. Alabama (1980) the Court held that juries must be allowed to consider lesser 
penalties, and thus could not be forced to choose only between a capital sentence and acquittal; 
and in Godfrey v. Georgia (1980), the Court held that the death penalty could not be imposed for 
ordinary murder. In sum, the Court’s landmark decisions in Furman and Gregg profoundly 
altered the state of death penalty policy in the United States. The moratorium imposed by 
Furman was short lived, to be sure, but the Gregg decision does not mark an outright abdication 
by the Court; rather Gregg was the first in a line of cases decided by the Court imposed new 
limitations on the scope of capital punishment while simultaneously upholding the practice in 
general.20 These decisions, and the national debates that they sparked, led directly to a number of 
major substantive changes in death penalty policies around the country.  
In summary, I have argued that Supreme Court’s capital punishment decisions in the 
1970s profoundly influenced death penalty policy in the United States. The decision in Furman 
ended the death penalty for a short period of time, but even after it was revived, its new form was 
markedly different than its pre-Furman form. In other words, Furman was complied with (as we 
would expect in a case that is implemented by lower courts), but this compliance story misses 
much of the impact of these decisions, in terms of the direct power the Court exercised in 
bounding the policy choices available to legislators, as well as the indirect outcomes of the 
                                                 
20 In this sense, these decisions highlight the Court’s responsiveness to public opinion and the representative 
branches of government, which has been described as the Court’s tendency to stay “within the mainstream” of 
popular understandings of the Constitution (McCloskey 1994; see also Friedman 2009). Such tendencies have been 
documented in numerous other areas of doctrine as well, including abortion and gun rights, among others (e.g. Keck 
2014; Keck and McMahon 2016).  
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decisions. The policy compliance story cannot explain the reintroduction of the death penalty in 
numerous states after Furman, nor can it fully explain how the Court’s rulings influenced the 
substance of the reintroduced legislation. That is, Gregg was not a total retreat from Furman, as 
it is often treated. The Court certainly did distance itself from Furman, but it also imposed 
restrictions on the death penalty that had not existed pre-1972. The Court’s power to interpret the 
constitution allowed it to bound the range of policy choices available to legislators, which it did 
in Gregg and subsequent capital punishment cases.  
Free Exercise: Employment Division v. Smith and its Aftermath 
 Al Smith and Galen Black were rehabilitation counselors at an alcohol and drug 
treatment facility known as ADAPT in Roseburg, Oregon. Both Smith and Black were fired by 
ADAPT for ingesting peyote as a sacramental rite at Native American religious ceremonies, and 
both were denied unemployment benefits because the reason for being dismissed from their jobs 
was “work related misconduct.” Smith and Black each fought independently for his benefits in 
state administrative and judicial courts from 1983 to 1986, arguing that dismissal and denial of 
unemployment benefits for using sacramental peyote placed an undue burden on their right to 
free religious practice. Their cases eventually made it to the Supreme Court, where they were 
combined (see Epps 1998). The case seemed to be controlled by Sherbert v. Verner (1963) and 
Thomas v. Review Board (1980). In both cases, the Court ordered unemployment benefits be 
paid to religious persons who were unemployed because of adherence to their faith. In those 
cases the Court held that such burdens would only be upheld where the state could demonstrate 
that it was “the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest” (Thomas v. 
Review Board 1981: 718). 
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 The Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith upset some thirty years 
of Free Exercise jurisprudence by replacing the strict scrutiny requirement of the Sherbert 
regime with a new rule that individuals would not be relieved of burdens to their religious 
observances caused by “neutral, generally applicable” laws. While the Court had previously held 
that “only those interests of the highest order...can overbalance legitimate claims to the free 
exercise of religion” (Wisconsin v. Yoder 1971, 215), it changed tack in Smith, holding that 
“incidental effects” of otherwise neutral and generally applicable laws that might forbid or 
require actions in conflict with religious beliefs may be upheld as constitutional. The Court did 
not dispute the fact that the use of peyote was sacramental, but nevertheless concluded that 
“...the nation cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the 
religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest 
order” (Employment Division v. Smith 1990: 888). In short, the Court threw out the requirement 
that abridgments of free exercise rights meet a compelling state interest in most cases. It is 
important to highlight here that the Court substantially altered the state of the law as it stood at 
the time. Justice Blackmun called the decision “…a wholesale overturning of settled law 
concerning the Religion Clauses of our Constitution” (Employment Division v. Smith 1990: 908). 
Of course, the mere act of rejecting a constitutional challenge did not itself change the law, but 
rather the manner in which the Court went about rejecting that challenge: the Court 
authoritatively altered the law and policy of Free Exercise.  
 Because lower federal courts would implement the decision by applying the new rule in 
free exercise cases, compliance should be high. Thus we should see that the use of strict scrutiny 
should be diminished in federal cases. Further, because the standard announced in Smith was 
more deferential to legislatures than the pre-Smith test, we should observe a decline in success 
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rates of free exercise claimants in cases decided in federal courts.  Data collected by Adamczyk, 
Wybraniec, and Finke (2004) demonstrate that this is in fact the case: federal court decisions 
using the language of compelling interest dropped off after Smith from around 25% (before) to 
about 11% (after). Additionally, Brent (1999) shows that in the three years prior to Smith, 
litigants making Free Exercise claims in U.S. Courts of Appeals won 31.8% of their cases, but 
after Smith their success rate fell to 20%. I Shepardized the Smith decision as a robustness check. 
The Shepard’s summary indicates that lower federal courts have positively treated (“followed”) 
Smith 179 times, and have negatively treated it 85 times (“questioned” 39; “criticized” 8; 
“distinguished” 38).  
 A clear example of the basic acceptance of the Smith decision by lower federal courts is 
seen in the case of Yang v. Sturner (1990).21 Dr. William Sturner was the Chief Medical 
Examiner for the State of Rhode Island, and in that capacity he conducted a medical autopsy on 
the Yang’s son against the Yang’s wishes. The Yangs are Hmongs—an animist religion with 
origins in southeast Asia—and thus are deeply opposed to autopsies, which they believe 
constitute a sacrilegious mutilation of the body that would cause their son’s spirit to “not be free, 
therefore his spirit will come back and take another person in his family” (Yang v. Sturner 1990: 
558). The Yangs sued, believing the mistreatment of their son’s body constituted a violation of 
their constitutional rights. Judge Raymond Pettine ruled in the Yang’s favor under the then-
controlling precedent of the Sherbert regime, holding that Dr. Sturner’s justifications for his 
actions fall far short of the compelling state interest standard, and thus found Sturner liable for 
damages. However, after the Supreme Court announced its decision in Smith, Sturner’s lawyers 
                                                 
21 You Vang Yang, Ia Kue Yang v. William Q. Sturner, 728 F.Supp, 845 (1990). 
You Vang Yang, Ia Kue Yang v. William Q. Sturner, 750 F.Supp. 558 (1990). 
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petitioned for reconsideration in light of that decision. In a short, poignant opinion, Judge Pettine 
recalls his earlier decision. He writes:  
“It is with deep regret that I have determined that the Employment Division case 
mandates that I recall my prior opinion. …While I feel constrained to apply the 
majority’s opinion to the instant case, I cannot do this without expressing my profound 
regret and my own agreement with Justice Blackmun’s forceful dissent. Justice 
Blackmun points out that the majority distorted long-standing precedent to conclude that: 
‘[…] I do not believe the Founders thought that their dearly bought freedom from 
religious persecution a ‘luxury,’ but an essential element of liberty—and they could not 
have thought religious intolerance ‘unavoidable,’ for they drafted the Religion Clauses 
precisely in order to avoid that intolerance.”22  
 
Judge Pettine concludes “In the instant case, the Rhode Island statute governing autopsies is a 
generally applicable law. The law is facially neutral. There is no indication that the law was 
enacted with any animus toward any religious group. The law’s application did profoundly 
impair the Yang’s religious freedom; however, under Employment Division I can no longer rule 
that this impairment rises to a constitutional level” (Yang v. Sturner 1990: 560). As such, Yang v. 
Sturner provides a stark illustration of the Court’s ability to induce compliance in lower federal 
courts, and also highlights the profound implications the Court’s interpretive power has for its 
ability to shape law and policy. 
The first two columns at left in each part of figure 3.3 demonstrate that Smith resulted in 
a precipitous drop in the use of the compelling interest test by federal courts, and in the success 
rate of individuals bringing free exercise challenges to statutes in federal courts. These figures 
likely underestimate the effects of Smith, because religious groups were far less likely to initiate 
free exercise cases in federal courts following that decision (rate of cases filed per month 
dropped from 7.1 to 3.2; see Adamczyk et al. 2004). In short, lower federal courts complied with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith to a substantial degree. 
                                                 
22 You Vang Yang, Ia Kue Yang v. William Q. Sturner, 750 F.Supp. 558 (1990), at 559-560, quoting Employnment 
Division v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (Blackmun, dissenting) at 1616.  
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 Interests from across the political spectrum lambasted the Smith decision as an assault on 
the free exercise of religion (Niebuhr 1993). And indeed, the number of Free Exercise claims 
brought into federal courts by religious groups—especially small minority religious groups—
dropped by more than fifty-percent after Smith, and when cases were brought, religious 
claimants were significantly less likely to win than before (Adamczyk et al. 2004; Richardson 
1995). Groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Council of Churches, 
Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, the American Jewish Congress, and 
many others formed an unlikely alliance to protest, and importantly, to resist the Court’s 
decision. These groups ultimately led an effort to pursue constitutional change (by restoring the 
pre-Smith status quo) by extra-judicial means: they pushed for the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act. 
Figure 3.3. Free Exercise Claims in Federal Courts, 1981-1997 
   
 
Source: Adamczyk et al. (2004). Pre-Smith period includes cases decided between January 1981 and April 1990; 
Post-Smith period includes cases decided between May 1990 and November 1993 [i.e. before RFRA was enacted], 
After RFRA includes cases decided between December 1993 and January 1997. 
 
 The Act, widely known as RFRA, was introduced to the House of Representatives on 
March 11, 1993 by Chuck Schumer (D-NY). The bill (H.R. 1308) garnered 170 co-sponsors 
between the two houses. The bill passed on a voice vote in the House of Representatives the 
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same day it was introduced. The Senate took rather longer, passing an amended version of the 
bill on October 27, 1993 by a vote of 97-3. A week later, the House agreed to the Senate 
amendment without objection. President Bill Clinton signed the bill into law (PL 103-141) on 
November 16, 1993. Thus, the coordinate branches of government, by overwhelming margins, 
set aside the rule of law announced by the Court and replaced it with one they found preferable. 
 RFRA was designed to alter the state of constitutional practice by restoring the pre-Smith 
status quo, that is, by reviving the strict scrutiny regime in Free Exercise doctrine. In its own 
words, the Act held that both federal and state laws that “substantially burden a person’s exercise 
of religion” can be upheld only if the government “demonstrates that application of the burden to 
the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 
restrictive means to furthering that compelling governmental interest.”23 
 This change had its own significant impact on the state of constitutional practice in the 
area of Free Exercise. Looking at all Free Exercise cases decided by federal courts between 1981 
and January of 1997, Adamczyk, et al. (2004) find that before Smith, 39.5% of Free Exercise 
cases were decided in favor of the religious practitioner; after Smith but before RFRA, that 
success rate falls to 28.4% (despite the massive drop in cases filed, mentioned above); but after 
RFRA, the success rate for religious claimants rises to 45.2%, and the rate of filings returned to 
its pre-Smith levels. The right-most columns in each graph in figure 3.3 visually depict these 
changes. It is noteworthy that RFRA had as much impact on case outcomes as Smith: lower 
Courts responded as much to Congress as they did to the Court (Brent 1999).  
 RFRA was not without its critics, however. Many argued that it placed an undue burden 
on democratic majorities, or that it interfered with the ability of states and municipalities to 
                                                 
23 Public Law No. 103-141, Section 1 
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govern effectively. This latter claim came to center stage in 1997, in the case of City of Boerne v. 
Flores, in which the local government argued that RFRA unconstitutionally burdened its 
capacity to govern. The Court ruled in the city’s favor, holding that Congress could enforce the 
Bill of Rights against the states, but that it could not change “what the right is” nor “determine 
what constitutes a constitutional violation” (Boerne v. Flores 1997: 519). In other words, the 
Court held that only it gets to say what the Constitution means, and that Congress can only 
enforce the Court’s interpretations. Thus the Boerne Court struck down RFRA as 
unconstitutional as it applied to the states (RFRA still stands with respect to federal laws). And 
again, City of Boerne, as Smith before it, substantially altered the outcomes of challenges brought 
under the Free Exercise clause. Brent (2003) reports that the success rate of claimants in U.S. 
Courts of Appeals in the three years following Boerne was basically identical to the success of 
claimants after Smith but before RFRA (20.6% versus 20.0%, as compared to the 31.8% before 
Smith, and 32.4% during RFRA). 
 Once again, advocates of robust religious freedom moved to alter the constitutional 
playing field by extra-judicial methods. These groups again primarily pursued change through 
legislatures, as they thought an attempt at amending the Constitution was both too risky and too 
time and resource consuming (Adamczyk et al. 2004). Members of Congress proposed the 
Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999 (RLPA), which was intended to overturn Smith and 
expand protections for religious expression. The law would operate by requiring strict scrutiny in 
free exercise cases involving programs that receive federal financial support or affect interstate 
commerce. After passing in the House, however, the bill died in committee in the Senate as 
members there thought the bill stood on too tenuous of constitutional footing. Thus in 2000, 
Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 
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which protects religious construction activities (such as those that had been at the center of the 
controversy in City of Boerne v. Flores) and prisoners, relying on Congress’ commerce power. In 
2005, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld RLUIPA as constitutional in Cutter v. Wilkinson 
(2005). 
To summarize, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a statute in 
Employment Division v. Smith, but in doing so significantly altered the state of free exercise 
policy. Lower courts complied with the Court’s ruling in Smith by implementing the new rule in 
subsequent free exercise cases. Thus we see that the compliance formula can speak to non-
invalidations provided that the Court requires some change in behavior from the implementing 
actors. This was not the end of the story, however. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was 
undoubtedly an impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith. Indeed, the entire interbranch 
exchange from RFRA to Boerne to RLUIPA to Cutter v. Wilkinson can be understood as 
reverberations of Smith—though RFRA is obviously the most direct impact in this inter-
institutional vein. It is equally clear that none of this subsequent development can be understood 
in terms of compliance and non-compliance. This fact points to the problems of understanding 
impact as compliance only, without also paying attention to larger systemic effects in the 
political arena. To conclude that Smith was a “successful” exercise of Court power because that 
decision was largely complied with is to miss the larger political story of which Smith is only 
part. 
Religious Nonestablishment: Agostini v. Felton 
 Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 provided financial 
support to local schools in order to meet the needs of “educationally deprived children from low-
income families,” even those enrolled in private schools (Aguilar v. Felton 1985: 404). In many 
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communities these funds were used to pay employees who taught in non-public schools and 
programs. In 1985 the Supreme Court ruled that schemes using Title I funds to pay employees of 
parochial schools in New York City, and for a “Shared Time and Community Program” that 
provided nonpublic classes in nonpublic schools were unconstitutional in Aguilar v. Felton and 
Grand Rapids v. Ball, respectively. These were “Popular-Lateral” decisions in Hall’s (2011) 
framework, meaning that the decisions were popular but had to be implemented by non-court 
actors—in these cases, local school boards. Consistent with his theory, Hall finds that both cases 
had “a profound impact on the administration of Title I programs for private school students in 
the United States. Very shortly after the ruling, every school district administering Title I funds 
ceased to use these funds to pay for teachers to instruct students within religiously affiliated 
school buildings” (2011: 112).  
 The Court reconsidered its position on Title I funding in parochial schools a decade later 
in Agostini v. Felton (1997). The ruling in Aguilar required alternative delivery of Title I 
services, often at leased sites or in mobile instructional units, which were much costlier than 
provision directly in the parochial schools. In New York City, for example, compliance with 
Aguilar cost an average of $15 million per year, significantly reducing the amount of Title I 
funds available for actual remedial education (Mangrum 1998). The Board of Education of the 
City of New York (hereafter “the Board”) filed a motion in federal court seeking relief from the 
injunction against provision of services on private school grounds issued in the wake of Aguilar. 
The US District Court for the Eastern District of New York and the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals each ruled against the Board. The case ultimately made it to the Supreme Court, where a 
narrow majority ruled that Aguilar and Grand Rapids v. Ball had been wrongly decided, and thus 
overruled them. Justice O’Connor, in her majority opinion, also repudiated the Lemon Test, 
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suggesting a somewhat softer “Endorsement Test,” which served to further muddy the already 
murky waters of Establishment Clause doctrine (Mangrum 1998; Sisk and Heise 2012).24 One 
consequence of this doctrinal development was that lower federal courts now had more tools at 
their disposal to find against Establishment Clause claimants. Figure 3.4 demonstrates the 
Agostini ruling did in fact significantly affect subsequent Establishment Clause litigation, with 
Establishment clause claimants losing at higher clip after compared to before.  
Figure 3.4. Predicted Probability of Success for  
Establishment Clause Claims, Before and After Agostini 
 
Predicted probability and 95% confidence intervals calculated by Sisk and Heise (2012). 
Their models estimate that Agostini resulted in a 17 percentage-point decline in the 
success rates of Establishment Clause claimants.  
 
 The practical upshot of the Agostini decision was that Title I funds could again be used 
on parochial school grounds, so long as schools maintained strict standards to insulate Title I 
services from religious influences. As noted above, Hall (2011) demonstrates that Aguilar had 
the effect of ending the provision of Title I services in private schools, and also of decreasing the 
overall number of private school students receiving Title I services across the U.S. Hall was able 
                                                 
24 The so-called “Lemon Test” was a three-pronged test announced by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) in 
order to assess the constitutionality of practices dealing with religious establishment. To be constitutional, the statute 
must have a “secular legislative purpose,” its principal effects must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it must 
not foster “excessive government entanglement with religion.” 
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to establish this pattern because the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted studies 
in 1987, 1989, and 1993 explicitly examining the extent of compliance with Aguilar. 
Unfortunately, the GAO did not conduct any similar studies after Agostini.25 In any event, 
because the same New York School Board that lost in Aguilar won in Agostini, it seems 
extremely unlikely that it would not have reverted, more or less immediately, to the activities it 
conducted pre-Aguilar. That is, it would be strange indeed if schools did not respond to Agostini 
by reinstating some of the pre-Aguilar modes of delivering Title I services, such as by paying 
parochial school teachers to participate and by hosting supplementary educational services on 
private school properties. 
Buffer Zones: Hill v. Colorado  
 In 1993 the Colorado legislature passed a law intended to prevent the “willful obstruction 
of a person’s access to medical counseling and treatment” by criminalizing knowing obstruction, 
hinderance, impediment, etc. of another person’s entry to or exit from any health care facility. 
Section 3 of the law went much further than this, making it a crime for any person: 
“[to] knowingly approach another person within eight feet of such person, unless such 
other person consents, for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign 
to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person in the 
public way or sidewalk area within a radius of one hundred feet from any entrance door 
to a health care facility.” (quoted in Raskin and LeBlanc 2001, 190). 
 
Thus the statute effectively banned or curtailed a range of speech activities in this “buffer zone.” 
The State acknowledged that Section 3 criminalized purely speech activities, but defended that 
move as a “prophylactic” regulation which would prevent demonstrators from descending into 
                                                 
25 Correspondence with GAO Research Librarian, January 21, 2016. 
I have also tried to find data on Title I delivery methods within the New York City School District itself, but to no 
avail.  
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non-speech conduct—namely the sorts of activities outlawed in Section 2 of the act, especially 
blocking and other acts of physical violence or threat.   
 Shortly after enactment a group anti-abortion protestors (self-described “sidewalk 
counselors”) filed suit in state court, arguing that Section 3 was an unconstitutional restriction of 
their right to speak. The protestors lost at all levels of court in the state of Colorado (Hill v. City 
of Lakewood [1995]). The protestors appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, challenging Section 3 
of the Colorado act on the grounds of content and viewpoint discrimination, insufficiently 
narrow tailoring, failure to leave open alternative channels of communication, prior restraint, 
vagueness, and overbreadth (Raskin and LeBlanc 2001). In a 6-3 decision the Court upheld 
Section 3 against all of the petitioners’ challenges. The Court did not expressly overrule any 
precedent in its decision in Hill v. Colorado, though many scholars argue that Hill represents a 
significant step away from precedent, in that it defined protection of the “interest of the unwilling 
listener” as a compelling state interest (see Scalia, dissenting in Hill v. Colorado; also Raskin 
and LeBlanc 2001; Chen 2003; O’Neill 2006).  
 The Hill decision provides a roadmap of sorts for other states and municipalities to create 
statutory buffer zones around abortion facilities that could withstand judicial scrutiny when 
challenged on constitutional grounds. In 2014, the National Abortion Federation published a 
handbook for its members, “Legal Remedies to Address Clinic Violence and Harassment,” 
which states that “The Hill decision upheld a Colorado ordinance…[that] has successfully served 
as a model for similar ordinances across the country” because “they would likely survive a 
constitutional challenge” (NAF 2014: 7; see also Guttmacher Report 2001). And there was in 
fact a modest uptick in state and local-level buffer-zone type ordinances after Hill. The Court’s 
decision in Hill clearly did not open any floodgates for abortion clinic buffer zones, but it does 
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appear to have had some effect in terms of the cumulative number of buffer zone laws on the 
books. It would be unfair to argue that the Court intended to cause states to adopt buffer zone 
laws, however. As in Gregg, Hill represents not an affirmative command toward some policy, 
but the acknowledgment that a policy is permissible within some bounds. 
Figure 3.5. Hill v. CO and Buffer Zone Ordinances in Force 
 
Source: NAF Handbook (2014) 
 If we look to the stated purpose of the law and the presumptive intention of the Court in 
upholding the statute—reducing the incidence of obstruction at abortion clinics—the picture is 
fuzzier. Figure 3.6 demonstrates that the downward trend in blockading abortion clinics began 
before Hill was decided; the post-Hill trend is, if anything, slightly upwards. Additionally, figure 
3.6 shows that arrests for blockading activities fell to zero in 2000, and that no person in the US 
was arrested for such an activity in the next three years, despite the modest uptick in buffer zone 
restrictions. Thus, if reducing obstruction at abortion clinics was the Court’s intent in Hill, it is 
far from clear that it achieved its purpose. Regardless, the Court did effectively shift federal free 
speech doctrine by defining a new type of interest as suitably compelling to meet the 
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requirements of strict scrutiny. Shepard’s reveals that federal courts have followed the Court’s 
lead, having treated Hill positively (178 instances) far more often than negatively (30 instances).  
Figure 3.6. Blockading Activity at Abortion Clinics 
 
Source: NAF Violence and Disruption Statistics (2014) 
Eminent Domain: Kelo v. New London  
The Supreme Court decided Kelo v. New London on June 23, 2005. In that decision, a 5-4 
majority held that a series of condemnations of homes and other private properties by the city of 
New London, CT, for the purpose of economic redevelopment were constitutionally valid. 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that the condemnations were permissible because 
redevelopment was a “public use” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause, 
even though the land would not be used by, or even open to, the public at large. In this decision, 
the Court upheld the relevant legislation against a constitutional challenge, and declined to alter 
existing precedent in more than a very minor way. As such, the compliance approach can tell us 
very little about the impact of this decision. Even so, one could study the implementation of this 
decision in lower federal courts, for example, to see if the decision is being complied with 
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throughout the judicial hierarchy. To assess compliance with Kelo in federal courts, I 
Shepardized the decision to see how the case was treated in subsequent federal cases.26 I find that 
Kelo has been “followed” twenty-eight times, and “distinguished” only eight times by federal 
courts (Shepard’s also reports nine “neutral” analyses). For example, a federal judge in 
Pennsylvania dismissed a constitutional challenge of a taking for economic redevelopment, 
holding that Kelo established private development as a sufficiently “public” purpose to meet the 
Constitution’s “public use” requirement (Whittaker v. County of Lawrence 2009). Thus we see, 
unsurprisingly, that the Court’s significant hierarchical control of the federal judiciary translates 
into a high degree of compliance with its decision—if we understand compliance to include 
faithful implementation by lower courts.  
On June 27, 2005—just four days after the Court announced its decision in Kelo—
Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) introduced the “Protections of Homes, Small Businesses and 
Private Property Act of 2005” (S.B. 1313, 109th Congress). The bill was a direct response to the 
Kelo decision, as its purposes was to limit the use of eminent domain for purposes of economic 
development. The bill stated that “The power of eminent domain shall be available only for 
public use... ‘public use’ shall not be construed to include economic development.” S.B. 1313, 
however, never made it out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, despite the fact that it had 32 co-
sponsors in the Senate, including 3 members of the SJC itself. Not much later, the House passed 
the “Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005” (“PRPA”; H.R. 4128, 109th Congress) by a 
                                                 
26 Shepard’s analyzes how treatment cases interpret a particular precedent, labelling a positive interpretation 
“followed”, and labels a negative treatment as either “distinguished,” “criticized,” “limited,” “questioned,” or 
“overruled” (see Hansford and Spriggs 2006, 43-54 for an extended discussion). Importantly, for Shepherd’s to code 
a treatment case in any of the above categories, the case must more than simply cite the precedent – it must “provide 
specific language that has a potential effect on the legal authority of the precedent” (Hansford and Spriggs 2006, 45; 
citing Shepard’s 1993 in-house training manual). While this is an admittedly coarse measure of “compliance,” it is a 
valid and reliable measure of the treatment of a Court precedent – and because that is all compliance entails with 
respect to courts, it is suitable for the purpose at hand. 
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huge margin (376-38). This bill would also prohibit the use of eminent domain for the purpose of 
economic development by any entity that receives federal economic development funds. 
Violators would be punished by losing eligibility for future federal redevelopment funds for two 
years. The PRPA, like S.B. 1313, languished before the Senate Judiciary Committee, and was 
never reported to the floor for a vote. This bill has been reintroduced and passed by several 
subsequent Congresses—most recently the “Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2015”—
but has died in the Senate each time. 
Both chambers were able to agree on one minor adjustment to the law in the wake of 
Kelo, passing the “Bond Amendment” in November of 2005. The Bond Amendment was an 
amendment to an appropriation bill for the departments of Transportation, Treasury, and Housing 
and Urban Development. The amendment forbids the use of funds allocated in the Act to support 
the use of eminent domain “for economic development that primarily benefits private entities” 
(quoted in Somin 2009: 2152). Additionally, President George W. Bush issued an executive 
order on the one-year anniversary of the Kelo decision, stating: 
“It is the policy of the United States to protect the rights of Americans to their private 
property, including by limiting the taking of private property by the Federal Government 
to situations in which the taking is for public use, with just compensation, and for the 
purpose of benefiting the general public and not merely for advancing the economic 
interest of private parties to be given ownership or use of the property taken.”27 
 
Somin (2009; 2015) has argued, however, that this order does little to curtail takings, as 
government officials always at least claim that a taking is for the benefit of the general public.  
The states have been much more active in altering the state of constitutional practice 
regarding eminent domain than have actors at the federal level. Within a year of the decision, 
twenty-nine states had acted on Justice Stevens’ invitation to enact limitations on eminent 
                                                 
27 Executive Order No. 13,406, 71 Federal Register 36,973 (June 23, 2006). 
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domain more stringent than the one adopted by the Court (Ross and Tolan 2006). Today that 
number has risen to forty-five, including ten which have gone as far as amending their 
constitutions (see Beienburg 2014). In addition to this tide of legislation, state courts have also 
bitten back against the Court’s ruling. The state supreme courts of Oklahoma and Ohio have both 
explicitly rejected Kelo and ruled that their respective state constitutions forbid economic 
development takings.28 The high court of South Dakota has also directly repudiated Kelo, but did 
not rule outright that takings for economic development are per se invalid.29 Other state high 
courts have restricted the takings power in other ways: “quick take” condemnations have been 
severely constrained in Maryland and Rhode Island30; blight condemnations have been 
constrained in Ohio, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania31 (see generally Somin 2011). In fairness, it 
is not obvious that these state court decisions were “caused” by Kelo: four state supreme courts 
(those of Illinois, Michigan, Montana, and South Carolina32) had forbidden economic 
development takings before Kelo. Thus these decisions since 2005 may be part of a broader 
intellectual and political trend against broad deference to legislatures on questions of public use 
that began in the 1980s (Ely 2008; Somin 2011). 
As above, I utilize Shepard’s to document the treatment of Kelo in state courts. The data 
suggest that state courts were considerably less deferential to the Supreme Court than were the 
                                                 
28 City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006) 
Board of County Commissioners of Muskogee County v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639 (Oklahoma 2006) 
29 Benson v. State, 710 N.W.2d 131 (South Dakota 2006) 
30 Mayor of Baltimore v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d 324 (Maryland 2007) 
Rhode Island Economic Development Corp. v. The Parking Company 892 A.2d 87 (Rhode Island 2006) 
31 City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006) 
Gallenthin Realty Developers, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447 (New Jersey 2007) 
In re Condemnation by Redevelopment Authority, 962 A.2d 1257 (PA Commonwealth Court 2008) 
32 Southwest Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental, L.L.C. 768 N.E.2d 1 (Illinois 2002) 
County of Wayne v. Hathcock 684 N.W.2d 765 (Michigan 2004) 
City of Bozeman v. Vaniman 898 P2d 1208 (Montana 1995) 
Georgia Department of Transportation v. Jasper 586 S.E.2d 853 (South Carolina 2003) 
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lower federal courts. Shephard’s indicates that Kelo was twice ruled as superseded by state 
statutes (in Missouri and Pennsylvania), twice “criticized,” “distinguished” nineteen times, and 
“followed” twenty-one times. In one of the noted “negative” treatments, the Ohio Supreme Court 
contrasts state-level protections for property owners with the Kelo decision’s apparently minimal 
requirements. It held in City of Norwood v. Horney33 that “although economic factors may be 
considered in determining whether private property may be appropriated, the fact that the 
appropriation would provide an economic benefit to the government and community, standing 
alone, does not satisfy the public-use requirement of Section 19, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution.” In contrast, an appellate court in Illinois favorably cited Kelo in City of Chicago v. 
Eychaner34 as grounds for upholding a taking of a conservation area for redevelopment: “Guided 
by…Kelo, we turn to the City’s taking, and hold that it unquestionably serves a public purpose of 
preventing blight, promoting economic revitalization, and protecting existing industry.” Overall, 
this pattern indicates that Kelo was treated positively twenty-one times, and negatively twenty-
three times in state courts (compared to twenty-eight and eight times respectively, in federal 
courts). In short, individuals and interest groups litigating for a tighter conception of “public use” 
found a considerably more hospitable audience in state courts than in federal courts. 
A key reason that the Kelo decision precipitated so much political activity was that it 
dramatically increased the salience of eminent domain policy (e.g. Zilis 2015). In order to assess 
the effect of the Court’s decision on coverage of the eminent domain issue, broadly construed, I 
gathered data on the average daily number of stories in the New York Times including the term 
                                                 
33 110 Ohio St. 3d 353 
34 389 Ill. Dec. 411 
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“eminent domain.” These data were gathered by keyword searching the Lexis-Nexis Academic 
database for NYT coverage from January 1, 2002, to December 31, 2008.35  
I assess the impact of Kelo on media coverage of eminent domain utilizing Box-Tiao 
(1975) intervention analyses, which estimate the effects of an event (or events) on a set of serial 
observations. This method is attractive because intervention analyses assess natural experiments; 
in this case, the quasi-experimental treatments (interventions) are judicial decisions, and the set 
of serial observations is media coverage of the issues in which the cases are embedded (Box-
Steffensmeier et al. 2014; Ura 2009). Box-Tiao analyses explicitly model ARIMA error 
processes by estimating the auto-regressive and moving average components of the dependent 
time series (Box and Jenkins 1976). This means that the effects of intervention on the dependent 
time series are assessed after other sources of dynamic error are accounted for (reduced to white 
noise). Importantly, as Ura (2009: 438) points out, when intervention analyses are properly 
modelled, “only the identification of a rival causal event threatens inferences drawn from the 
assessment of the impact of the event of interest.” 
Table 3.2. Impact of Kelo v. New London on NYT Attention to Eminent Domain 
Issue Area/Case Finding %Change in Coverage 
Eminent Domain   
Kelo v. New London step*** 931.35 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
The first step in assessing potential intervention effects of decisions is to develop 
appropriate ARIMA models of the media coverage series. I then model the effects of the Kelo 
decision on the media coverage data. Following Ura (2009), I take a stepwise approach to 
developing the final model specifications. The decision is treated first as a “pulse” intervention, a 
dummy variable coded as one for the month of the intervention and zero otherwise. Decisions 
                                                 
35 This approach was borrowed from Ura (2009); see chapter 5 for extended discussion of the method.  
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were then modeled treating the intervention as “steps” to assess the extent to which the data 
supported such a specification; when events or complexities in the models were insignificant or 
unsupported by the data, they were dropped (Ura 2009). 
Figure 3.7. NYT Coverage of Eminent Domain 
 
Note: Figure depicts the average number of daily stories containing the string “eminent domain.” The 
vertical gray line at 2005m6 (i.e. June of 2005) depicts the Court’s announcement of its decision in Kelo v. 
New London.  
 
 Table 3.2 indicates that Kelo had a massive, long-term effect on the salience of eminent 
domain. In the three years before Kelo, eminent domain was mentioned in about one New York 
Times story per month; immediately afterward, eminent domain was covered in an average of a 
little more than nine stories per month (Table S5.8 in the supplementary materials for chapter 5 
presents the full model). Figure 3.7 depicts this shift graphically. Clearly, Kelo caused a massive 
and sustained increase in attention to eminent domain. The effect clearly decayed over time, but 
persisted for more than two years.  
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Table 3.3. State Adoption of Legislative Eminent Domain Reform, by Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Alabama Alabama Connecticut California + Delaware 
Ohio Alaska Maryland Nevada + Texas + 
Texas Colorado Michigan Rhode Island   
  Florida + Montana     
  Georgia Nevada     
  Idaho New Mexico     
  Illinois North Dakota     
  Indiana Ohio     
  Iowa South Carolina     
  Kansas Texas     
  Kentucky Utah     
  Louisiana + Virginia*     
  Maine Washington     
  Michigan + Wyoming     
  Minnesota      
  Missouri       
  Nebraska       
  Nevada       
  New Hampshire +       
  North Carolina       
  North Dakota +       
  Oregon       
  Pennsylvania       
  South Carolina +       
  South Dakota       
  Tennessee       
  Utah       
  Vermont       
  West Virginia       
  Wisconsin       
Note: All reforms were adopted in the conventional legislative mode unless noted 
with an * or an +. States denoted with an asterisk (*) adopted their reforms 
through popular initiatives or referenda, states denoted with a plus-sign (+) 
adopted a constitutional amendment. States are listed in alphabetical order to 
facilitate reference. States are listed multiple times if they adopted substantively 
different reforms in multiple years. 
 
The Court’s decision in Kelo was also extremely unpopular. Polls in the weeks after the 
decision found that huge majorities of Americans disagreed with the decision: 81% of 
89 
 
respondents to a Saint Index survey expressed disagreement with the Court, as did 95% of 
respondents to a Zogby poll (see Strother 2016). State-level polls generally comported with these 
national averages (Strother 2016; Somin 2015). This massive increase in coverage of eminent 
domain issues, combined with the significant public disfavor for the Court’s ruling, created a 
“political opportunity structure” for significant policy change. That is, the salience and 
unpopularity of the issues created incentives for electorally minded office holders to “do 
something” about the problem (Mayhew 1974). And we see in fact that thirty-nine states adopted 
statutory or constitutional reforms during this period of heightened salience (Table 3.3). 
Additionally, the Court’s decision profoundly affected public opinion. Kelo was an 
unusually newsworthy decision because of the sympathetic plaintiffs and the strident 
disagreements over the decision between the justices in the majority and the dissenters, making it 
a prime candidate to cause an opinion backlash (Zilis 2015; Strother 2017a). Further, Strother 
(2016) argues that the substance of the Court’s ruling—upholding “broad” economic 
development takings—caused the public to strongly disapprove of eminent domain. Thus 
heightened and long-lasting media coverage of a decision which caused strong negative reactions 
among virtually all subsets of the public created a unique opportunity for interested parties to 
pursue policy change in this area. Court decisions, at least highly salient ones, have the potential 
to focus mass opinion and reframe political debates (Franklin and Kosaki 1989; Engel 2013; 
Egan, Persily, and Wallsten 2008). Recognizing this power, Christenson and Glick (2015) argue 
that after cases such as Lawrence v. Texas, “[i]t is unclear how much we should attribute opinion 
changes to the direction of the Court’s ruling, and how much we should attribute to it simply 
priming gay rights issues” (2015: 883; see also Engel 2013). To be sure, even if the Court did not 
alter the substance of public opinion, by focusing attention on eminent domain, it made the 
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public’s strongly anti-taking views salient, and in doing so opened a window of opportunity for 
policy entrepreneurs to push anti-takings policies in legislatures around the country (Somin 
2015). 
Discussion: Judicial Power and Judicial Impact 
 These cases can teach us much about the nature of judicial power and the scope of 
judicial impact. First, they show that the Court’s power is more robust is often appreciated by 
scholars working in the impact tradition. Second, they show that the “compliance” approach to 
the study of judicial impact is fundamentally limited in two ways: it can only speak to a subset of 
the Court’s decisions, and even for decisions to which it can be applied, the compliance approach 
can tell only a partial story of case impact. Third, Supreme Court decisions can have a huge 
range of impacts on politics and policy: they can increase the salience of an issue, they can 
provoke Congressional or presidential responses, and they can spur interest group or mass 
activism to name just a few. I draw out each of these points below.  
First, to the extent that the Court issued clear orders requiring behavioral deviations from 
the status quo in the above cases, the relevant actors largely complied with those decisions. 
Additionally, in all of the cases discussed the Court presented an authoritative interpretation of a 
clause or provision of the constitution which lower courts were bound to follow. Thus to the 
extent that the rule of law announced in each case required an observable change in lower court 
behavior, we observed lower court compliance. From these case studies we can infer that the 
Court is able to exercise power over other actors’ behavior even when it declines to use its power 
to impose constitutional limitations on other government institutions. As such, theories of 
judicial power must countenance such cases. 
 Second, and relatedly, the conventional compliance formula is considerably strained by 
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moving away from Court reversals of policies set by other state actors and examining instead 
cases in which the Court does not invalidate laws or practices. The formula is strained for two 
reasons: first, the Court does not always change the law or issue an order which requires any 
observable change in behavior from implementing actors; second, even when the Court does 
alter doctrine, such decisions may permit changes in behavior, but not require them. As a result, 
only a small subset of non-invalidation cases can be studied using the compliance formula. The 
case studies presented here demonstrate that when the Court does change the law or issue an 
unambiguous order in these non-invalidation cases, lower courts comply with those decisions. 
That is, by putting focus on compliance with the legal policy announced in each decision we can 
significantly broaden the applicability of the compliance formula, and shed new light on that 
aspect of the Court’s impact on policy. For example, in the study of Employment Division v. 
Smith, I showed that the decision to alter Free Exercise doctrine in that case (replacing the 
Sherbert rule with the new rule of neutrality and general applicability) significantly changed 
policy on the ground in the area of free exercise. However, the discussion of Kelo shows that 
even this broadened approach to compliance is limited: indeed, compliance is an essentially 
useless concept with respect to Kelo as the Court did not significantly change legal policy or 
issue an order requiring an observable deviation in behavior, and thus rendered compliance 
nonfalsifiable with respect to that case.  
This points to the third key takeaway, which is that judicial power, which is captured by 
compliance studies, tells only part of the story of judicial impact. Kelo had tremendous impact on 
eminent domain policy despite the fact that it did not directly change law or policy. Even in cases 
for which the compliance formula gives us some traction, such as Furman v. Georgia and 
Employment Division v. Smith, the compliance story is decidedly incomplete. The indirect effects 
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of those decisions—such as spurring responses from Congress and state legislatures—are 
arguably even more consequential than the direct effects captured by the compliance approach. 
More generally, with respect to impact, these cases show that there are numerous types of effects 
that can be caused by judicial decisions: they can increase the public salience of an issue and/or 
put the issue on the agenda of other policymakers, they can provoke Congressional or 
presidential responses or responses from state governments, they can spur interest group or mass 
activism, they can influence public opinion, and more. The variety of effects discussed in the 
above cases is certainly not exhaustive. In fact, it is likely impossible to define the range of 
possible effects of Court decisions before they are rendered. In any event, the fact of multifarious 
modes of impact points to the utility of the policy-oriented conceptualization of impact suggested 
here. By focusing on a case or series of cases within a given issue domain and in their 
institutional context, and by studying the pathways by which Court influence ultimately led to 
changes in policy, we can see that the Supreme Court routinely shapes American politics and 
policy. I build on these insights in chapters five, six, and seven, by studying the Court’s influence 
on the public agenda, the president’s agenda, and the agendas of the political parties.  
Conclusions 
 The foregoing discussion point to a few key considerations for students of impact and 
judicial power. One clear implication of these findings is that the Court can and does exercise 
power over the behavior of actors outside of the context of judicial reversals of policies 
established by other institutions. As such, studies of judicial power that omit any consideration of 
non-reversals are limited at best, and likely biased. Hall’s (2011) study is remarkably effective at 
explaining patterns of compliance when the Court invalidates statutes, but the two-by-two 
scheme he uses to predict compliance does not translate well to non-invalidations. His concept of 
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“lateral” implementers appears only to be relevant in the subset of cases in which the Court 
strikes laws down as unconstitutional. A fuller theory of the nature of Supreme Court power 
must explain that power in broader set of contexts. That is, the power to invalidate statutes has 
been aptly described as the Court’s “most potent power” (Keith 2008), but unless we are 
prepared to stipulate that the Court only exercises power by invalidating statutes on 
constitutional grounds, which the above case studies demonstrate is not the case, we must strive 
to develop a theory which can speak to cases outside this narrow context. 
 These limitations of the compliance formula point also to a major shortcoming in the 
broader judicial impact literature: compliance is important, but it leaves much of what is properly 
understood as judicial impact unexplored. I have argued that there is much more to the story of 
Employment Division v. Smith than what a compliance study can tell. The fact that lower courts 
implemented the Court’s Smith ruling fails to explain subsequent developments in Free Exercise 
doctrine and practice, such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, City of Boerne v. Flores, 
and so on, all of which are directly attributable to the Court’s decision in Smith. Similarly, to 
focus on compliance with Gregg v. Georgia (or Furman v. Georgia) is to miss the larger picture 
of rapid development in capital punishment policy of which those cases are only part. The impact 
of Gregg can only be understood in the broader context of death penalty politics in the 1960s and 
1970s. The Supreme Court issued a controversial decision which effectively abolished the death 
penalty as it was then practiced in Furman v. Georgia. This decision was complied with (Hall 
2011), but as with Employment Division v. Smith, to focus on compliance is to miss the forest for 
the trees. More important is the fact Furman directly precipitated a host of constitutional and 
legislative politics aimed at both reversing and further entrenching that decision. 
94 
 
To be clear, none of these things are direct outcomes of intentional exercises of Court 
power, but they are emphatically impacts of Court decisions. As such, I argue that the 
conceptualization of judicial impact as compliance is incomplete, and that the policy-oriented 
view adopted here much better explains the Court’s role in American politics and policymaking. 
For example, students of the Court would do well to follow in the footsteps of other 
institutionalists by probing the role of the Supreme Court as a major political agenda setter for 
the other institutions of government.  
 The above studies point to the limitations of the conventional compliance formula, and to 
the utility of the study of compliance generally. While the Supreme Court can and does exercise 
power over actors in the political system outside of the context of judicial reversals of policies, a 
narrow focus on power misses much of the real-world importance of judicial action. Put 
differently, the reality of Court power certainly affects politics in important ways, but Court 
decisions have important effects that are not attributable to its power to influence the behavior of 
other actors. As such, I argue that we must adopt a broader conception of judicial impact which 
considers all of the policy-relevant effects of a given decision. Existing literatures point to paths 
forward in this endeavor: a focus on the policy-relevance of Court decisions would have us 
consider the impacts of decisions on the political agenda, on motivation or incentive to act, and 
on public opinion along with more typical behavioral-compliance stories. By focusing on policy 
development, scholars can systematize the study of these disparate elements in order to achieve a 
better understanding of the Court’s role in processes of political contestation that continually 
produce and alter policy. 
 Returning to the example of Employment Division v. Smith, this approach would have us 
consider the importance of lower court’s application of the new doctrinal rule to the free exercise 
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of religion, as well as how that decision was received by the public and political elites, how those 
political actors altered policy in turn (RFRA), and the subsequent iterative battle over free 
exercise (City of Boerne v. Flores, RLPA, RLUIPA, Cutter v. Wilkinson, etc.). By focusing on 
the policy back-and-forth between the branches instead of mere compliance with Smith and 
Boerne, we gain a more accurate and more nuanced understanding of the Court’s role in 
American politics. 
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Chapter 4: 
The Rarely Constrained Court: 
The Influence of External Constraints on Supreme Court Decisions 
 
The theory presented in chapter two strongly suggests that the Supreme Court should be 
able to interpret the law with minimal meddling from outside forces. That is, if the Court’s power 
is fundamentally interpretive, as I have argued, then the Court should be mostly free from 
outside influence in exercising this power. Further, I have argued that most Supreme Court 
decisions are “vertical” (meaning they can be implemented by lower federal courts), which 
suggests that the Court need not worry much that unpopular decisions might not be implemented. 
After all, few political elites are likely to care about the vagaries of constitutional law; members 
of Congress, for example, care about getting elected, not Commerce clause doctrine (Mayhew 
1974; Pickerill 2004; Hall 2011). The majority of judicial decisions are implemented by lower 
courts, over whom the Supreme Court has substantial hierarchical control, which implies that 
fear of nonimplementation should not much constrain the Court (cf. Hall 2011; Hall 2014; Hall 
2016). Relatedly, sanctions from a coordinate branch are exceedingly rare, rendering that threat 
fairly impotent (Sala and Spriggs 2004; Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011; Hall 2014).  
A major focus of judicial politics research has been the extent to which the Supreme 
Court is constrained or influenced by external forces such as public opinion or institutional 
pressure from the coordinate branches of government. This question of external constraint has 
perennially occupied students of the Court because it has profound implications for the long-
standing debates over the Court’s role as a policymaker in the American political system (Dahl 
1957; Segal 1997; Keck 2007; Clark 2009). The extent of judicial independence, from the people 
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and from their elected representatives, suggests the extent to which the Court has a free hand to 
impose its policy preferences on the country. Thus the possibility of constraint also has 
implications for the “countermajoritarian difficulty,” as a constrained Court is perhaps less 
“deviant” in a democratic polity than an unconstrained Court (Bickel 1986; Hall 2016). On the 
other hand, if a key benefit of an independent judiciary is insulation from routine political 
pressures, then a highly constrained Court may not “act according to the law” but rather attend to 
“the will of the political branches of government” (Breyer 1995: 989). As such, answering this 
question has important empirical and normative implications for American politics, broadly 
considered. 
To the extent that political elites do care about Court decisions, they typically do so 
because of the policy effects those decisions have (or are expected to have) (e.g. Barnes 2004). 
The “people themselves” have only vague notions of what the Constitution says or means, and 
these views are generally not typically well thought out; rather, ideas about constitutionalism 
tend to correlate highly with what one’s preferred political elites think about the constitution. It is 
of course the case that Congress and the president can influence judicial decisions in some cases: 
the “political” branches can level unambiguous threats to the Court regarding a pending case 
(Glick 2009), they can sanction the Court for issuing an unfavorable decision (Engel 2011; Clark 
2009; however, as noted above, such sanctions are relatively rare), or they can signal their 
preferences to the Court while the decisions is still pending (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Salokar 
1992; Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman 2005).  
However, this view—that the Court should be largely unconstrained in its decision-
making—stands in contrast to the generally-accepted understanding of the Court in the 
separation of powers literature. A major focus of judicial politics research has been the extent to 
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which the Supreme Court is constrained or influenced by external forces such as public opinion 
or institutional pressure from the coordinate branches of government. This question of external 
constraint has perennially occupied students of the Court because it has profound implications 
for the long-standing debates over the Court’s role as a policymaker in the American political 
system (Dahl 1957; Segal 1997; Keck 2007; Clark 2009). The extent of judicial independence, 
from the people and from their elected representatives, suggests the extent to which the Court has 
a free hand to impose its policy preferences on the country. Thus the possibility of constraint also 
has implications for the “countermajoritarian difficulty” as a constrained Court is perhaps less 
“deviant” in a democratic polity than an unconstrained Court (Bickel 1986; Hall 2016). On the 
other hand, if a key benefit of an independent judiciary is insulation from routine political 
pressures, then a highly constrained Court may not “act according to the law” but rather attend to 
“the will of the political branches of government” (Breyer 1995: 989). As such, answering this 
question has important empirical and normative implications for American politics, broadly 
considered. 
 Most scholarship in this area has found that the Supreme Court is in fact constrained by 
external forces, at least under some circumstances (Hall 2014; Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 
2011; Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011; Clark 2009). As such, recent research has largely 
shifted focus from the fact of constraint to the conditions under which the Court is more or less 
constrained, and to the mechanisms by which such constraints might operate (e.g. Peabody 
2011). Today, most scholars agree that the Court is constrained by some combination of its 
desire for institutional maintenance (Friedman 2009; Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011; 
Hall 2014), and rational anticipation of possible adverse reactions (Harvey and Friedman 2006; 
Clark 2009; Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 2011).  
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In many of these accounts, case salience is theorized to play a key role in the operation of 
external constraint on the Court, as adverse responses to judicial decisions are thought to be 
much more likely in salient than non-salient cases. This expectation has been supported by 
members of the Court itself; an anonymous justice stated in an interview that “we read the 
newspapers and see what is being said—probably more than most people do…We know if there 
is a lot of public interest; we have to be careful not to reach too far” (Clark 2009: 973). Several 
leading theories of judicial constraint find empirical support for this observation. In one recent 
study of constraints on the Court, Hall (2014) finds that the Supreme Court is constrained in 
salient cases—especially in its decisions that cannot be implemented by lower courts. In another 
study, Bailey and Maltzman (2011) find that the Court responds to changes in preferences in the 
elected branches, and that these effects are most pronounced in salient cases.   
These findings stand in stark contrast to that of Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth (2011), 
who contend that the Court is constrained in its non-salient cases, as it seeks to avoid activating 
latent opinion that might erode its institutional legitimacy, but not in its salient cases, in which 
the policy stakes are high. Similarly, Bartels (2011) finds that justices are significantly more 
likely to vote ideologically in salient cases, suggesting that the justices are not strongly 
constrained in such cases. Thus leading accounts of the operation of external constraint on the 
Supreme Court reach diametrically opposed conclusions. However, in testing these theories 
scholars have uniformly relied on post-decision measures of case salience—but post-decision 
salience is clearly endogenous to the decision rendered by the Court. Further, post-decision 
salience is theoretically distinct from the salience of the case that came before the Court. 
Reliance on an endogenous measure of a key explanatory variable prevents us from adjudicating 
between these competing models of constraint. In this paper, I reexamine these competing 
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theories using two theoretically appropriate and complementary measures of pre-decision case 
salience. Ultimately, I conclude that the Supreme Court is much less constrained by 
Congressional and public preferences than we have typically thought.  
Theories of External Constraint on the Supreme Court 
 Scholars have been drawn to questions regarding the separation of powers, including 
judicial independence and constraint, because of the theoretical and normative importance of 
their implications for American democracy. Studies in this rich tradition of scholarship have 
often found that the Supreme Court is constrained, at least to some degree or under some 
circumstances (Mishler and Sheehan 1993; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Segal and Westerland 
2005; Clark 2009; Engel 2011; Segal et al. 2011; Bailey and Maltzman 2011; Casillas, Enns, and 
Wohlfarth 2011; Enns and Wohlfarth 2013; Marshall, Curry, and Pacelle 2014; Hall 2014; Bryan 
and Kromphardt 2016), though a few contest this finding (e.g. Segal 1997; Sala and Spriggs 
2004; Giles, Blackstone, and Vining 2008; Owens 2010). As a result, many recent works have 
sought to uncover the mechanisms by which such constraints operate (Clark 2009; Casillas, 
Enns, and Wohlfarth 2011; Segal, et al. 2011; Hall 2014). 
One frequently hypothesized mechanism is rational anticipation by the justices of 
sanctions from the coordinate branches. Several scholars have highlighted the many tools 
available to Congress, in particular, to sanction the Court: jurisdiction stripping, impeachment, 
reducing the Court’s budget, court-packing, altering decision rules, refusing to raise judicial 
salaries, eliminating courts or judges, ignoring decisions, tampering with bench size, etc. (Engel 
2011; Clark 2009; Rosenberg 2008). In light of the reality of these formal checks, many scholars 
working in the separation-of-powers tradition argue that the Court’s policy decisions are 
significantly influenced by the possibility of Congressional override (Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; 
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Harvey and Friedman 2006). As Epstein, Knight, and Martin put it: “why would justices who are 
preference maximizers take a position they know Congress would overturn?” (2001: 591). 
Indeed, this possibility of override may even influence the Court’s constitutional decisions (Dahl 
1957; Meernik and Ignagni 1997). However, the empirical case for the rational anticipation 
model is thin (Segal and Spaeth 2002; Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011). 
Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist (2011) argue that Congressional overrides are not a 
meaningful threat to the Court, and that their mere possibility is therefore unlikely to exert much 
influence over judicial behavior (see also Owens 2010; Segal and Westerland 2005). They posit 
instead that the Court is motivated by a concern for “institutional maintenance”—that is, a 
collective desire to maintain the institutional power and legitimacy by avoiding decisions that 
might prompt an attack from Congress (see also Harvey and Friedman 2006; Keck 2007). More 
important decisions may be more likely to garner Congressional attention—including rebukes, if 
the Court is not careful (Hall 2014; Lindquist and Solberg 2007). For example, Lindquist and 
Solberg (2007) argue that the Court is likely more sensitive to the preferences of other actors 
when it is considering a constitutional challenge to federal statute. Moreover, if the justices are 
concerned with the possibility of sanctions from Congress they may also be more attentive to 
public opinion in such cases (Hall 2014; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Mishler and Sheehan 
1993). 
Some recent works have suggested the Court is directly responsive to changes in public 
opinion, though again the mechanism through which this potential constraint operates is subject 
to debate (McGuire and Stimson 2004; Giles, Blackstone, and Vining 2008; Epstein and Martin 
2010; Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 2011; Bartels 2011; Enns and Wohlfarth 2013). Giles, 
Blackstone, and Vining (2008) suggest that justices respond to changes in public opinion through 
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a slow process of individual attitude change. That is, they contend that Supreme Court justices 
are subject to the same social forces as is the public at large, and thus their beliefs and attitudes 
evolve in a similar fashion to those of the general public (see also Mishler and Sheehan 1996). 
Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth (2011) offer a different mechanism: justices’ desire to maintain 
institutional legitimacy leads them to strategically respond to public opinion. They develop an 
original measure to control for “social change” in an effort to isolate the effects of attitudinal 
change and external influence from public opinion, and conclude that public opinion constrains 
judicial decision making in nonsalient cases (Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 2011: 75-78, 84-86). 
Relatedly, Bartels (2011) argues that because the stakes are highest in salient cases, justices are 
least constrained by public opinion in those cases.  
Hall (2014) offers a very different picture of the operation of external constraints on the 
Court. He argues that because research suggests that public support for the Court is both high 
and resistant to change (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003; Bybee 2010), and because sanctions 
on the Court are so rare (Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011; Owens 2010; Segal and 
Westerland 2005), neither of the above mechanisms is likely to significantly constrain the Court. 
Hall posits instead that the “justices’ concern for institutional maintenance may be partially 
rooted in a fear of nonimplementation” of its decisions (2014: 354; see also Friedman 2009). 
Recurrent nonimplementation, he argues, might reduce the power and legitimacy of the Court in 
the long run (see also Cross and Nelson 2001; Owens 2005; Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 2011). 
Importantly, while it may be quite difficult for Congress or the president to formally sanction the 
Court (Clark 2009), it is relatively easy for them to ignore its decisions (Engel 2011; Rosenberg 
2008). 
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Hall (2014) draws on a key theoretical distinction, developed in his 2011 book, between 
“vertical” and “lateral” cases to test this theory. Hall (2011) argues that the Supreme Court has 
significant power to implement its decisions in “vertical cases” (those concerning criminal or 
civil liability) because lower courts, over which the Court has significant hierarchical control, 
directly implement such rulings. Lateral cases, on the other hand, must be implemented by other 
(i.e. non-court) actors, over whom the Court has little power. As such, he reasons that the Court 
will be constrained by popular preferences and by Congress in its lateral decisions, precisely 
because implementation of those decisions relies on nonjudicial actors. Ultimately, Hall 
concludes that fear of nonimplementation is indeed a crucial factor motivating Supreme Court 
responses to external pressures: “When deciding important lateral cases, the Court is highly 
constrained by external forces because it lacks the necessary implementation powers to give 
efficacy to its rulings in the absence of popular and/or elite support” (2014: 364). Bailey and 
Maltzman reach a similar conclusion, arguing that “separation of powers constraints are more 
binding on politically salient issues” (2011: 117).  
In short, these leading theories of external constraint on the Court hold that case salience 
is a key factor in the operation of constraint from both mass and elite sources (Hall 2014; 
Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 2011; Bryan and Kromphardt 2016; Bailey and Maltzman 2011; 
Bartels 2011). In these accounts, justices’ desire to maintain their reserve of diffuse institutional 
support, and their fear of nonimplementation of their decisions, cause them to alter their behavior 
(decisions) under some conditions. In particular, Casillas et al. (2011) argue that this constraint 
operates in nonsalient cases; Hall (2014) argues it operates primarily in salient cases—especially 
salient “lateral” cases. 
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The Importance of Case Salience 
 It has been frequently noted that the salience of a given case may influence justices’ 
thinking and behavior with respect to that case (Bartels 2011; Bailey and Maltzman 2011; 
Collins and Cooper 2012; Black, Sorenson, and Johnson 2013; Clark, Lax, and Rice 2015). This 
observation is an important part of the basis for the competing theories of the operation of 
external constraints on the Court discussed above. Some, such as Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 
(2011) and Bartels (2011) argue that the Court should be most attentive to public opinion in 
nonsalient cases because the Court must maintain its reservoir of “diffuse support” by saving 
“countermajoritarian” decisions for a select few cases that are particularly important or 
influential. Scholars including Hall (2014) and Bailey and Maltzman (2011), on the other hand, 
suggest that constraint from both public opinion and Congress should operate most significantly 
on the Court in the context of salient cases, perhaps because its unpopular, salient decisions 
might not be implemented by non-court actors.  
 These studies, however, may not have adequately accounted for the influence of case 
salience on Court action in their models. Salience is a latent quality that some cases possess—or 
perhaps that all cases possess in different measure. In general, this latent quality speaks to the 
contemporaneous importance of a given case. This importance may be due to legal or political 
significance, controversialness, expected impact, or other factors (Clark et al. 2015; Black, 
Sorenson, and Johnson 2013; Collins and Cooper 2012; Epstein and Segal 2000). Scholars have 
adopted a number of strategies to try to proxy this latent quality of interest, including media 
coverage (e.g. Clark et al. 2015; Collins and Cooper 2012; Epstein and Segal 2000), interest 
group participation as amicus curiae (e.g. Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000; Collins 
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2011), and the level of engagement individual justices display in cases (Black, Sorenson, and 
Johnson 2013).  
Because salience is a key factor theorized to influence the operation of external constraint 
on the Court, specification and measurement of salience are critical. Virtually all research in this 
literature relies on Epstein and Segal’s (2000) case salience measure. Epstein and Segal’s (2000) 
measure is media based: cases are coded as salient if they appeared on the front page of the New 
York Times the day after the decision is announced, and as non-salient otherwise. Numerous 
scholars have pointed out that this measure, though widely used, has significant shortcomings 
(Clark, Lax, and Rice 2015; Black, Sorenson, and Johnson 2013; Collins and Cooper 2012). For 
example, the Epstein-Segal measure is overly-conservative and yields too many false negatives 
(Clark, Lax, and Rice 2015). This is the case in part because space on the front page of the New 
York Times is both scarce and in high demand, and thus a multitude of considerations likely 
influence the substance of the front page (Collins and Cooper 2012). This data draws on only one 
news source, and thus may be systematically influenced by internal idiosyncrasies (Collins and 
Cooper 2012; Clark, Lax, and Rice 2015), and may magnify natural fluctuations in the news 
cycle (Boydstun 2008).  Relatedly, the Epstein and Segal measure is dichotomous—cases are 
either salient or nonsalient—which masks the wide variability in salience actually observed in 
cases (Clark, Lax, and Rice 2015; Black, Sorenson, and Johnson 2013; Collins and Cooper 
2012). 
Most crucially, though, its use is problematic in application to judicial decision making 
research because salience is measured after the case is decided, and thus the salience captured by 
this measure could not have caused or influenced the decision. As Clark and colleagues put it, 
“While claims of causation are always suspect in observational research, measuring a treatment 
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by proxy after the observed outcome is a particularly troublesome form of posttreatment bias. If 
decisions and related choices affect the salience measure (coverage of the decisions themselves), 
then even if salience itself affects decisions or choices, our estimate of that effect can be biased 
in an unknown direction” (2015: 42). Epstein and Segal’s measure, if it is to be validly used as a 
measure of salience that might influence judicial decision making, relies on the assumption that 
salience before a decision correlates highly with post-decision salience. Put differently, the 
Epstein-Segal measure and other measures of post-decision media coverage or importance 
capture the salience of the Court’s decision; measures of pre-decision media coverage or 
importance, on the other hand, capture the salience of the case when it came before the Court. 
This distinction is crucial because the salience of any given Court decision is clearly endogenous 
to the decision rendered by the Court. Put differently, in deciding a given case the Court itself 
may make that case much more (or less) salient than it was before having been decided.  
This theoretical distinction points to the importance of the strategy employed to proxy 
salience. Epstein and Segal’s (2000) salience measure is a dummy variable that takes on a “1” 
value if the case appeared on the front page of the New York Times the day after it was decided, 
and a “0” otherwise. That is, this measure clearly captures the salience of Supreme Court 
decisions, but it is less clear that it captures the salience of the case that comes before the Court. 
Scholars have sought to address this issue by developing measures of salience of cases as 
they come to the Court. Clark, Lax, and Rice (2015), for example, also rely on media coverage, 
though their data includes all media mentions of Court cases in the first section of the New York 
Times, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times. In addition to drawing from a wider 
range of media sources, their data also comes from a much wider timespan: they collect data on 
cases from one year before the case is decided, to one year after, and most importantly, they 
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differentiate between coverage at different stages of a case’s life, including between pre- and 
post-decision coverage. These data offer a significant improvement over the Epstein-Segal 
measure for studies of judicial decision making because they allow the researcher to restrict the 
measure of salience to pre-decision salience and thus to test the effect of the salience of the case 
as it came before the Court. In other words, this measure avoids the endogeneity problem of 
post-decision measures in that it only captures case salience before a given decision is handed 
down by the Court.  
As noted above, measures of post-decision salience, such as the Epstein-Segal measure, if 
they are to validly used to proxy the salience that might influence judicial decision making, rely 
on the assumption that post-decision and pre-decision salience correlate at a high level. Pre- and 
post-decision salience do not correlate highly, however. When pre-decision coverage and post-
decision salience are both specified using media measures they only correlate at 0.23 (Clark et al. 
2015 and Epstein-Segal 2000, respectively, specifying both as dummy variables).36  
This low level of correlation is likely due both to the overly-conservative nature of the 
Epstein-Segal measure, and to the fact that pre- and post-decision salience of cases differ in 
important ways. Substantively, the theoretical distinction between the latent concepts captured 
by these measures, and the extremely low level of correlation between those measures, casts 
doubt on findings in which salience was argued to significantly influence behavior at the 
Supreme Court, but which relied on an ex post measure of salience. As such, theories of external 
constraint on the Court must be tested utilizing chronologically appropriate measures of salience. 
                                                 
36 For these correlations, all variables are specified as dummy variables, taking on a “1” value on cases that received 
any pre- or post- decision coverage (respectively). Pre-decision salience is coded so that roughly the same 
proportion of cases are coded as salient as in the Epstein and Segal measure, approximately 15% of cases. This is 
accomplished by restricting cases coded as “salient” pre-decision to those covered in 3 or more pre-decision news 
stories for the media measure, and as the 15% of cases in which the justices exhibited the highest levels of 
engagement.   
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To this point I have argued that because salience is a key factor theorized to condition the 
operation of external constraint on the Court, specification and measurement of salience are 
critical. The specification relied on in many important studies in the Law and Courts literature is 
inappropriate for studies of judicial decision making, in that some phenomenon X at time t 
clearly cannot have caused or influenced Y at time t-1. In the following section, I empirically 
reexamine leading theories of external constraint on the Court, which reached opposite 
conclusions regarding the role of case salience in the operation of constraints on judicial action, 
using chronologically appropriate measures of case salience.  
Empirical Assessment of Constraints on the Supreme Court 
In this section I empirically reassess two competing theories of external constraint on the 
Supreme Court—those of Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth (2011) and Hall (2014)—utilizing 
theoretically and chronologically appropriate measures of case salience. With the exception of 
the salience measures, all data were obtained from the original authors’ replication files. These 
data allow me to test the theories against cases decided from 1956 to 2000 in the time series 
analysis, and from 1956 to 2007 in cross-sectional analyses. To reiterate, because pre- and post-
decision salience differ significantly, and because accurately distinguishing between salient and 
nonsalient cases is crucial to these theories of external constraint on the Court, I utilize Clark, 
Lax, and Rice’s (2015) 37 measure of pre-decision salience.38 
In their analyses, Casillas and colleagues (2011) operationalize Court output in the 
aggregate, as the percentage of liberal decisions each term among all cases that reverse the lower 
court’s ruling, in salient and nonsalient cases respectively (see also McGuire and Stimson 2004). 
                                                 
37 Harvard Dataverse, V1: http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/29637 
38 As a robustness check, I also dichotomize the salience measures, and reestimate the models using these dummy 
variables, and at different levels of salience. The core findings are robust to these alternative specifications—see the 
supplementary materials for full presentation of these models.  
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As such, in their analyses the dependent variables are the percentages of reversals of lower court 
decisions decided in the liberal direction among cases that appeared on the front page of the New 
York Times the day after they were decided (DV1), and among those that did not appear on the 
front page of the New York Times the day after they were decided (DV2). As argued above, post-
decision salience clearly could not cause or influence judicial behavior in the decision-making 
process. Thus in order to retest their theory, I first constructed a new dependent variable series in 
which I differentiate between cases that were salient before they were decided on the one hand, 
and cases that were not salient before they were decided on the other. This approach required 
dichotomizing the salience measure, in that it required the creation of two discrete series 
delineated by their “salience.” For this purpose, I coded the most salient 15% of cases in Clark, 
Lax, and Rice’s (2015) dataset as “salient” and all others as “nonsalient.” This proportion 
matches the proportion of cases coded as salient in the Epstein and Segal data.39  
After creating the new dependent variables, I retest Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth’s 
(2011) theory. The measure of public opinion is Stimson’s Policy Mood (Stimson 1999), which 
incorporates data on public opinion from hundreds of survey questions to capture the public’s 
changing preferences on a single liberal-conservative dimension. Virtually all studies of the 
influence of public opinion on the Court rely on this measure (Hall 2014; Casillas, Enns, and 
Wohlfarth 2011; Giles, Blackstone, and Vining 2008; McGuire and Stimson 2004). Segal-Cover 
median scores are used to control for the justices’ ideology (Segal and Cover 1989). A major 
contribution of Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth’s article was their novel approach to control for 
“social forces,” which have long been theorized to influence both justices and the public at large: 
                                                 
39 As a robustness test, I relaxed the threshold for qualification as “salient,” and coded all cases receiving any pre-
decision news coverage as “salient,” and only coded cases as “nonsalient” if they received no pre-decision news 
coverage: the findings are robust to this alternative coding. See Table A1 in the appendix for the full models.  
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they utilize Martin-Quinn (2002) scores, which provide a dynamic measure of justice’s revealed 
preferences, and rely on the two-stage least-squares (TSLS) estimation to get around the 
potential problem of circularity introduced by use of the Martin-Quinn scores (see generally 
Enns et al. 2016). In brief, TSLS generates predicted values of the Martin-Quinn score by 
regressing these scores on a series of exogenous instruments—in this case, the social forces 
theorized to simultaneously influence the justices and the public: the overall liberalness of 
national policy, changes in the economy, unemployment, inflation, income inequality, and crime 
rate (for an extended discussion see Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 2011: 78). Thus the first stage 
of the model isolates changes in the ideology measure from changes in the measure of public 
mood; the second stage uses the predicted values of judicial preferences to assess the influence 
of the independent variables on changes in observed ideological outcomes of judicial decisions. 
All variables are coded such that higher values correspond to liberal preferences and outcomes, 
and lower values correspond to conservative outcomes.40 Analyses include all formally decided 
cases reversing lower court decisions from the 1956 through 2000 Supreme Court terms. Table 1 
reports the results of the second stage of this TSLS analysis.  
The analyses presented in Table 4.1 are decidedly mixed with respect to the theories 
being tested. The models suggest that the Court is somewhat constrained in its salient decisions 
but not in its nonsalient decisions. In salient cases, the influence of Public Mood is relatively 
small and only marginally significant (p=0.097). Notably, this influence of public mood on Court 
outputs is more immediate than has been previously thought (Casillas et al. 2011; Giles et al. 
2008). Substantively, the model indicates that as public mood becomes more liberal, the 
proportion of liberal Court decisions in salient cases increases, net of controls: a one-unit (that is, 
                                                 
40 I obtained these measures from the replication data of Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth (2011), available at: Harvard 
Dataverse, V2: hdl:1902.1/14568. Detailed discussion of these measures can be found in the original article.  
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a one percentage-point) increase in public liberalness results in a 3.8% increase in liberal 
behavior in its salient cases. 
Table 4.1. The Influence of Public Opinion on Salient and Nonsalient Supreme Court 
Decisions While Controlling for Attitudinal Change, 1956-2000 
 Nonsalient Salient 
Short-Term (Immediate) Effects   
Δ Public Mood 1.34 3.80⁺ 
 (0.88) (2.29) 
Δ Court Ideology 11.06* -26.53* 
 (4.83) (13.44) 
Δ Social Forces (IV) 4.29 9.03 
 (3.42) (7.16) 
Long-Term Effects   
Public Mood t-1 0.80⁺ 1.37 
 (0.47) (1.11) 
Court Ideology t-1 9.59** 17.43* 
 (3.40) (8.79) 
Social Forces (IV) t-1 0.53 0.87 
 (2.41) (5.97) 
Error Correction Rate   
Percent Liberal t-1 -0.75*** -0.92*** 
 (0.15) (0.17) 
Constant -6.09 -30.97 
 (28.23) (67.73) 
Observations 45 38 
R-squared 0.43 0.54 
Note: Table reports results from TSLS regression models of decision making by the U.S. Supreme Court: the 
dependent variable represents the change in the percentage of liberal decisions issued by the Supreme Court each 
term (among reversals only) in nonsalient and salient cases, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⁺ p<0.1 (two-tailed test).  
 
In short, these analyses do not strongly support the contention that the Court is 
constrained in either its salient or its nonsalient decisions; indeed, we cannot conclude 
definitively that salient and nonsalient cases are statistically distinct. In summary, when the 
models are specified with chronologically appropriate measures of case salience, Casillas, Enns, 
and Wohlfarth’s (2011) theory of constraint in nonsalient cases receives limited empirical 
support. 
With these findings in mind, I now turn to a case-level analysis in order to more closely 
parse the effects of case salience on the operation of external constraints on the Court. As 
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discussed above, numerous accounts suggest that the Court should be more constrained in its 
salient decisions than in its nonsalient decisions (e.g. Bailey and Maltzman 2011; Bryan and 
Kromphardt 2016). Hall (2014) goes further, theorizing that the Court is constrained by its fear 
of nonimplementation of its decisions, and that this concern turns on case salience. He draws on 
a key theoretical distinction, developed in his 2011 book, between “vertical” and “lateral” cases 
to test this theory. Hall (2011) argues that the Supreme Court has significantly greater 
implementation power in “vertical cases” (those concerning criminal or civil liability) because 
lower courts directly implement such rulings. Lateral cases, on the other hand, must be 
implemented by other (i.e. non-court) actors. From this he reasons that the Court will be 
constrained by popular preferences and by Congress in its lateral decisions, precisely because 
implementation of those decisions relies on nonjudicial actors. Case salience is crucial to his 
analysis because, in his words: “First, my findings may be biased if lateral cases are more likely 
to be salient to the public and, therefore, attract public criticism. That is, the justices may fear 
public criticism rather than nonimplementation. Therefore, it is important to control for Salience. 
Second, my theory suggests that the justices primarily fear nonimplementation in important 
cases. Therefore, I expect constraint to be strongest in salient lateral cases” (2014: 357). 
Like Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth, though, Hall (2014) uses Epstein and Segal’s (2000) 
measure to capture salience, raising the problems of causality and chronology discussed above. I 
retest Hall’s theory to see if it holds when using chronologically appropriate measures of 
salience. As above, all other data and code are obtained from Hall’s replication files.41 Most of 
the variables are identical to those discussed in the previous section. Congressional Ideology is 
measured using Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) Common Space score for the median House and 
                                                 
41 Harvard Dataverse, V2: hdl:1902.1/22018.  
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Senate members each year, which are then averaged (Hall 2014). The Lateral variable is a 
dichotomous indicator coded as “zero” (i.e. “vertical”) if the case involves potential criminal 
penalties, potential monetary damages, or internal administration of lower courts, and coded as 
“one” otherwise (Hall 2014: 356). The dependent variable in this part of the study is the 
ideological direction of each Supreme Court decision (liberal decisions are coded as “1”, 
conservative decisions as “0”; decisions where ideological direction could not be determined 
were dropped). The sample includes 6,035 merits decisions issued by the Court between 1956 
and 2007. These models include natural Court fixed effects to control for the influence of 
changes in the Court’s composition. 
The results of these logit analyses are presented in Table 4.2. The column at left utilizes 
the continuous specification of the salience variable; the column at right utilizes a dichotomized 
version of the continuous variable which codes the top 15% of salient cases as “salient” and the 
rest as “nonsalient” so that the proportion of cases coded as salient mirrors the Epstein and Segal 
measure. The analyses presented here provide little support for the propositions that the Court is 
constrained by either Congress or the mass public, or that constraint is conditioned by salience. 
Note that the main effects of Congressional Ideology and Public Mood are insignificant in all 
models. Further, it is also notable that the interaction variables between Salience and ideology 
and mood are also insignificant. In all four cases, we cannot reject the null that there is no 
relationship between the variable of interest and the Court’s output. This suggests that, contra 
much work in this vein, the Court is not often constrained by external forces. 
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Table 4.2. The Impact of External Constraint on Supreme Court Decision Making 
 Continuous 
Pre-Decision 
Salience Measure 
Dichotomous 
Pre-Decision 
Salience Measure 
Main Effects   
Court Ideology 0.29*** 0.27** 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
Public Mood -0.08 -0.10 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
Congressional Ideology 0.07 0.09 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Lateral 0.13⁺ 0.17* 
 (0.07) (0.08) 
Pre-Decision Salience 0.02 0.10 
 (0.05) (0.09) 
Interaction Effects   
Public Mood x Lateral 0.03 -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Congressional Ideology x Lateral 0.01 -0.06 
 (0.07) (0.08) 
Public Mood x Salience -0.00 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.12) 
Congressional Ideology x Salient -0.08⁺ -0.10 
 (0.05) (0.08) 
Lateral x Salience 0.09 0.12 
 (0.10) (0.18) 
Public Mood x Lateral 0.21* 0.51* 
 x Salience (0.10) (0.21) 
Congressional Ideology x Lateral 0.14 0.28⁺ 
 x Salience (0.09) (0.16) 
Constant 1.13*** 1.12*** 
 (0.24) (0.24) 
Observations 6,035 6,035 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.034 0.035 
Note: Table reports results from logistic regression models of decision making by the U.S. Supreme Court: the 
dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the ideological direction of the decision is liberal. Natural Court fixed 
effects are omitted for presentation. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⁺ 
p<0.1 (two-tailed tests).  
 
With that said, Table 4.2 does provide support for Hall’s theory regarding the importance 
of implementation. The crucial variables testing Hall’s theory are the three-way interactions 
between Lateral, Salience, and Public Mood or Congressional Ideology.42 Note first that the 
                                                 
42 Note that Lateral exerts influence on Court decision making in the main effects portion of the analysis. Recall, 
however, that Lateral is an indicator that non-court actors will be tasked with implementation, and not a measure of 
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three-way interaction including Congressional Ideology does not rise to accepted levels of 
significance in any model specification, though it does approach significance in model using the 
dichotomized media measure of salience (p=0.076). The three-way interaction including Public 
Mood indicates that the Court is significantly constrained by the public in its lateral decisions 
that are salient in the media. This pattern of findings partially supports Hall, insofar as it suggests 
that the Court does indeed respond to the public, as he theorized; however the story regarding 
Congress is less clear. Figure 4.1 depicts the relationship graphically.  
Figure 4.1. Average Marginal Effects of Public Mood on Supreme Court Decisions 
 
                                                 
any source of constraint in itself. Put differently, there is no obvious reason to expect that the Court should be more 
liberal (the outcome variable) with respect to its lateral decisions than it is in its vertical decisions independent of 
influence from the public or Congress, yet that is precisely what the models indicate. Because most vertical cases 
concern criminal procedure, it is likely that this variable is actually just picking up the fact that the Court is, on 
average, more conservative in its criminal procedure decisions than it is in most other issue areas. 
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The graphs depict the marginal effect of Public Mood on the probability of a liberal 
decision being rendered in a given case at various levels of case salience in vertical and lateral 
cases, respectively. The graph at left indicates that in vertical cases, which are implemented by 
lower courts, mood has no discernible effect on Court outputs at any level of salience. The graph 
at right, however, shows that when decisions must be implemented by non-court actors (i.e. are 
lateral), mood significantly influences outputs—and the size of this effect grows as salience 
increases.  
Moreover, we have no strong evidence that salience influences or conditions the effect of 
constraints except in the narrow context of salient-lateral cases identified by Hall (2014). Put 
differently, these analyses suggest that external constraints only significantly influence the 
Supreme Court’s merits decisions in cases which are of high salience and which must be 
implemented by non-court actors. Importantly, such cases are quite rare, accounting for only 
about 2% of all decisions in the sample: 123 cases out of 6,035 are coded as both lateral and 
salient enough for Public Mood to influence the Court (from model at left in Table 2). These 
cases are undoubtedly important (the high level of salience suggests as much), but the fact of 
their relatively rarity has important normative implications for our understanding of the Court’s 
role in American politics.  
Finally, I turn attention to cases involving constitutional review of federal statutes in 
particular. A number of scholars working in this area have suggested that the Supreme Court 
may be most responsive to external constraints—perhaps especially to Congress—when it is 
exercising its constitutional review power (e.g. Meernik and Ignagni 1997; Segal et al. 2011; 
Hall 2014). These cases merit special attention here for two reasons. First, these cases receive 
extensive attention from students of law and courts because they most directly implicate the 
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countermajoritarian difficulty; that is, because the possibility of invalidation of a policy passed 
by a representative body is a poignant manifestation of the Court’s counter-democratic power. 
Second, while many scholars have studied the influence of external constraints on Court 
decision-making in the context of judicial review, none have examined the influence of case 
salience on the operation of those constraints in the particular context of judicial review. This is 
an important question, however: if justices fear nonimplementation of their decisions (Hall 
2014), criticism from other political elites (Baum and Devins 2009), and reprisals from the 
coordinate branches (Clark 2009; Engel 2011), then they should be especially wary of bucking 
the preferences of elites in this context. In order to probe this question, I estimate the influence of 
external constraints on the Court’s decisions in cases in which the Court is reviewing a federal 
statute and cases in which it is not separately.  
As above, I present the models using both the continuous (column at left) and 
dichotomous (column at right) specifications of the pre-decision salience variable. The findings 
presented in Table 4.3 indicate that the Court responds very differently to external forces in its 
judicial review and non-judicial review cases. With respect to the cases involving judicial review 
of federal statutes, we see that the Court is significantly influenced by Congress, but no such 
evidence of influence from the mass public is present. In particular, in these cases, 
Congressional Ideology exerts a direct and statistically significant effect on the Court’s 
decisions: a one standard deviation increase in Congressional liberalness corresponds to roughly 
a nine percentage point increase in the probability of a liberal decision. Additionally, the models 
indicate that the Court is further influenced by Congress in its judicial review cases that are both 
salient and which must be implemented by non-Court actors (i.e. lateral cases), net of controls. 
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Figure 4.2 depicts the effects of Congress on Court decision-making in federal judicial review 
cases graphically.  
Table 4.3. The Differential Impact of External Constraint on SCOTUS Decision Making 
 Judicial Review 
of Fed. Statutes 
All Other 
Cases 
Main Effects     
Court Ideology 0.56* 0.47⁺ 0.24** 0.23** 
 (0.27) (0.28) (0.09) (0.09) 
Public Mood -0.10 -0.28 -0.08 -0.10 
 (0.26) (0.29) (0.08) (0.08) 
Congressional Ideology 0.49⁺ 0.59* 0.03 0.06 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.07) (0.08) 
Lateral 0.42 0.68* 0.11 0.13 
 (0.26) (0.32) (0.07) (0.08) 
Salience (continuous) 0.20  0.01  
 (0.20)  (0.05)  
Salient (dichotomous)  0.67⁺  0.06 
  (0.37)  (0.10) 
Interaction Effects     
Public Mood x Lateral 0.30 0.26 0.01 -0.05 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.07) (0.07) 
Congressional Ideology x Lateral -0.18 -0.40 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.25) (0.30) (0.07) (0.09) 
Public Mood x Salience 0.42 0.87 -0.04 0.00 
 (0.27) (0.52) (0.06) (0.12) 
Congressional Ideology x Salient -0.19 -0.00 -0.09⁺ -0.12 
 (0.18) (0.31) (0.05) (0.09) 
Lateral x Salience 0.02 -0.61 0.09 0.16 
 (0.34) (0.56) (0.10) (0.19) 
Public Mood x Lateral -0.55 -0.78 0.30** 0.62** 
 x Salience (0.35) (0.69) (0.11) (0.23) 
Congressional Ideology x Lateral 0.76* 1.05* 0.08 0.19 
 x Salience (0.31) (0.51) (0.10) (0.17) 
Constant 0.08 -0.02 1.23*** 1.22*** 
 (0.87) (0.90) (0.26) (0.26) 
Observations 591 591 5,435 5,435 
Prob > χ2 0.002 0.002 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.076 0.075 0.034 0.034 
Note: Table reports results from logistic regression models of decision making by the U.S. Supreme Court: 
the dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the ideological direction of the decision is liberal. Natural 
Court fixed effects are omitted for presentation. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** 
p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⁺ p<0.1 (two-tailed tests). 
 
The graph at left in figure 4.2 depicts the direct effect that Congressional Ideology has on 
the probability of a liberal Supreme Court decision in judicial review cases. The graph at right 
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depicts the average marginal effect of Congressional Ideology on the Court in its salient-lateral 
decisions. This graph indicates that when decisions must be implemented by non-court actors 
(i.e. are lateral), Congress significantly influences the Court’s decision in judicial review cases, 
net of the direct effect depicted in the graph at left.  
Figure 4.2. Congressional Influence on Judicial Review Decisions 
 
 
The effects of external constraints in the rest of the Court’s work are much different. In 
the models concerning all cases except those involving constitutional review of federal statutes 
(the two models at right), we find no evidence of Congressional influence. However, both 
models reveal significant influence from the mass public. Again consistent with Hall’s 
perspective, this influence is limited to salient cases that rely on lateral actors for 
implementation. This effect is presented graphically in Figure 4.3. 
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The findings presented in Table 4.3 indicate that the Court appears to be responsive to 
both public opinion and Congressional preferences in cases in which it is reviewing federal 
statutes, but supplementary analyses reveal that these effects are less clear in cases in which it is 
reviewing the constitutionality of state or local statutes. This finding is consistent with some 
previous work, but is somewhat puzzling, just the same: Congress clearly has no power over the 
Court’s constitutional interpretation, but can easily override its statutory decisions, so why does 
the Court respond to Congressional preferences in cases over which Congress has little to no 
institutional power? And why does it appear to ignore Congressional preferences in the context 
of the most significant Congressional power? One answer may be something like “duty” (Keck 
2007); that is, the Court may be intentionally incorporating Congressional preferences out of a 
sense of institutional duty in precisely those cases over which Congress has no other recourse. 
Figure 4.3. Mass Public Influence on Decisions Except Federal Judicial Review 
 
The key takeaway from this portion of the analysis is that the Supreme Court responds 
very differently to external constraints in different institutional contexts. Congressional 
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preferences strongly and directly influence the Supreme Court’s decision-making in cases 
concerning constitutional review of federal statutes. However, these analyses also indicate that 
the Court is especially responsive to Congress in that subset of its judicial review decisions 
which are both salient and which must be implemented by non-court actors. Put differently, the 
Court regularly attends to Congress when considering invalidating a federal statute, but it is 
particularly attentive when that case must be implemented by outside actors and which has 
received significant media attention. In cases not concerning judicial review of federal statutes, 
however, I find no evidence that the Court responds to Congressional preferences. Indeed, in 
these cases the Court is largely unconstrained by external forces. However, consistent with 
Hall’s implementer dependence theory, I find that the Court is influenced by public opinion in 
these cases when the case is highly salient and must be implemented by non-court actors. In 
summary, I find that the Court is only significantly constrained by Congress when it is 
considering invalidating a federal statute, and by the public only when it is deciding highly 
salient cases which cannot be implemented by lower courts. It is important to keep in mind that 
while both of these institutional contexts in which constraints operate are substantively quite 
important, they are also relatively uncommon. In a large majority of the Court’s merits cases, I 
find no evidence that it is constrained by external forces. 
Discussion 
I have argued that most leading accounts of the operation of external constraints on the 
Supreme Court have been empirically tested using an endogenous measure of a key variable. I 
reexamined this important question utilizing a chronologically appropriate measure of salience in 
order to shed new light on the nature of external influences on the Court’s decision making. I 
find that case salience itself does not much influence the operation of external constraints on the 
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Court’s work. The time-series analyses presented in Table 1 provide some weak support for the 
proposition that the Court is constrained in its salient cases. Closer analysis indicates, however, 
that any effect of case salience is concentrated in those decisions that must be implemented by 
non-court actors, as theorized by Hall (2014). However, I modify Hall’s argument by showing 
that the Court’s fear of nonimplementation is not uniform across institutional contexts: the Court 
responds to Congress only when it is considering constitutional challenges to federal statutes.  
The analyses presented above have two major implications for the study of the Supreme 
Court in American politics. First, I have argued that the Supreme Court is rarely constrained by 
external forces. It is significantly constrained by public opinion only when it is considering cases 
which are highly salient and must be implemented by non-court actors. It is significantly 
constrained in its merits decisions by Congress only when it is considering constitutional 
challenges to federal statutes. Together, these two institutional contexts account for less than 
fifteen percent of the cases in the sample. To be clear, these are substantively important sets of 
cases, but the fact that no influence of external constraints is observed in a large majority of the 
Court’s decisions is notable. This finding has important implications for ongoing empirical and 
normative debates regarding the relative importance of judicial independence vis-à-vis 
democracy in practice in the United States. It suggests that the Court is rather more independent 
in its decision-making than prior works have often suggested. And while this may be heartening 
to those concerned about the potential for undue partisan influence over matters of law, it also 
suggests that the “countermajoritarian difficulty” may be alive and well (cf. Hall 2016). The 
Court may be less constrained than we have thought, but this not to say that the Court is the 
unconstrained super legislature that Brutus feared (Brutus XV 1788).  
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The second key contribution is methodological: numerous scholars have pointed out the 
significant inferential problems created by utilizing an ex post measure of case salience as an 
explanatory variable for judicial decision making. The analyses presented here lend credence to 
that concern, as leading theories of the operation of judicial constraint received limited empirical 
support when tested using chronologically appropriate measures of case salience. More broadly, 
the findings here should motivate scholars to reexamine other theories in the field which rely on 
case salience. Indeed, any study relying on salience to explain judicial behavior should be 
replicated and validated using chronologically appropriate measures. Of course, measures of 
post-decision salience are important and appropriate for a wide range of studies—the claim here 
is simply that they are suspect in their application to studies of judicial decision making. 
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Supplementary Materials for Chapter 4 
Robustness Checks: 
 
Table S4.1. The Influence of Public Opinion on Salient and Nonsalient Supreme Court 
Decisions While Controlling for Attitudinal Change, 1956-2000 
 Nonsalient Salient Nonsalient Salient 
 (Any) (Any) (Top 15%) (Top 15%) 
Short-Term (Immediate) Effects     
Δ Public Mood 1.05 1.81⁺ 1.34 3.80⁺ 
 (1.58) (0.98) (0.88) (2.29) 
Δ Court Ideology 11.36 -1.02 11.06* -26.53* 
 (8.65) (5.67) (4.83) (13.44) 
Δ Social Forces (IV) 2.21 5.92 4.29 9.03 
 (6.67) (4.36) (3.42) (7.16) 
Long-Term Effects     
Public Mood t-1 0.24 0.68 0.80⁺ 1.37 
 (0.85) (0.52) (0.47) (1.11) 
Court Ideology t-1 2.85 11.17** 9.59** 17.43* 
 (4.69) (3.73) (3.40) (8.79) 
Social Forces (IV) t-1 -3.04 3.36 0.53 0.87 
 (4.23) (2.61) (2.41) (5.97) 
Error Correction Rate     
Percent Liberal t-1 -0.42** -0.78*** -0.75*** -0.92*** 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.17) 
Constant 15.20 3.02 -6.09 -30.97 
 (51.01) (31.33) (28.23) (67.73) 
Observations 43 45 45 38 
R-squared 0.17 0.56 0.43 0.54 
Note: Table reports results from TSLS regression models of decision making by the U.S. Supreme Court: the 
dependent variable represents the change in the percentage of liberal decisions issued by the Supreme Court each 
term (among reversals only) in nonsalient and salient cases, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⁺ p<0.1 (two-tailed test).  
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Table S4.2. The Impact of External Constraint on Supreme Court Decision Making 
[Utilizing Dichotomized Specifications of the Salience Variables, Media and Justice-
Centered at higher threshold, and using Amicus participation as an alternative salience 
measure (amici data from Collins 2008)] 
 Media 
(top 5%) 
Justice 
(top 5%) 
Amici 
(top 15%) 
Amici 
(top 5%) 
Main Effects     
Court Ideology 0.27*** 0.27** 0.25* 0.25* 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Public Mood -0.09 -0.09 -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) 
Congressional Ideology 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.04 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Lateral 0.16* 0.26* 0.10 0.12⁺ 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) 
Pre-Decision Salience -0.23 -0.08 -0.15 -0.01 
 (0.19) (0.23) (0.12) (0.25) 
Interaction Effects     
Public Mood x Lateral 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.04 
 (0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.06) 
Congressional Ideology x Lateral -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.03 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) 
Public Mood x Salience 0.11 -0.10 -0.28⁺ -0.15 
 (0.26) (0.28) (0.15) (0.25) 
Congressional Ideology x Salient -0.31⁺ -0.13 0.13 0.04 
 (0.16) (0.19) (0.11) (0.15) 
Lateral x Salience 0.23 0.36 0.29 0.16 
 (0.30) (0.53) (0.20) (0.31) 
Public Mood x Lateral 0.23 0.69 0.23 0.35 
 x Salience (0.38) (0.56) (0.23) (0.37) 
Congressional Ideology x Lateral 0.42⁺ 0.04 0.12 -0.05 
 x Salience (0.26) (0.39) (0.18) (0.25) 
Constant 1.12*** -0.50* 0.07 0.05 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.30) (0.29) 
Observations 6,035 2,974 5,968 5,968 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.682 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.034 0.004 0.035 0.034 
Note: Table reports results from logistic regression models of decision making by the U.S. Supreme Court: the 
dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the ideological direction of the decision is liberal. Natural Court fixed 
effects are omitted for presentation. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⁺ 
p<0.1 (two-tailed tests).  
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Table S4.3. The Differential Impact of External Constraint on SCOTUS Decision Making 
[Utilizing Dichotomized Specifications of the Salience Variables] 
 Judicial Review 
(Federal) 
All Other 
Cases 
Main Effects     
Court Ideology 0.47⁺ 0.43 0.23** 0.24* 
 (0.28) (0.36) (0.09) (0.11) 
Public Mood -0.28 0.18 -0.10 -0.13 
 (0.29) (0.41) (0.08) (0.13) 
Congressional Ideology 0.59* 1.23** 0.06 0.03 
 (0.28) (0.45) (0.08) (0.10) 
Lateral 0.68* 0.50 0.13 0.23 
 (0.32) (0.37) (0.08) (0.12) 
Salience (Media Measure) 0.67⁺  0.06  
 (0.37)  (0.10)  
Salience (Justice Centered)  0.41  0.13 
  (0.46)  (0.14) 
Interaction Effects     
Public Mood x Lateral 0.26 0.31 -0.05 0.23 
 (0.25) (0.47) (0.07) (0.15) 
Congressional Ideology x Lateral -0.40 0.06 -0.02 0.02 
 (0.30) (0.32) (0.09) (0.10) 
Public Mood x Salience 0.87 1.48* 0.00 0.03 
 (0.52) (0.64) (0.12) (0.18) 
Congressional Ideology x Salient -0.00 -0.63 -0.12 0.02 
 (0.31) (0.39) (0.09) (0.12) 
Lateral x Salience -0.61 5.92** 0.16 0.22 
 (0.56) (2.23) (0.19) (0.38) 
Public Mood x Lateral -0.78 0.38 0.62** 0.19 
 x Salience (0.69) (1.22) (0.23) (0.42) 
Congressional Ideology x Lateral 1.05* -6.37* 0.19 -0.01 
 x Salience (0.51) (2.54) (0.17) (0.28) 
Constant -0.02 -1.20 1.22*** -0.46 
 (0.90) (0.90) (0.26) (0.25) 
Observations 591 305 5,435 2,668 
Prob > χ2 0.002 0.104 0.0000 0.906 
Pseudo R-squared 0.075 0.069 0.034 0.004 
Note: Table reports results from logistic regression models of decision making by the U.S. Supreme Court: the 
dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the ideological direction of the decision is liberal. Natural Court fixed 
effects are omitted for presentation. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⁺ 
p<0.1 (two-tailed tests). 
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Chapter 5: 
Supreme Court Influence on Public Issue Attention 
 
In chapter two, I echoed early scholars of judicial impact in defining impact as “all policy 
relevant outcomes” of judicial action (e.g. Becker and Feeley 1973; Wasby 1970).  I then argued 
that the more recent conceptualization of impact actually captures only one distinct type of 
judicial power. Thus in chapter three I showed how a theory of judicial power that focuses on the 
Supreme Court’s power to authoritatively interpret the law can shed new light on questions of 
judicial policymaking and the Court’s role in the American political system. This theory of 
Supreme Court power is intended to present a more accurate and nuanced picture of the role the 
Court plays in American politics—but studying Court power is not all there is to the theory of 
impact offered here. Policy-relevant effects need not be directly caused by exercises of judicial 
power; moreover, even policy-relevant effects that are more-or-less directly caused by Court 
power may not be direct outcomes of a power relationship.  
In this section, I build on the previous chapters by probing systematic but indirect effects 
of Court power in American politics. I argue that because the Court is quite powerful, and 
because its decisions (even the routine ones) are quite meaningful, we should expect that other 
political institutions, groups, and actors should respond to it as such. Put differently, the reality 
of the Supreme Court’s power will cause its actions to have significant indirect downstream 
impacts in addition to the more direct impacts discussed above. Some examples of these types of 
effects have already been discussed, as the direct and indirect effects of Court decisions are often 
essentially simultaneous. For example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith, discussed at length in chapter three, significantly altered the law and policy of free 
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exercise, but one of its chief effects was to induce a Congressional response in the form of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. RFRA, then, while a directly traceable result of the 
Court’s decision in Smith, was not an outcome of the particular power operation (i.e. the 
reinterpretation of the First Amendment) in that decision, insofar as the decision did not 
necessitate the Congressional response. 
Relatedly, sometimes Court decisions—even those which do not much alter the status 
quo—may create political opportunity structures that other actors or institutions can exploit in 
their own pursuit of policy change (Tarrow 2011; Andersen 2006). The example of Kelo v. New 
London, also discussed in chapter three, highlights this possibility. The Court’s decision in Kelo 
itself had very little effect on the state of the law or politics—that is, the decision did not 
substantially reinterpret the requirements of the law, nor did it set aside any existing political 
arrangements or policies (Somin 2015). However, the decision garnered significant attention in 
the media and quickly became extremely unpopular (Zilis 2015; Strother 2016). By making 
eminent domain policy salient, and by activating significant latent opposition to the existing 
policy status quo, the Kelo decision created an ideal political environment for property rights 
interest groups, activists, and interested legislators to assail the policy status quo in this area—
and they did so with considerable success. Within a decade of Kelo, forty-four states had revised 
their eminent domain statutes (Beienburg 2014; Somin 2015).  
Responses such as these fit with what Grossmann and Swedlow (2015) have described as 
the Court’s routine “indirect” contributions to public policy development. In a recent study, 
Grossmann and Swedlow (2015) utilize a dataset of “significant policy changes” that occurred 
between 1945 and 2004 created by Grossmann (2013), which is drawn from an extensive review 
of published policy history case studies, and codes the sources of each policy change (e.g. 
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whether it was the result of Congress, the executive, a bureaucracy, a court, etc.), relying on the 
expert judgment of the authors of the case studies for the coding. To further capture judicial 
influence in policy development, Grossmann and Swedlow also coded for mentions in these 
studies of court rulings that required or influenced actions of other branches, fear of court 
interventions, or patterns of related lawsuits, and the like. Using this innovative method, 
Grossmann and Swedlow find that federal courts (not just the Supreme Court) directly made 
policy in 15.8 percent (125 instances) of the significant policy changes in their dataset, and 
indirectly influenced policy outcomes in another 7.5 percent (59 instances) (see generally Keck 
and Strother 2016). Grossmann and Swedlow’s findings are important in their own right, as they 
indicate how regularly the Court significantly influences public policy. However, they offer no 
pathways by which this indirect influence operates (see also Howard and Steigerwalt 2011; 
Pacelle 2015). It is my argument that agenda influence is one such pathway, and indeed, is likely 
the chief pathway by which the Court indirectly influences policy development. To this end, I 
show in this chapter that the Supreme Court has significantly and routinely influenced the public 
political agenda, although the specific factors that might predict such impact are difficult to 
identify. 
Supreme Court Influence on the Public Agenda 
On June 23rd, 2005, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 
a theretofore little remarked-upon case concerning eminent domain. The Court held that New 
London’s takings of private properties to sell to a developer in the hope of boosting the local 
economy was permissible under the Fifth Amendment’s “public use” clause. This decision 
garnered extensive—and wholly unexpected—attention from the media, and from the public. 
Kelo generated a political backlash that is unprecedented in modern times despite the fact the 
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decision did not much alter the state of the law. In the decade since Kelo, forty-five states have 
passed legislation or amended their constitutions to curtail takings for economic development. In 
short, eminent domain went from being a virtually unknown topic to the center of key policy 
debates around the country because the Supreme Court decided a case concerning the issue. 
Many scholars have asked why the Kelo decision resulted in this massive backlash (see generally 
Strother 2016), but scholars have given less attention to the larger questions raised by this 
phenomenon: how often, and under what circumstances, does the Supreme Court have this 
profound effect on the American political agenda?  
Scholars have posited that the Supreme Court has this effect on the political agenda when 
it issues decisions that significantly alter the political status quo (Flemming, Bohte, and Wood 
1997; Ura 2009). If correct, this theory has major implications for our understanding of the 
Supreme Court’s role in the American political system. For example, Grossmann and Swedlow 
(2015) have argued that the Court routinely contributes to public policy development 
“indirectly,” but they offer no pathways by which this indirect influence operates; agenda 
influence is one such possible pathway. Relatedly, agenda influence may help us to understand 
the nature of backlashes to judicial decisions (Fontana and Braman 2012; Keck 2009). However, 
this theory of Supreme Court agenda influence rests on shaky foundations: Flemming and 
colleagues (1997) arrived at this argument inductively and did not directly test it. Since then, Ura 
(2009) found empirical support for the theory, but only examined four cases in one issue area. As 
such, the empirical case for this theory is quite thin. Moreover, the case of Kelo briefly outlined 
above seems to belie this theory, as it had a major influence on the political agenda though the 
decision did not alter the political or legal status quo. Given the importance of the implications of 
this theory, it is critical to investigate it more thoroughly.  
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In this chapter, I analyze time-series data to test this theory against a large and 
heterogeneous sample of cases in a wide range of issue domains. I find, contrary to expectations, 
that disruption of the status quo, when specified ex ante, fails to predict Supreme Court influence 
on the public agenda. I also examine a competing explanation—that controversial or unpopular 
Supreme Court opinions are likely to drive agenda influence—but this theory also fails to garner 
clear empirical support. The findings presented here are exciting for students of the Supreme 
Court and public policy in that they show that the Court does regularly influence the mass 
political agenda. However, these findings do not conclusively reveal the political context(s) in 
which Court decisions are likely to have this important effect in the political system. As such, 
this research points to important avenues for future work.  
The Supreme Court and the Public Agenda 
A growing body of scholarship has identified numerous pathways by which the Supreme 
Court influences politics and policy. Under some circumstances, the Court can directly alter 
public policy, as shown in chapter 3 above (see also Hall 2011; Howard and Steigerwalt 2012), 
and Congress or state legislatures may respond to Court decisions by altering policy itself 
(Barnes 2004; Pickerill 2004). Some salient decisions may influence public opinion, and thus 
motivate legislative responses (Christenson and Glick 2015; Linos and Twist 2016). Another 
important way in which the Supreme Court may powerfully impact American politics and policy 
is through influence on the political agenda (Flemming, Bohte, and Wood 1997; Ura 2009). 
Scholars are increasingly recognizing that no actor or institution has the “final word” in 
America’s famously fragmented political system (e.g. Barnes 2004; Silverstein 2009; Keck 
2014). This developmental view of policy emphasizes interbranch interplay over time. But 
governing institutions have limited time and resources to devote to policy problems, which 
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suggests that understanding the agenda setting process in the American political system is crucial 
to understanding what gets done and when (Schattschneider 1975; Baumgartner and Jones 2009). 
As such, a fuller understanding of the Supreme Court’s ability to shape public policy must take 
into consideration its influence on the national political agenda (Ura 2009). 
Policy scholars typically distinguish between the “public agenda” and the “policymaking 
agenda.” The policymaking agenda is the agenda of political actors empowered to make binding 
decisions on behalf of the polity—typically Congress and the president (Wolfe et al. 2013). The 
public agenda is more amorphous: it is the agenda of the American public, which is to say, it is 
the mix of issues that occupy the public mind at any given time. Scholars have begun to study 
the public agenda because it is politically consequential in that it significantly affects the 
policymaking agenda (e.g. Wolfe et al. 2013; McCombs 2014) and behavior of political elites 
(by rearranging their incentives), and thus can ultimately influence public policy (e.g. Arnold 
1990; Hall 2011; Wolfe et al. 2013). 
The public agenda is broad and amorphous. Given the American public’s low levels of 
political knowledge and interest, the public agenda is unstable and notoriously difficult to 
measure (Wlezein 2005). As a result, scholars interested in the public agenda have typically 
utilized media attention as a proxy for the public agenda (Flemming, Bohte, and Wood 1997; 
Pralle 2006; Ura 2009). This move is warranted not only because of convenience, however. The 
media are known to play a central role in allocating public attention and informing the public 
about the political world (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Jones and Wolfe 2010). Importantly, this 
is true regardless as to whether the media sets the public agenda or simply indexes to it (Wolfe et 
al. 2013). 
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Further, media attention can powerfully affect governmental attention, public opinion, 
and public policy in its own right (Boydstun 2013; Iyengar and Kinder 2010; McCombs 2014).43  
The relationship between mass media and systemic (macro-level) attention are reciprocal in 
nature. The media faces market incentives to follow events that attract audiences (Prior 2007). At 
the same time, however, systemic concerns about issues reflect media coverage (Iyengar and 
Kinder 2010). As a result, media attention provides a useful lens to study the public agenda as a 
proxy for public attention. This may be particularly true for the Supreme Court, which receives 
relatively little media attention (Graber 2010), and because the coverage it does receive appears 
to exert substantial influence over popular awareness of the Court and its decisions (Gibson and 
Caldeira 2009; Zilis 2015). 
The question for students of judicial politics, then, is when or under what circumstances a 
given Supreme Court decision is likely to significantly influence public attention to the issue or 
issues that a given case concerns. Flemming, Bohte, and Wood (1997) first sought to answer this 
question by assessing the influence of thirty-one “important” Supreme Court decisions on media 
coverage of the issues touched by those decisions.44 They gathered their media data from the 
Reader’s Guide, then conducted Box-Taio intervention analyses on these sets of serial 
observations, finding that seven cases resulted in significant changes in public attention in the 
                                                 
43 There has been substantial work done on the extent to which policymakers are able to influence the media agenda. 
A common approach in this literature has been to examine the “success rates” of various groups and actors who seek 
to gain news coverage by looking at the proportion of news releases and other “information subsidy” efforts that are 
kept versus those that are discarded by media gatekeepers. For most groups, the success rate is between 5 and 10 
percent (e.g. Morton 1986; Berkowitz 1990). Such efforts by government actors are generally much more 
successful, with success rates ranging from 20 percent to as much as 50 percent (Turk 1986; see generally Berkowitz 
1992). A look at the demand side of the equation demonstrates just how important this discrepancy is: studies of 
media content routinely find that more than half of all stories in newspapers, and as much as three-fourths of stories 
covered on television news, originate from information subsidy efforts by some non-media actor (Berkowitz 1992; 
Soloski 1989; Berkowitz 1987; Sigal 1973). As a result, government-affiliated news sources influence media 
coverage—and thus the public agenda—far more than do other sources (Berkowitz 1992; Soloski 1989; Sigal 1973). 
The Supreme Court, however, does not engage in any traditional public relations activities. 
44 Importance was measured as inclusion in the CQ Guide to the Supreme Court. 
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areas of desegregation, flag burning, and public school prayer. Four of those cases caused long-
run shifts in attention, which Flemming et al. attribute to the cases being “extremely 
controversial at the time they were announced” which resulted in “intense national debates that 
drew in new participants and expanded the scope of conflict through time” (1997: 1247). In 
discussing their findings, Flemming and colleagues reason that the Court may have the observed 
agenda-setting influence when its decision “expand the scope of conflict by activating new 
groups and accentuating old rivalries” (1997: 1225). To be clear, though, they develop this 
theory inductively and do not rigorously test it.  
 Ura (2009) builds on this foundational study by conducting an out-of-sample test of 
Flemming et al.’s (1997) theory: he analyzes the effects of four gay rights decisions between 
1990 and 2005 on media coverage of gay rights issues. Ura also conducts Box-Tiao intervention 
analyses on a set of serial observations, though he opted to draw his sample from Lexis-Nexis 
rather than the Reader’s Guide owing to concerns with the RG sample that have been raised 
since Flemming and colleagues conducted their study. Ura reaches essentially the same 
conclusion as Flemming et al., leading him to conclude that cases that “expanded gay rights 
increased content related to homosexuality, while gay rights cases that confirmed the existing 
scope of gay rights had little effect on media coverage of homosexuality” (2009: 441). In short, 
the central argument of these two studies is that Court decisions which upset the status quo ante 
are likely to affect issue attention, while those that affirm the status quo are not.  
Despite the importance of this question, it is notable that the theory has only been tested 
in one issue domain (gay rights), over a relatively short period of time (1990-2005), and for only 
four cases. It is not hard to imagine that the observed effects were driven by some contextual 
feature other than the cases’ relationship to the status quo. Put differently, while there is little 
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doubt that Lawrence v. Texas caused a significant shift in issue attention to gay rights issues, it 
may well be that that effect is attributable to the decision’s controversial nature, some 
happenstance of timing, or something else entirely, and not because it “rearranged the 
distribution of political benefits.”  
 Recent work in judicial politics suggests that case controversy may indeed be an 
important factor in explaining Court influence on issue attention. Consider again the example of 
Kelo v. New London outlined in the introduction of this chapter—that decision profoundly 
influenced public attention to the issue of eminent domain, but it did not change the state of the 
law or the distribution of political benefits much, if at all. Zilis (2015) argues that Kelo garnered 
so much attention because it was controversial—and that controversy helped it to stay salient for 
many months after the decision was rendered. More generally, controversy is viewed by media 
scholars as a key indicator of newsworthiness (Halton 1998; Straubhaar et al. 2009; Johnson and 
Socker 2012; Sill et al. 2013; Strother 2017a). Relatedly, Bryan and Ringsmuth (2016) argue that 
dissenting opinions, and especially strongly negative dissenting opinions, are especially likely to 
draw media coverage; and as Zilis (2015) points out, dissents are a clear indicator of controversy 
that reporters can build a story around. In sum, case controversy seems a likely candidate to 
explain the observed effects of the few cases found to have significantly altered media attention 
to political issues.  
In short, media coverage of Supreme Court decisions is critically important because it 
powerfully influences what issues citizens think are important (Iyengar and Kinder 2010) as well 
as how they think about those events and issues (Chong and Druckman 2007). Thus a strong 
theoretical and empirical account of the effect of Supreme Court’s decisions on media attention 
to issues should provide new insight into an understudied pathway by which the Court influences 
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public policy and politics: influence on the national political agenda. Systematic differences in 
the types of cases that tend to affect coverage will suggest different impacts of cases on the 
public agenda. Further, systematic differences in effects of cases with particular features may 
significantly affect the ways in which public attitudes are shaped by Court decisions. Finally, to 
the extent that political elites are attentive to the issues that voters view as important, this agenda 
influence will also reverberate in the policymaking realm.  
Flemming, Bohte, and Wood (1997) argue that cases that disrupt the political status quo 
may be likely to influence systemic issue attention, though they arrived at this conclusion 
inductively in trying to explain the pattern of agenda influence they observed, as few cases in 
their sample had any effect on media coverage. Ura (2009) tested this theory of status-quo 
disruption on a small set of out-of-sample cases (four) in one issue area (homosexual rights), and 
found support for it in that policy domain. Thus the leading theory of Supreme Court influence 
on issue attention holds that such influence depends on the Court disruption of the political status 
quo. While this theory is intuitively appealing, the empirical case for it is quite thin. Further, 
alternative explanations that fit the evidence can be easily imagined: the literature on media 
coverage and newsworthiness suggests that controversy could be a key explanatory variable in 
the issue-attention equation.  
Expectations 
1. Supreme Court decisions which significantly alter the political or legal status quo will 
also significantly affect media coverage of the issue that decision speaks to.  
2. Supreme Court decisions which are controversial will significantly affect media coverage 
of the issue that decision speaks to. 
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Approach & Data 
In order to assess the effects of Supreme Court cases on media coverage of the larger 
issues to which they speak, I conduct time-series intervention analyses of 52 Supreme Court 
decisions in 20 distinct issue areas. The data gathering process for this study is time consuming, 
as separate time series have to be constructed for every issue area. For this reason, the two 
existing studies in this vein examine relatively small numbers of issues (Flemming and 
colleagues looked at four issue areas, Ura at one). That being the case, the selection of particular 
cases for study is crucial. In this study, I aim to move beyond prior works by examining a larger 
number of issue areas and cases, selected on the basis of key hypothesized independent variables. 
These variables are disruption of status quo and case controversy. Following Flemming et al. 
(1997) and Ura (2009), I started by identifying “important” cases; I utilized Hall’s (2011) list of 
“landmark” constitutional cases (see above) as a starting point, but restricted the list to only cases 
decided between 1970 and 2005 in light of data availability.  
Data for the dependent variable for this part of the study is original data on the media 
salience of a number of policy issues in American politics.45 I follow Ura (2009) in measuring 
media coverage of an issue as a simple count of the mean number of daily stories each month in 
the New York Times. I gathered these data by keyword searching Lexis-Nexis for terms that 
indicate content related to each particular topic. For single cases, the search was time-bounded 
from January 1 three years prior to the decision to December 31 three years after. For issue areas 
with multiple cases, the time-series runs from January 1 three years prior to the earliest decision 
in that area to December 31 three years after the last decision. This process yielded 20 separate 
sets of serial observations. The issue keywords utilized to obtain the data for each series are 
                                                 
45 One exception: part of the time series on coverage of LGB issues comes from Ura’s (2009) data, accessed at: 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/14164 
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presented in the supplementary material at the end of the chapter; as an example, the keywords 
“eminent domain” were used to construct the time series to assess the influence of Kelo v. New 
London on media coverage of the larger issue (eminent domain) that case concerned. Thus the 
time series for eminent domain consists of the daily average number of stories appearing in the 
New York Times containing the string “eminent domain” every month from January of 2002 to 
December of 2008.  
Because the leading work in this area suggests that disruption of the status quo is the key 
predictor of Court-induced change in public issue-attention, I use the Supreme Court Database to 
specify ex ante whether each case disrupts the status quo. I specify the status quo in two ways: 
first, cases which formally overturn precedent are coded as altering the legal status quo, while 
cases which leave existing precedent intact are coded as preserving the status quo. Second, 
decisions which invalidate statutes (federal, state, or local) are coded as disrupting the policy 
status quo, while cases which uphold the challenged statute are coded as preserving the policy 
status quo.  
A key indicator of news value or newsworthiness is controversy. As such, I select cases 
for which reliable public opinion data is available whenever possible in order to specify 
controversy from contemporaneous public opinion (38 of 52 cases). Public opinion data for these 
cases is drawn from Marshall’s canonical studies on public opinion on the Court’s work 
(Marshall 1989; Marshall 2009). I operationalize “controversy” as a dummy variable (following 
Hall 2011) coded as “1” if a majority (50% or more) of respondents are opposed to the decision 
and as “0” (i.e. uncontroversial) if a majority favors the decision. Cases are coded as unclear if 
there is no clear majority or if there were no polls on the case. Descriptive statistics of the cases 
studied are presented in Table 5.1.  
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Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics of Case Characteristics (n reported) 
Independent Variable Yes No Unclear 
Controversial 20 18 14 
Alters legal status quo 8 44 n/a 
Alters policy status quo 18 34 n/a 
 
Analysis & Results 
 The processes discussed above yield 52 decision interventions between 1970 and 2005 in 
twenty separate issue areas for analysis. These theories of Supreme Court influence on issue 
attention are assessed using Box-Tiao (1975) intervention analyses, which estimate the effects of 
an event (or events) on a set of serial observations. This method is attractive because intervention 
analyses assess natural experiments; in this case, the quasi-experimental treatments 
(interventions) are judicial decisions, and the set of serial observations is media coverage of the 
issues in which the cases are embedded (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2014; Ura 2009). Box-Tiao 
analyses explicitly model ARIMA error processes by estimating the auto-regressive and moving 
average components of the dependent time series (Box and Jenkins 1976). This means that the 
effects of intervention on the dependent time series are assessed after other sources of dynamic 
error are accounted for (reduced to white noise). Importantly, as Ura (2009: 438) points out, 
when intervention analyses are properly modelled, “only the identification of a rival causal event 
threatens inferences drawn from the assessment of the impact of the event of interest” (see also 
Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha 2008).   
 The first step in assessing potential intervention effects of decisions is to develop 
appropriate ARIMA models of each media coverage series. I then model the effects of each 
Court decision on the relevant media coverage series. Following Ura (2009), I take a stepwise 
approach to developing the final model specifications. Each decision is treated first as a “pulse” 
intervention, a dummy variable coded as one for the month of the intervention and zero 
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otherwise. Decisions were then modeled treating the intervention as “steps” to assess the extent 
to which the data supported such a specification; when events or complexities in the models were 
insignificant or unsupported by the data, they were dropped (Ura 2009). 
 The expectation here is that decisions which are controversial, or which alter the status 
quo ante will alter the public agenda, while cases which are not controversial or leave the status 
quo unchanged, will not. In each table, the column labeled “Δ Status Quo” indicates whether that 
decision changed the policy (indicated with a “P”) or the legal (indicated with an “L”); cases that 
left the status quo unchanged are designated in the tables with a “No.” Similarly, the column 
labeled “Controversial” indicates whether the cases is coded as controversial with a “Yes” or a 
“No”—cases for which no data were found are coded as missing, and designated as “[.]” in the 
tables. The column labeled “finding” indicates whether a statistically significant pulse or step 
was present in the data, and the level of significance of the step; in all cases, *** p<0.001, ** 
p<0.01, and * p<0.05. The size of the statistically significant effects was calculated by predicting 
(using STATA’s margins command) the level of coverage, in terms of average daily stories, 
before and after the intervention. Put simply, this column indicates the size of the effect caused 
by the intervention. The full tables from which these summaries are derived are presented in the 
supplementary material for presentational purposes. The technical tables in the supplementary 
material at the end of this chapter are labeled to correspond to the labels presented below; for 
example, Table S5.2 in the supplementary material at the end of the chapter presents the full 
results of the analyses summarized in Table 5.2 in the main text.  
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Congressional Power 
Table 5.2. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Congressional Power 
Issue Area/Case 
Δ Status 
Quo 
Controversial 
Finding 
% Δ in 
Coverage 
Public Sector Minimum Wage  
 
  
National League of Cities v. 
Usery P, L 
[.] 
null  
Garcia v. SAMTA L [.] null  
Gun Control     
U.S. v. Lopez P No null  
Printz v. U.S. P No null  
Minimum Drinking Age     
South Dakota v. Dole No No step* -66.67 
Medical Marijuana     
Gonzales v. Raich No Yes null   
 
Separation of Powers 
Table 5.3. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Separation of 
Powers 
Issue Area/Case Δ Status Quo 
Controversial 
Finding 
% Δ in 
Coverage 
Separation of Powers  
 
  
INS v. Chadha P [.] null  
Bowsher v. Synar P [.] step* 89.39 
Morrison v. Olson No No null   
 
Sovereign Immunity 
Table 5.4. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Sovereign 
Immunity 
Issue Area/Case 
Δ Status 
Quo 
Controversial 
Finding 
% Δ in 
Coverage 
Sovereign Immunity  
 
  
Seminole Tribe v. Florida P, L Yes null  
Alden v. Maine No [.] step** 100.9 
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Abortion 
Table 5.5. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Abortion 
Issue Area/Case 
Δ Status 
Quo 
Controversia
l Finding 
% Δ in 
Coverage 
Abortion  
 
  
Roe v. Wade P Yes null  
Harris v. McRae No [.] step*** 277.61 
Webster v. Reproductive 
Services L 
[.] 
step** 130.65 
Rust v. Sullivan No Yes null  
Planned Parenthood v. Casey P, L No null  
Stenberg v. Carhart P Yes null   
 
Affirmative Action 
Table 5.6. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Affirmative Action 
Issue Area/Case 
Δ Status 
Quo 
Controversial 
Finding 
% Δ in 
Coverage 
Affirmative Action  
 
  
Richmond v. Croson No Yes null  
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC No Yes null  
Adarand Contractors v. Pena L No pulse** 58.44 
Gratz & Grutter [v. 
Bollinger] No 
No 
null   
 
Capital Punishment 
Table 5.7. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Capital 
Punishment 
Issue Area/Case Δ Status Quo 
Controversial 
Finding 
% Δ in 
Coverage 
Capital Punishment  
 
  
Furman v. Georgia P Yes null  
Gregg v. Georgia L No step*** 81.91 
 
Eminent Domain 
Table 5.8. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Eminent 
Domain 
Issue Area/Case Δ Status Quo 
Controversial 
Finding 
% Δ in 
Coverage 
Eminent Domain  
 
  
Kelo v. New London No Yes step*** 931.35 
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Free Exercise of Religion 
Table 5.9. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Free Exercise of 
Religion 
Issue Area/Case Δ Status Quo 
Controversial 
Finding 
% Δ in 
Coverage 
Free Exercise of Religion  
 
  
Employment Division v. 
Smith No 
Yes 
null  
Church of Lukumi v. 
Hialeah P 
[.] 
null  
City of Boerne v. Flores P [.] step*** 125.37 
 
Free Press 
Table 5.10. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Freedom of Press 
Issue Area/Case 
Δ Status 
Quo 
Controversial 
Finding 
% Δ in 
Coverage 
Freedom of Press  
 
  
New York Times Co. v. U.S. No No null  
Branzburg v. Hayes No Yes null  
Nebraska Press Assoc. v. 
Stuart No 
Yes 
null  
Richmond Newspapers v. 
Virginia No 
Yes 
step*** >1000.00 
 
Free Speech  
Table 5.11. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Free Speech 
Issue Area/Case Δ Status Quo 
Controversial 
Finding 
% Δ in 
Coverage 
Free Speech  
 
  
Wisconsin v. Mitchell No No null  
Denver Area Consort. v. 
FCC No 
No 
null  
Reno v. ACLU P Yes null  
Flag Desecration     
Texas v. Johnson P Yes step*** 94.44 
U.S. v. Eichman P [.] step*** -1.79 
Buffer Zones     
Hill v. Colorado No No null   
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Gay Rights 
Table 5.12. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Gay Rights 
Issue Area/Case Δ Status Quo 
Controversial 
Finding 
% Δ in 
Coverage 
Gay Rights  
 
  
Bowers v. Hardwick No No null  
Romer v. Evans P Yes null  
Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale No 
Yes 
null  
Lawrence v. Texas P, L No step*** 65.43 
 
Non-Establishment 
Table 5.13. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Establishment 
Issues 
Issue Area/Case 
Δ Status 
Quo 
Controversial 
Finding 
% Δ in 
Coverage 
Public Aid to Religious Schools  
 
  
Aguilar v. Felton P No step* -23.81 
Agostini v. Felton No [.] step* 31.25 
Public Displays of Religious 
Icons  
 
  
Marsh v. Chambers No [.] null  
Lynch v. Donnelly No [.] null  
 
Right to Die 
Table 5.14. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Right to Die 
Issue Area/Case 
Δ Status 
Quo 
Controversial 
Finding 
% Δ in 
Coverage 
Right to Die  
 
  
Cruzan v. Missouri No Yes pulse*** 361.54 
Washington v. Glucksberg No Yes pulse*** 658.33 
 
 
School Funding 
Table 5.15. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to School Funding 
Issue Area/Case 
Δ Status 
Quo 
Controversial 
Finding 
% Δ in 
Coverage 
School Funding  
 
  
SAISD v. Rodriguez No Yes step* 175 
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Wiretapping 
Table 5.16. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Wiretapping 
Issue Area/Case Δ Status Quo 
Controversial 
Finding 
% Δ in 
Coverage 
Wiretapping  
 
  
U.S. v. US District 
Court No 
No 
step** 323.81 
 
Of the 52 cases analyzed, 17 resulted in statistically significant, long-run changes (steps) 
in media coverage of the larger issues in which they are embedded. Of those 17, 14 were positive 
steps (increases in coverage), and 3 were negative steps. Four more cases resulted in short-term 
(pulse) increases in media attention to an issue. The 17 cases that resulted in significant long-run 
changes in issue coverage in the New York Times were: South Dakota v. Dole, Bowsher v. Synar, 
Alden v. Maine, Harris v. McRae, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, Gregg v. Georgia, 
City of Boerne v. Flores, Kelo v. New London, Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, Texas v. 
Johnson, U.S. v. Eichman, Lawrence v. Texas, Aguilar v. Felton & Grand Rapids v. Bell, 
Agostini v. Felton, San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, and U.S. v. US District Court. 
Additionally, Adarand Constructors v. Pena, Cruzan v. Missouri, Washington v. Glucksberg and 
Vacco v. Quill resulted in short-term (pulse) increases in New York Times coverage of 
affirmative action and right-to-die, respectively. Some cases, such as New York Times Co. v. US, 
Roe v. Wade, Romer v. Evans, and Employment Division v. Smith, among others, are conspicuous 
for their absence from the foregoing lists.  
The size of the substantive effects of these interventions varies but is quite large on 
average, as noted above. Figure 5.1 depicts the effect of the Court’s Kelo decision on coverage of 
eminent domain graphically. Specifically, figure 5.1 shows that the Court’s decision in Kelo v. 
New London caused a 931-percent increase in media attention to eminent domain from the month 
before Kelo was decided to the month after. Further, the graph indicates that this effect began 
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regressing toward the mean relatively quickly (that is, the effect decayed over time), but eminent 
domain was covered at a substantially higher level for more than two years post-Kelo compared 
to the average level of coverage before that decision.  
Figure 5.1. The Impact of Kelo on Media Coverage of Eminent Domain 
 
Note: the vertical dashed line indicates the Supreme Court intervention in this issue area: 
its decision in Kelo v. New London.  
  
 Similarly, Figure 5.2 depicts the effects (or lack thereof) of three decisions in the area of 
religious free exercise: Employment Division v. Smith, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of 
Hialeah, and City of Boerne v. Flores. Of these, only Boerne v. Flores had a significant effect on 
media coverage of religious freedom; the case caused a roughly 125% increase in media 
attention to that issue. As indicated by Table 5.9 above, and depicted graphically in Figure 5.2, 
neither Employment Division v. Smith nor Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye had a significant effect 
on media attention. Together, these figures provide a good illustration of the size of the 
substantive effect Supreme Court decisions can have on media coverage.  
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Figure 5.2. The Impact of Three Cases on Media Coverage of Free Exercise of Religion 
 
Note: The vertical dashed lines indicate the three Court interventions in this issue area; 
from left to right, they are Employment Division v. Smith, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye 
v. City of Hialeah, and City of Boerne v. Flores.  
 
 So far I have shown that Supreme Court decisions can and do significantly impact 
media attention to issues. In fact, at least one case in every issue area I examined resulted in a 
statistically significant effect. This basic finding is important in its own right because it indicates 
the pervasiveness of the Court’s influence, and suggests that influence on issue attention is likely 
a key pathway of the Court’s documented “indirect influence” over policy (Grossmann and 
Swedlow 2015). I now turn to more explicit interrogation of the expectations presented in the 
preceding section, namely, that the Court is more likely to exert significant influence over issue 
attention when its decisions disrupt the status quo ante, or when they are controversial.  
Only one case had all three theorized predictors of influence—Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida—and it did not cause a significant change in issue attention to sovereign immunity. On 
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the other hand, seven cases had none of the theorized predictors present, yet one of those did 
result in a large and significant increase in attention to the issue concerned: South Dakota v. 
Dole. At first blush, these patterns do not bode well for the theories presented. 
Table 5.17. Testing Theories of Court Impact on Issue Attention 
Intervention Controversial  Statute Invalidated  Precedent Altered 
  No Yes   No Yes   No Yes 
No 58.8% 70.0%  59.4% 66.7%  64.3% 50.0% 
Yes 41.2% 30.0%  40.6% 33.3%  35.7% 50.0% 
 χ
2
=0.504, p=0.478  χ
2
=0.26, p=0.61  χ
2
=0.582, p=0.445 
 
Table 5.17 presents the findings from the full sample of cases analyzed. Among the 37 
cases for which I have public opinion data (so as to code for the controversialness of the 
decision), 20 were coded as controversial, and 17 were not. Of the 20 controversial decisions, 
only 6 resulted in significant changes in issue attention. A Wald’s χ2 test indicates that we cannot 
reject the null, which is to say, there appears to be no significant difference in the effects of 
controversial and noncontroversial decisions (p=0.478). Similarly, neither disruption of the 
political nor legal status quo even approaches statistical significance. Among the 18 cases coded 
as disrupting the political status quo, only 6 resulted in significant changes in issue attention; 
moreover, cases disrupting the status quo cannot be statistically distinguished from those not 
disrupting the status quo, with respect to their effects on media coverage (p=0.610). Finally, 
eight cases in the sample disrupted the legal status quo, and among these four resulted in 
significant changes in issue attention. But again, cases disrupting the legal status quo cannot be 
statistically distinguished from those not disrupting the status quo (p=0.445). In sum, the 
prevailing theory, that disruption of the status quo is a key predictor of significant media 
influence by the Supreme Court, is not supported when tested against a relatively large and 
heterogeneous set of cases and issue areas. However, the competing theory offered here, that 
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case controversy would be a key predictor of significant media effects, also fails to garner 
empirical support. The implications of these important findings are discussed in the concluding 
section.  
Discussion 
In this chapter I have shown that the Supreme Court does in fact regularly influence 
media attention to the issues that it is speaking when it decides cases. These findings have 
several important implications for our understanding of American politics. The paper also raises 
important questions for future research. First, I provide new evidence that decisions made by the 
Supreme Court regularly influence media attention to issues in significant ways. In this sample 
of 52 cases decided between 1970 and 2005 in 20 distinct issue areas, 20 cases (38%) caused 
statistically significant changes in subsequent media attention to the issue each case was 
concerned with. Importantly, 17 of these cases (32.6%) resulted in long-term changes in the 
salience of the issue to which they spoke. And the size of these effects was clearly significant as 
well, with the average change in the volume of coverage being about 220 percent.  
This finding clearly indicates that the Supreme Court can powerfully influence the public 
agenda. Indeed, Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha (2008) argue that presidents’ best opportunity to 
increase media attention to their preferred policies is in their televised addresses. Even so, they 
find that the ability of presidents to significantly alter media coverage of issues through such 
televised addresses is significantly constrained, with presidents doing so successfully only in 14 
of the 40 instances they studied (35%). They conclude that the “president’s public leadership 
may be limited because the presidency must rely upon an independent, economic-driven media 
to communicate with the public” (Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha 2008:130). My analyses indicate 
that the Court is able to influence media coverage of issues about as often as the president is.  
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The second key takeaway is that the theorized predictors of significant changes in media 
coverage do not perform well in a large, heterogeneous sample of issue areas and cases. That is, 
neither the controversialness of a decision nor the disruption of the political or legal status quo 
reliably predicts significant impact on public issue attention. As such, while these analyses have 
offered significant insight into the nature of Court influence on issue attention, I have also 
uncovered ambiguity in the causal dynamics of the relationship. I noted at the outset that the 
leading view of Court impact on issue attention was developed inductively (Flemming et al. 
1997) and only tested once, on a small sample concerning only one issue (Ura 2009). In my 
analyses, I find no empirical support for this perspective: decisions that disrupt the status quo 
appear to be no more likely to affect media attention than decisions which leave the status quo 
intact. However, I also failed to find support for the alternative offered here: I hypothesized, 
drawing on a large body of research in media studies, that controversial decisions would be more 
likely to influence issue attention than noncontroversial ones. 
The fact that the Supreme Court regularly influences public issue attention is profoundly 
important to American politics research. To the extent that American citizens monitor politics 
and political elites, they do so by consuming information provided by media; thus the modern 
mass media is a crucial link between political elites and the general public (Pritchard 1992; 
McCombs 2004; Jones and Wolfe 2010). Media coverage of issues and events powerfully 
influences what issues people think are important (e.g. Iyengar and Kinder 2010), how people 
think about those issues (e.g. Chong and Druckman 2007), and subsequent levels of interest in 
and attention to those issues (e.g. McCombs 2005; Albertson and Gadarian 2015). Put 
differently, the media plays a powerful role in shaping the national political agenda (Sill et al. 
2013). As such, any theory of how and when political institutions shape politics and policy must 
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take media coverage into account. Given that recent work has found that the Court often shapes 
public policy indirectly (Grossmann and Swedlow 2015), this research can be plausibly read as 
suggesting a pathway for such indirect influence. Put different, it seems likely that one pathway 
by which the Court indirectly shapes public policy is by influencing the political agenda.  
 These important implications of the analyses presented here point to the importance of 
further research on this question. Namely, are the observed effects random, or is there some yet-
unknown variable that predicts Supreme Court influence on public issue attention? Since the 
Court likely does not seek to intentionally influence public issue attention, it is quite possible 
these effects are random or quasi-random (Rutledge and Price-Larsen 2014). In any event, more 
leverage on this important question promises to significantly shape our understanding of the 
Court’s role in the American political system.  
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Supplementary Materials for Chapter 5:  
Technical Tables from Time-Series Intervention Analyses 
Table S5.2. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Congressional 
Power 
Issue Area/Case Parameter Est. S.E. z-statistic 
Public Sector Minimum Wage    
National League of Cities v. Usery 0.08 11.57 0.99 
Garcia v. SAMTA 0.37 1.49 0.25 
MA1 -0.09 0.06 0.14 
constant 0.03** 0.01 2.72 
N 180   
Gun Control    
U.S. v. Lopez 0.63 0.73 0.87 
Printz v. U.S. 0.43 1.21 0.35 
AR1 0.67*** 0.05 11.51 
constant 1.36*** 0.23 5.99 
N 108   
Minimum Drinking Age    
South Dakota v. Dole (pulse) 0.13 0.18 0.73 
South Dakota v. Dole (step) -0.10* 0.04 -2.29 
AR1 0.09 0.26 0.36 
MA1 0.43 0.28 1.57 
constant 0.15 0.02 6.09 
N 84   
Medical Marijuana    
Gonzales v. Raich  0.82 3.52 0.23 
AR1 -0.69 1.21 -0.57 
MA1 0.73 1.14 0.64 
constant 0.22*** 0.02 9.89 
N 84     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
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Table S5.3. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Separation of 
Powers 
Issue Area/Case Parameter Est. S.E. z-statistic 
Separation of Powers    
INS v. Chadha 0.04 0.32 0.12 
Bowsher v. Synar (pulse) 0.45* 0.22 2.01 
Bowsher v. Synar (step) 0.07* 0.03 2.27 
Morrison v. Olson 0.29 0.65 0.45 
AR1 0.93*** 0.04 22.08 
MA1 -0.73*** 0.09 -7.82 
constant 0.12*** 0.03 3.34 
N 144     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
 
Table S5.4. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Sovereign 
Immunity 
Issue Area/Case Parameter Est. S.E. z-statistic 
Sovereign Immunity    
Seminole Tribe v. Florida 0.09 7713682 0 
Alden v. Maine (pulse) 0.41 403364.5 0 
Alden v. Maine (step) 0.02** 0.009 2.73 
constant 0.03*** 0.007 4.05 
N 120     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
 
Table S5.5. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Abortion 
Issue Area/Case Parameter Est. S.E. z-statistic 
Abortion    
Roe v. Wade 0.41 2.27 0.18 
Harris v. McRae (pulse) -0.54 0.77 -0.7 
Harris v. McRae (step) 1.35*** 0.38 3.5 
Webster v. Reproductive Services (pulse) 1.31 5.41 0.24 
Webster v. Reproductive Services (step) 0.90** 0.21 4.13 
Rust v. Sullivan -0.44 2.01 -0.22 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey -0.03 0.3 -0.1 
Stenberg v. Carhart 0.13 0.85 0.16 
AR1 1.03* 0.43 2.44 
AR2 -0.22 0.23 -0.93 
MA1 -0.57 0.42 -1.34 
constant 0.64 0.35 1.84 
N 408     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
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Table S5.6. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Affirmative 
Action 
Issue Area/Case Parameter Est. S.E. z-statistic 
Affirmative Action    
Richmond v. Croson 0.82 0.58 1.41 
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC -0.09 0.57 -0.15 
Adarand Contractors v. Pena (step) 0.43** 0.16 2.69 
Gratz v. Bollinger & Grutter v. Bollinger 1.72 2.43 0.71 
AR1 1.18*** 0.15 7.99 
AR2 -0.24* 0.11 -2.29 
MA1 -0.74*** 0.13 -5.6 
constant 0.75*** 0.14 5.31 
N 240     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
 
Table S5.7. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Capital 
Punishment 
Issue Area/Case Parameter Est. S.E. z-statistic 
Capital Punishment    
Furman v. Georgia 0.28 0.27 1.04 
Gregg v. Georgia (pulse) 0.58 2.01 0.29 
Gregg v. Georgia (step) 0.29*** 0.07 3.86 
AR1 1.35*** 0.09 14.9 
AR2 -0.38*** 0.09 -4.2 
constant 0.42*** 0.03 12.16 
N 132     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
 
Table S5.8. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Eminent Domain 
Issue Area/Case Parameter Est. S.E. z-statistic 
Eminent Domain    
Kelo v. New London (pulse) -0.04 0.1 -0.37 
Kelo v. New London (step) 0.31*** 0.07 4.4 
AR1 1.12*** 0.19 5.84 
AR2 -0.14 0.16 -0.86 
MA1 -0.76*** 0.15 -4.94 
constant 0.02 0.19 0.12 
N 84     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
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Table S5.9. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Free Exercise of 
Religion 
Issue Area/Case Parameter Est. S.E. z-statistic 
Free Exercise of Religion    
Employment Division v. Smith 0.03 0.32 0.12 
Church of Lukumi v. Hialeah 0.14 0.86 0.16 
City of Boerne v. Flores (pulse) 0.42* 0.19 2.17 
City of Boerne v. Flores (step) 0.12*** 0.03 3.35 
AR1 0.94*** 0.05 18.65 
MA1 -0.81*** 0.09 -8.77 
constant 0.17*** 0.03 4.93 
N 168     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
 
Table S5.10. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Freedom of 
Press 
Issue Area/Case Parameter Est. S.E. z-statistic 
Freedom of Press    
New York Times Co. v. U.S. 0.43 0.83 0.52 
Branzburg v. Hayes 0.03 0.59 0.06 
Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart 0.07 0.34 0.23 
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia (pulse) -0.14 0.31 -0.48 
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia (step) 0.81*** 0.14 5.75 
AR1 -0.11 1.1 -0.1 
AR2 0.24 0.39 0.62 
MA1 -0.47 1.11 -0.43 
MA2 -0.46 1.04 -0.45 
constant 0.0005 0.001 0.31 
N 179     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
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Table S5.11. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Free Speech 
Issue Area/Case Parameter Est. S.E. z-statistic 
Free Speech    
Wisconsin v. Mitchell -0.14 0.43 -0.33 
Denver Area Consort. v. FCC 0.19 3.48 0.05 
Reno v. ACLU 0.30 2.01 0.15 
AR1 0.39*** 0.08 4.64 
constant 1.21*** 0.05 23.96 
N 132   
Flag Desecration    
Texas v. Johnson (pulse) 0.07 0.21 0.35 
Texas v. Johnson (step) 0.53*** 0.09 5.57 
U.S. v. Eichman (pulse) 1.61*** 0.44 3.6 
U.S. v. Eichman (step) -0.50*** 0.08 -6.17 
MA1 0.14 0.08 1.89 
constant 0.18* 0.08 2.13 
N 96   
Buffer Zones    
Hill v. Colorado 0.03 0.25 0.12 
MA1 0.32** 0.1 3.09 
constant 0.06*** 0.007 9.26 
N 84     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
 
Table S5.12. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Gay Rights 
Issue Area/Case Parameter Est. S.E. z-statistic 
Gay Rights    
Bowers v. Hardwick 0.03 6.07 0 
Romer v. Evans 0.63 6.41 0.1 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 1.03 1.63 0.64 
Lawrence v. Texas (pulse) 1.70* 0.71 2.38 
Lawrence v. Texas (step) 2.21*** 0.6 3.64 
AR1 1.11*** 0.08 13.63 
AR2 -0.12 0.07 -1.66 
MA1 -0.77*** 0.05 -13.82 
constant 3.57*** 0.63 5.62 
N 276     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; NOTE: Lawrence pulse and step functions were estimated separately. 
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Table S5.13. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Establishment 
Issues 
Issue Area/Case Parameter Est. S.E. z-statistic 
Public Aid to Religious Schools    
Aguilar v. Felton & Grand Rapids v. Bell (pulse) 0.20 0.62 0.32 
Aguilar v. Felton & Grand Rapids v. Bell (step) -0.05* 0.02 -2.4 
Agostini v. Felton (pulse) -0.04 1.02 -0.04 
Agostini v. Felton (step) 0.05* 0.02 2.3 
AR1 -0.51 0.4 -1.27 
AR2 0.10 0.13 0.76 
MA1 0.74 0.38 1.93 
constant 0.21 0.02 10.28 
N 240   
Public Displays of Religious Icons    
Marsh v. Chambers -0.08 4.73 -0.02 
Lynch v. Donnelly 0.23 1.81 0.13 
AR1 -0.24 2.6 -0.09 
MA1 0.20 2.66 0.07 
constant 0.04* 0.02 2.04 
N 84     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
 
Table S5.14. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Right to Die 
Issue Area/Case Parameter Est. S.E. z-statistic 
Right to Die    
Cruzan v. Missouri (pulse) 0.43*** 0.08 5.48 
Cruzan v. Missouri (step) 0.05 0.04 1.18 
Wash. v. Glucksberg & Vacco v. Quill (pulse) 0.82*** 0.18 4.44 
Wash. v. Glucksberg & Vacco v. Quill (step) -0.05 0.05 -1.32 
MA1 0.36*** 0.08 4.65 
constant 0.10** 0.03 2.9 
N 168     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
 
Table S5.15. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to School Funding 
Issue Area/Case Parameter Est. S.E. z-statistic 
School Funding    
SAISD v. Rodriguez (pulse) -0.06 0.09 -0.69 
SAISD v. Rodriguez (step) 0.07* 0.03 2.13 
AR1 0.44 0.08 5.5 
constant 0.03 0.03 1.14 
N 84     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
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Table S5.16. Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on NYT Attention to Wiretapping 
Issue Area/Case Parameter Est. S.E. z-statistic 
Wiretapping    
U.S. v. US District Court (pulse) 0.12 1.01 0.12 
U.S. v. US District Court (step) 0.67** 0.24 2.78 
AR1 0.43*** 0.13 3.24 
constant 0.22 0.21 1.01 
N 84     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
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Issue-Area Keywords for Time-Series Data-Gathering 
 
Following Ura (2009), I measure media attention as a simple count of the mean number of daily 
stories each month appearing in the New York Times, archived at Lexis-Nexis, that mention a set 
of keywords related to the case.  
 
For the Free Speech cases: “free speech” or “freedom of speech” 
 
For the flag desecration cases: ("flag" AND "desecration") OR ("flag" AND ("burn" OR "desecrate" 
OR "burning")) AND NOT “Iraq” 
 
For the Free Exercise cases: “free exercise” OR “religious freedom” 
 
For the Establishment clause cases: “establishment clause” OR “separation of church and state” 
 
For the more specific public display of religious icon cases: “public display” AND (“Ten 
Commandments” OR “Nativity Scene” OR “crèche”) 
 
For the Title I cases: “Title I” AND “school” 
 
For the sovereign immunity cases: “sovereign immunity” 
 
For the Free Press cases: (“free press” OR “freedom of press” OR “freedom of the press” OR “press 
freedom”) 
 
For the right to die cases: “right to die” OR “physician assisted suicide” 
 
For the abortion cases: “abortion” 
 
For the public sector minimum wage cases: “minimum wage” 
 
For the affirmative action cases: (“affirmative action” OR “minority preference”) 
 
For SD v. Dole: "minimum drinking age" OR "legal drinking age" 
 
For SAISD v. Rodriguez: (("public school" AND "funding") OR ("public education" AND "funding") 
OR ("public" AND ("school" OR "education") AND "funding") OR ("public" AND 
"funding" AND "equal")) 
 
For US v US District Court: “wiretapping” OR “wire tap” 
 
For Hill v. CO: ("buffer zone" AND "speech") OR ("abortion" AND "free speech") 
 
For Kelo: “eminent domain” 
 
For Gonzales, the keywords were: (“medical” OR “medicinal”) AND (“marijuana” OR “cannabis”) 
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Chapter 6: 
Supreme Court Influence on the Presidential Agenda 
 
In chapter five I showed that the Supreme Court has regularly influenced the public 
political agenda, specified as media attention to given issues, in significant ways. In this chapter, 
I turn attention away from the mass political agenda and toward what is often referred to as the 
“policymaking agenda,” which is the agenda of political actors empowered to make binding 
decisions on behalf of the polity—typically Congress and the president (Wolfe et al. 2013). In 
this chapter I focus specifically on Supreme Court influence on the agenda of the sitting 
president. I chose to focus on the president rather than Congress for two primary reasons. First, 
the president is widely considered the “agenda-setter-in-chief”—that is, he is theorized to be the 
foremost agenda leader in American politics (Rutledge and Price-Larsen 2014), and because 
presidents are uniquely successful among the institutions in seeing their agenda translated into 
policy change (Grossmann 2014). Thus, I argue that it is likely that Supreme Court influence on 
the presidential agenda is particularly likely to result in subsequent politicking and/or policy 
development. Second, the Supreme Court-Presidential relations are much less studied, and as 
result, much less understood, than Court-Congress relations (e.g. Eshbaugh-Soha and Collins 
2016). As in the previous chapter, I ultimately argue here that the Supreme Court has regularly 
shaped the policy agenda of the sitting president, that it does so in theoretically predictable ways, 
and that Court influence over the presidential agenda is a function of political context as well as 
the relatively independent incentives and goals of both institutions. 
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The Supreme Court and the Presidential Agenda 
 In a press conference about a week after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Texas v. Johnson, President George H.W. Bush opened with remarks on that decision:  
“On Wednesday morning, the Supreme Court issued a decision which held that a person 
could not be convicted for desecration of our flag, the American flag, because to do so 
would infringe upon the right to political protest. 
… And I have the greatest respect for the Supreme Court and, indeed, for the Justices 
who interpreted the Constitution, as they saw fit. But I believe the importance of this 
issue compels me to call for a constitutional amendment. Support for the first amendment 
need not extend to desecration of the American flag. And we are reviewing proposed 
language for a constitutional amendment. We are beginning consultation with Members 
of the United States Congress who hold similar views. And as President, I will uphold 
our precious right to dissent. But burning the flag goes too far, and I want to see that 
matter remedied.”46 
 
President Bush’s call to action on flag desecration is representative of a relatively rare yet regular 
impact of Supreme Court decisions: influence on the agenda of the sitting president. In previous 
chapters I explored the role of the Supreme Court in shaping the so-called “public agenda,” 
understood as the mix of issues that occupy the public mind at any given point in time. In this 
chapter, I turn my focus to the policymaking agenda itself. Understanding Court influence on the 
policymaking agenda is critical to a full understanding of the Court’s role in the American 
political system, as agenda change is an important step in the policy process. Here I begin this 
work by systematically examining the influence of the Supreme Court on the agenda of the 
sitting president. In doing so, this paper will significantly improve our understanding of the 
Court’s role in shaping public policy in the US.  
 Understanding agenda setting is fundamental to understanding policy change. Governing 
institutions have limited time and resources to devote to policy problems, and as a result, many 
issues never get addressed. The first step in one key pathway to policy change is getting an issue 
                                                 
46 George Bush: "The President's News Conference," June 27, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17216. 
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on the agenda of some policymaker in the political system. To paraphrase Schattschneider 
(1975), understanding the agenda setting process in the American political system is crucial to 
understanding what gets done and when. 
The president is commonly understood to be the primary agenda setter in the American 
political system (Kingdon 1984; Peake 2001; Baumgartner and Jones 2009). Indeed, the 
president’s ability to set the agenda is often viewed as a key source of presidential power: it 
allows him (or prospectively, her) to influence the priorities of other governmental actors, the 
media, and the mass public—to say nothing of the president’s own unilateral powers (Grossmann 
2014; Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha 2008; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2004; Kernell 1997). 
Discussion of issues by the president can focus Congressional attention (Edwards and Wood 
1999) and may influence the Supreme Court’s agenda (Yates 2002).47 As such, presidential 
involvement in some given policy area significantly increases the probability that official action 
will be taken in that policy area. Further, presidential involvement in an issue influences the 
substance of legislation and administrative action, as well as court outputs (Grossmann 2014; 
Cameron 2000). Additionally, presidential responses may significantly influence the willingness 
of the public or of implementing actors to cooperate with or resist policies handed down by the 
Supreme Court (Canon and Johnson 1999; Hall 2011). For these reasons, understanding the 
Supreme Court’s ability to influence the presidential agenda will provide a window into an 
important pathway by which the Court influences policy development. Or to put it differently, 
presidential attention significantly increases the likelihood that action will be taken on a given 
                                                 
47 When the president gives even a single high-profile speech on a policy issue, that policy typically rises on the 
public agenda (Behr and Iyengar 1986; Cohen 1995). Importantly, Cohen finds that the president does not have to 
lay out an extended, substantive case for some policy in order to achieve this agenda setting effect; rather “[m]erely 
mentioning a problem to the public heightens public concern with [that] policy problem” (1995: 102; see also Hill 
1998). 
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issue, thus Supreme Court influence on the president’s agenda is one likely pathway by which 
the Court indirectly influences public policy and politics.  
The Policymaking Agenda 
Scholars are increasingly recognizing that no actor or institution has the “final word” in 
America’s famously fragmented political system (e.g. Barnes 2004; Silverstein 2009; Keck 
2014). This developmental view of policy emphasizes interbranch interplay over time. But 
governing institutions have limited time and resources to devote to policy problems, which 
suggests that understanding the agenda setting process in the American political system is crucial 
to understanding what gets done and when (Schattschneider 1975; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; 
Baumgartner and Jones 2009). Understanding Court influence over the “policymaking 
agenda”—the agenda of political actors empowered to make binding decisions on behalf of the 
polity (typically Congress and the president; see Wolfe et al. 2013)—is thus of central 
importance in understanding the Supreme Court’s role in the American political system. 
 The Supreme Court may powerfully influence American politics and policy by shaping 
the political agenda. To date, the majority of the work on agenda setting and the Supreme Court 
concerns how the Court sets its own agenda, rather than how it shapes or influences the national 
agenda (e.g. Perry 1991; Yates et al. 2005; Black and Owens 2009; Owens 2010; Owens 2011). 
These are certainly interrelated phenomena, as, for example, members of the Court anticipate 
possible reactions from Congress when deciding whether or not to hear a case (Owens 2011).48 
As a result of this focus, however, relatively little is known about the role the Supreme Court 
                                                 
48 It should be noted that the Court is often able to advance its policy goals by speaking on issues not formally raised 
by the parties in a particular case (McGuire and Palmer 1996), indicating that the Court’s agenda is somewhat more 
fluid than is often thought. 
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plays in shaping the broader policymaking agenda—that is, the agendas of other policymaking 
institutions in the US. 
 Political scientists have been interested in agenda setting at least since the early 1960s 
when Schattschneider (1975 [1960]) and Bachrach and Baratz (1962) published their seminal 
works on the topic. These scholars point out that exercising control over the agenda is no less an 
exercise of power than is exercising control over another actor’s behavior. Or as Schattschneider 
put it, “All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds 
of conflict and the suppression of others because organization is the mobilization of bias.  Some 
issues are organized into politics while others are organized out,” (1975: 71). Schattschneider 
famously referred to the definition of policy alternatives as the “supreme instrument of power” 
(1975: 68).49  
 Put differently, most contemporary work on agenda setting examines the ability of groups 
and other interested actors to influence the national political agenda in order to pursue some 
desired policy change. This is the basic approach I will take in this chapter, with one key 
distinction. Rather than focus on some advocacy organization’s attempts to strategically alter the 
agenda in pursuit of some policy (e.g. gun control or environmental protection), I will focus on 
the effects a particular political institution has on this agenda. In other words, while most policy 
scholars focus on advocacy organizations’ attempts to influence the agendas of political actors 
(including the Supreme Court, via amicus participation and strategic litigation), I will focus 
instead on how the actions of one political institution shapes the agenda of another. Many studies 
                                                 
49 This face of power is subtle and thus very difficult to study (e.g. Anzia and Jackman 2013). Indeed, many of the 
operations of second face power are unobservable (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). As a result, much of the policy 
studies literature focuses on the positive side of agenda setting; that is, on when groups or actors are able to 
overcome second face power by placing issues on the political agenda (e.g. Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Pralle 
2006; Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Sabatier 1988; Kingdon 1984). 
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of presidential power utilize this approach, and for good reason: the president is often thought of 
as the nation’s “agenda-setter-in-chief” (Rutledge and Price-Larsen 2014), and because 
presidents are the actor in Washington most likely to achieve policy change (Grossmann 2014). 
The Supreme Court’s role as a national agenda setter, on the other hand, has received very little 
scholarly attention.50 
Inter-Institutional Agenda Setting 
 The importance of the policymaking agenda has led many scholars to interrogate the 
power of governing institutions to set or influence the agendas of other such institutions. Indeed, 
the ability to set or constrain the policymaking agenda has long been considered one of the most 
important sources of political power (Schattschneider 1975; Bachrach and Baratz 1962; March 
and Olsen 1976; Cobb and Elder 1972). As such, a few scholars have sought to systematically 
examine the complex dynamics of agenda setting in the American political system. Flemming, 
Wood, and Bohte (1999), for example, examine how the institutional agendas of Congress, the 
president, and the Supreme Court interact with each other, and with the “systemic” or “public” 
agenda. They find that issue attention to civil rights, civil liberties, and environmental issues is 
driven by complex interactions among the four groups studied, and that the patterns of 
interactions vary significantly across issue domains. That is, Flemming and coauthors (1999) 
conclude that neither top-down nor bottom-up models of agenda setting adequately capture 
agenda dynamics in the American political system. Similarly, Edwards and Wood (1999) find 
                                                 
50 The importance of inter-institutional agenda influence is illustrated by an important paper on Court-Congress 
relations by Hettinger and Zorn (2005). Hettinger and Zorn observe that many existing studies in the separation of 
power literature rely on explanations of case-level factors in their attempts to explain Congressional overrides of the 
Court. Hettinger and Zorn demonstrate, however, that the relative rarity of overrides hampers this approach, and that 
both Court- and Congress-specific features determine whether a Court decision will receive attention from Congress, 
and thus even be a candidate for override. Put differently, they argue that even if overrides are the ultimate outcome 
of interest, scholars must pay careful attention to the related but distinct set of features that influence the 
Congressional agenda if we are to develop a realistic model of Court-Congress interactions. It is on important 
insights such as this that I intend to build in this chapter. 
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that the president, Congress, and the media, all react to issues and all influence the attention of 
the others, though the president does have significant opportunity to lead in domestic policy. In 
short, these scholars argue that the agenda emerges from complex interactions of institutional 
preferences, recent history, electoral incentives, and exogenous events.  
 In light of this significant complexity, researchers often seek to explain the sources of a 
single institution’s agenda, or the influence of one branch of government over the agenda of 
another branch. Light (1999) argues that information, expertise, and political capital significantly 
shape the president’s agenda. Eshbaugh-Soha (2005) builds on this work, arguing that a 
president’s decision to pursue major policy goals in Congress is significantly shaped by political 
context, especially fiscal constraints and partisan gridlock. Others have found that the president 
selectively and strategically uses his agenda setting capacity to respond to (and perhaps even 
manipulate) public opinion (Druckman and Jacobs 2015; Canes-Wrone 2006; Yates and 
Whitford 2005).  
Much of this inter-institutional research has centered on the ability of the president to 
influence the Congressional agenda. Edwards and Barrett (2000), for example, find that 
presidential initiatives are more likely to receive consideration from Congress than are initiatives 
advanced by members of Congress. Further, presidents’ most significant legislative proposals are 
virtually guaranteed to receive hearing in Congress (Mayhew 2004; Edwards and Barrett 2000). 
Recent research clearly demonstrates that presidents can significantly shape the Congressional 
agenda, at least under some conditions. (Rutledge and Price Larsen 2014; Lovett et al. 2015; 
Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2004; Peake 2001).  Rutledge and Price Larsen (2014) call the 
president the “agenda setter-in-chief” in light of their finding that in the areas of environmental 
policy, law and crime, health care, marcoeconomics, defense, and international affairs, 
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presidential attention significantly increases the amount of attention paid by Congress to these 
issues. Similarly, Lovett et al. argue that when a “popular president announces a major policy 
initiative in the State of the Union address at the beginning of a new congressional session, 
committee chairs follow suit” (2015: 22). However, they demonstrate that while presidents are 
key agenda setters, this ability is conditional on presidential approval, shared party control of the 
presidency and Congress, and timing (Lovett et al. 2015).  
 Many students of judicial politics have sought to shed light on the president’s influence 
on the Supreme Court. In the extensive literature on agenda setting within the Supreme Court, 
for example, the influence of the Solicitor General (SG) has received significant attention. The 
Solicitor General is the litigating arm of the executive branch; it is this office that signals the 
president’s preferences to the Court directly, both at the certiorari stage, and on the merits 
(Caldeira and Wright 1988; Meinhod and Shaw 1998; Salokar 1992; Caplan 1988). Further, 
litigants supported by the Solicitor General are much more likely to win than not (Segal 1988; 
Segal 1990; McGuire 1994; Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman 2005). When the SG submits an 
amicus, he wins 74% of the time; when the office argues orally, it wins 76.6% of the time; when 
the SG himself argues before the Court, he wins 94% of the time (Segal 1988). Typical 
explanations for the high degree of success Solicitors General find before the Supreme Court 
include his status as a “repeat player,” his elite status, or his reputation as a source for credible 
legal arguments and information (but see Wohlfarth 2009).  
Segal (1990), however, argues that the apparent influence of the Solicitor General over 
the Supreme Court is actually a function of the Court’s tendency to defer to the president (see 
also Collins 2004; Yates 2002). Bailey, Kamoi, and Maltzman (2005) argue that Justices tend to 
vote with the SG when s/he adopts a policy that is ideologically congruous with the justice. 
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Further, justices are more likely to take seriously a cue from the SG when he takes a position 
contra to his typical policy predilections (e.g. a conservative SG advocates a liberal position). 
Thus, the SG is not an apolitical legal expert—his influence must be understood in political 
terms. These studies in the judicial decision-making literature suggest that the office of the 
Solicitor General exerts an institutional constraint on the Court by signaling the president’s 
preferences to the justices. 
Other scholars have explored interactions between Congress and the Supreme Court. For 
example, Dahl (1957) famously argued that the Supreme Court routinely makes policy, and that 
if in doing so it upsets the current “lawmaking majority” Congress typically reverses the Court’s 
policy (cf. Hall and Black 2013). Similarly, Hall and Ura (2015) argue that the Court tends to 
only invalidate federal laws that have little support from elected officials (see also Uribe et al. 
2014). This relationship is likely attributable to Congress’ willingness to work to respond 
Supreme Court invalidations of its statutes, especially when doing so is consistent with the 
reelection goals of members of Congress (Ignagni and Meernik 1994). Put differently, these 
works indicate that Supreme Court invalidations of statutes that are favored by sitting political 
elites often return to the institutional agenda of Congress. Pickerill (2004) and Blackstone (2013) 
have demonstrated that such invalidations frequently prompt Congress to respond by reenacting 
the statute in modified form, such that the new law comports with the Court’s ruling but also 
pursues Congress’ policy goal (see also Clark and McGuire 1996; O’Brien 2005).  
Meernik and Ignagni (1997) find Congress attempted to override a Supreme Court 
invalidation of some policy 125 times (out of 569 such reversals, or 22% of the time) between 
1954 and 1990, and that in 41 of those 125 cases it succeeded (33%; 7.2% overall overturn rate). 
Bringing the president back into the fray, in analyzing attempted and successful overrides of 
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Court invalidations by Congress, Meernik and Ignagni (1997) find that presidential opposition to 
a Court ruling is the strongest predictor of Congressional decisions to work against the Court 
(making it 21% more likely than average that they will attempt, and 89% more likely that they 
will succeed). Additionally, they find that Congress is considerably more likely to attempt to 
reverse the Court when “there is evidence of public opposition,” when the ruling involves a state 
law, and when the ruling involves issues of federal power (Meernik and Ignagni 1997: 463). 
These studies consistently find that Congress is relatively more likely to respond to 
invalidations when the cases concern issues of federal power, and is more likely to do so 
effectively when the offending decision is salient and unpopular among the public. Policy 
responses necessarily begin as issues on the Congressional agenda. These studies collectively 
demonstrate the importance of understanding the Court’s influence on other institutions’ 
agendas. Importantly, Congress can also respond to decisions it views favorably (that is, there is 
more to the story than “backlash,” e.g. Graber 1993; Gillman 2002). For example, Klarman 
(2004; 1994) has famously argued that the chief impact of the Court’s decision in Brown v. 
Board (1954) was to provoke a massive political backlash in the South, which in turn rallied 
national opinion behind Brown and precipitated the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  
Casper (1976) goes further, making a powerful case that the Supreme Court has several 
tools beyond invalidation at its disposal to shape public policy, including its power of statutory 
construction. Works in this vein demonstrate that Congress itself clearly views the Court’s 
statutory decisions as important, as it frequently works to override or alter them (Eskridge 1991; 
Barnes 2004; Baum and Hausegger 2004; Hettinger and Zorn 2005). These overrides provide the 
opportunity for “dissatisfied groups to revisit issues in a legislative forum, and raise concerns 
that courts—as adjudicators of discrete legal disputes—may either have overlooked or be poorly 
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designed to consider” (Barnes 2004: 5). Moreover, Barnes argues that this interbranch dialogue 
promotes broad political participation, provides an opportunity for Congress to assert control 
over contested issues, and often increases judicial consensus on those issues (see also Barnes 
2007). 
Relatedly, recent works suggest that Congress significantly influences the Supreme 
Court’s agenda. Harvey and Friedman (2006) argue that members of the Supreme Court 
rationally anticipate and seek to avoid Congressional punishment for adverse decisions (such as 
those documented by Meernik and Ignagni 1997), and thus that the Court’s decisions to grant 
certiorari, as well as decisions on the merits, are influenced by Congressional preferences (see 
also Uribe et al. 2014). Clark (2009) goes further, arguing that the desire to maintain judicial 
legitimacy drives justices to exercise self-restraint in the face of congressional (and public) 
preferences. That is, Clark concludes that “[w]hen the Court fears it will lose public support, it 
will adjust its behavior in light of congressional signals about the Court’s level of public 
support” (2009: 985; cf. Owens 2010, arguing that archival evidence suggests that justices do not 
take separation of powers concerns into consideration at cert stage).  
The above studies explore the role the president plays in shaping the agendas of Congress 
and the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court’s influence over the agenda of Congress and vice 
versa. Somewhat less attention has been paid to the role Congress and the Court play in shaping 
the president’s agenda. What little research does exist in this area suggests that Congress has 
little to no ability to influence the presidential agenda (Rutledge and Larsen Price 2014; Edwards 
and Barrett 2000; Edwards and Wood 1999; Flemming et al. 1999). The existing literature has 
two major limitations. First, existing work emphasizes Congressional responses to Court 
decisions, and thus leaves unanswered significant questions regarding agenda of the executive 
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branch. Yet influence on the presidential agenda is important, as the presidential agenda is a key 
factor in policy change in the US. Second, like the compliance literature (and much other work in 
Law and Courts), the literature focuses almost entirely on judicial invalidations. As a result, we 
know very little about how non-invalidations, which make up the bulk of the Court’s work, 
influence the agendas of other institutions. In chapters two and three I argued that non-
invalidations are important, and that their effects on politics and policy must be rigorously 
scrutinized if we are to develop a full understanding of the Court’s impact in the American 
political system—the potential agenda-influence of such decisions are one pathway through 
which such decisions may significantly influence subsequent politics and policy development.  
 The few works that seek explicitly to examine the Court’s role as an agenda setter tend to 
focus on the “public agenda”—that is, on media coverage, as examined in the previous chapter. 
Recall, for example, that Flemming, Bohte, and Wood argue that Supreme Court decisions can 
“expand the scope of conflict by activating new groups and accentuating old rivalries” (1997: 
1225). These processes, they argue, may in turn amplify public and media attention, and draw 
other institutions into the fray. Flemming et al. identify thirty-one “important” cases (importance 
measured as appearing in the CQ Guide to the Supreme Court) and found that seven affected the 
agenda. Flemming et al. find that in these seven cases, which involve school desegregation, flag 
burning, and public school prayer, the Court did cause long-term shifts in media attention on 
those issues, and that those decisions “rearranged the distribution of political influence, and 
significantly expanded the scope of conflict for the underlying issues” (1997: 1224; see also Ura 
2009). In a later paper, Flemming, Bohte, and Wood recognize that changes in attention to issues 
“emerge from interaction between the three branches of government, as well as between the 
government and the people” (1999: 76). Here again though, Flemming and coauthors focus on a 
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subset of issues (civil rights, civil liberties, and environmental policy) and measure attention as 
coverage in the media, again finding that the Court, like other institutions, can influence attention 
to an issue. More importantly, they argue that neither top-down nor bottom-up explanations for 
agenda setting are satisfactory; the reality of national agenda setting is far more complex, 
entailing a “hybrid of both vertical and horizontal interactions” (1999: 104).  
Very little existing research explicitly examines Supreme Court influence on the 
presidential agenda. Rather, most work examining the executive-judicial relations focuses on 
presidential rhetoric about judicial nominations (e.g. Maltese 1995; Johnson and Roberts 2004; 
Holmes 2007; Holmes 2008). One recent study has taken first steps in the direction of 
understanding presidential responses to the Court by examining why and when presidents refer 
to Supreme Court decisions in their speeches or written commentary (Eshbaugh-Soha and 
Collins 2015). Eshbaugh-Soha and Collins (2015) argue that presidents will comment on cases 
when doing so serves their reelection or policy goals, or when they expect that doing so might 
enhance their historic legacy. This perspective is well-grounded in the literature on presidential 
behavior (e.g. Ross 2012; Canes-Wrone 2001; Light 1999; Moe 1985). Similarly, Blackstone and 
Goelzhauser (2014) argue that presidents direct more rhetoric toward the Supreme Court during 
election years and when there is a vacancy on the Court. In short, existing works find that 
political context significantly affects the likelihood that the sitting president will respond to 
Court decisions with political rhetoric, and specifically, that political and policy views 
importantly condition the likelihood of a presidential response. However, these existing works 
focus on how the political environment shapes the president’s incentives; no work has yet 
systematically examined how Supreme Court action per se might provoke a presidential 
response. Collins and Eshbaugh-Soha (2014) begin to address the shortcoming in the literature 
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by examining the influence of some case-level characteristics on presidential rhetoric. They find 
that presidents are more likely to comment on salient cases, and are especially likely to make 
negative remarks about decisions when the Court exercises its constitutional review power, and 
when the Court’s decision is ideologically distant from the president’s preferred outcome.  
In summary, the institutional agendas of each of the three branches of government are 
significantly related. The president can influence the agenda of Congress by focusing attention 
on issues, especially when he is popular, and when his party controls Congress. The president 
can influence the Supreme Court’s agenda by signaling his preferences through the Solicitor 
General. Congress, in turn, appears to influence the Supreme Court’s agenda, as members of the 
Court rationally anticipate and generally seek to avoid adverse responses from Congress. In 
contrast, Congress appears to have relatively little influence over the presidential agenda. 
Finally, we know very little about the extent to which the work of the Supreme Court may 
influence the agenda of the president, although some recent work suggests that the Court may 
place issues on the presidential agenda when it makes salient decisions that are adverse to the 
president’s policy preferences. It is toward this important but poorly understood relationship that 
I now turn.  
Theory & Hypotheses 
 The theory here begins from the perspective that the president’s political agenda seeks to 
serve two primary goals: attaining policy preferences and reelection. Eshbaugh-Soha and Collins 
(2015) find that presidents speak on Court decisions almost exclusively after they have been 
decided, and attribute this finding to presidents’ desire to signal their preferences on important 
and salient issues. To be sure, the Supreme Court lacks the formal agenda setting powers that the 
president enjoys: for example, it has no officer to carry its preferences to the executive for 
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consideration. But the lack of institutional mechanisms for agenda setting in the other branches 
hardly indicates that the Court lacks the ability to influence the agendas of the other institutions, 
as the literature discussed above with respect to Court-Congress relations amply demonstrates. 
Rather, this suggests that the Court’s ability to influence the president’s agenda will be 
contingent on the factors that shape the president’s agenda under normal circumstances. Put 
differently, if the president’s agenda is shaped by his policy preferences (however constrained by 
political context), then Supreme Court decisions which speak to issues on the president’s agenda 
may be likely to draw a response. By the same token, if a Supreme Court case moves some 
policy away from the president’s preferred policy, then that decision may place an issue on the 
presidential agenda even if it was not there before. Similarly, if the president’s agenda is shaped 
by a desire for reelection, then cases relevant to the president’s reelection goals are likely to 
influence his agenda.  
Existing scholarship strongly suggests that both Court- and presidential-level factors 
should influence the likelihood that a Court decision puts an issue on the president’s agenda (e.g. 
Lovett et al. 2015; Hettinger and Zorn 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha 2005). That is, the likelihood that 
the president utilizes his agenda setting power varies in predictable ways; thus the extent to 
which he will respond with that agenda setting power to Court decisions varies according to both 
case-level factors and the presidential-level factors that inform the more general phenomenon.  
 Previous works have identified several important variables that influence a president’s 
ability to successfully put an issue on Congress’ agenda. Popular presidents are better able to set 
the agenda than are less popular presidents (Lovett et al. 2015; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2004; 
Page and Shapiro 1985; Horvit et al. 2008). Unsurprisingly, presidents are more successful at 
setting the Congressional agenda when copartisans control Congress. (Lovett et al. 2015). 
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Finally, Presidents are likely to be more successful in setting the agenda when the issue is 
already salient (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2004).  
While these studies have shed important light on the conditions under which relative 
success of presidential agenda-setting efforts are more likely to succeed, we know less about 
what induces a president to try to utilize this power to shape the national agenda—that is, about 
the sources of the president’s own agenda per se. Eshbaugh-Soha (2005) argues that a few key 
factors influence the president’s agenda. The overall size of a president’s agenda is influenced by 
the previous year’s budget: larger deficits lead to smaller agendas (i.e. fewer distinct issues are 
tackled by the president). In contrast, higher approval ratings encourage presidents to take on 
more issues. Finally, Eshbaugh-Soha (2005) argues that presidents build a larger agenda during 
unified government than during divided government, as they expect to be able to successfully 
take on more policy issues.  
Building on these studies, and the perspective that the president’s agenda centers on his 
policy and reelection goals, I hypothesize that presidential-level, court-level, and political-
context variables will influence the likelihood that a Supreme Court decision influences the 
presidential agenda. To be clear, some of these factors can be plausibly grouped with either 
policy goals or reelection goals, but this fact simply attests to the valence between those two 
abstract categories when they are brought down to a more concrete level.  
The key hypotheses here are that the political and legal importance and the mobilizability 
of issues will be central in informing presidents’ decisions to take up an issue decided by the 
Supreme Court. Politically important cases are more likely to draw presidential attention because 
they are those most likely to affect the president’s ability to pursue his policy and reelection 
goals (Eshbaugh-Soha and Collins 2015). The logic here is twofold: first, the president’s agenda 
177 
 
is necessarily limited—he can deal with only so many issues and problems at a time—thus only 
important decisions are likely to earn presidential attention; second, as chief executive, the 
modern president is expected to have answers to all important issues facing the nation (e.g. Lowi 
1986). This is perhaps especially true when cases are both important and salient (though 
importance or impact of a case also predicts its media salience; see Strother 2017a). Similarly, 
interest group participation in a case indicates the extent to which politically active interests care 
about an issue. This points to the perceived contemporary political importance of the case, 
certainly—but also the potential for group mobilization on the issue. Given the central 
importance of such interests in electoral politics (Cohen et al. 2008), officeholders—even 
presidents (at least in their first term)—ignore such “intense policy demanders” at their peril.  
Key Hypotheses: 
H1: The president is more likely to respond to important Supreme Court decisions than less 
important ones.  
H2: The president is more likely to respond to cases on issues that are mobilizable. 
H3: The president is more likely to respond to cases which are salient.  
 
Clearly, one issue here is that interest group participation as amicus curiae is a key 
indicator of both importance and mobilizability. This theory of amicus-as-cue, well-established 
in the Public Law literature, holds that the “potential significance of a case is proportional to the 
demand for adjudication among affected parties and that the amount of amicus curiae 
participation reflects the demand for adjudication” (Caldeira and Wright 1988: 1112). In fact, the 
potential for political mobilization on that issue may be part of what makes a case important. The 
problem for this analysis is that relying on this one variable makes it very difficult to adjudicate 
between two potential explanations (importance versus mobilizability, except for the extent to 
which those latent concepts covary). In an effort to address this, I also include a widely accepted 
measure of the importance of Supreme Court decisions—the length of the opinion (Black and 
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Spriggs 2008). This measure, however, is generally thought to capture legal importance, not 
necessarily political importance.51 
Additionally, a number of other factors will likely influence the president’s willingness to 
take up a Court decision. First, previous research suggests that two key presidential-level policy 
preference factors influence the likelihood that an issue makes it onto the presidential agenda: the 
ideological distance between the policy announced by the Court and the president’s preferred 
policy outcome, and Court invalidations of policies. Both of these factors should significantly 
increase the probability of negative reactions from the president (Collins and Eshbaugh-Soha 
2014). Further, the president may be more likely to take on new agenda items (including by 
responding to Court cases) during election years (Collins and Eshbaugh-Soha 2014). Finally, 
presidents are more likely to take on issues when they expect to be successful in pursuing their 
policy aims on that issue: as such, presidents may be more likely to respond to Court decisions 
when their job approval rating is high, when the national debt is relatively small, and during 
times of unified government (Eshbaugh-Soha and Collins 2015; Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha 2008; 
Eshbaugh-Soha 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2004). Measurement strategies for these 
theorized indicators will be discussed in the following section.  
Ancillary Expectations from the Literature: 
Presidential-Level Factors 
E1: The president is more likely to respond to Supreme Court decisions when they are 
ideologically distant from his preferred policy position.  
E2: The president is more likely to respond to Supreme Court decisions that invalidate statutes 
than those in which it upholds statutes.  
E3: The president is more likely to respond to Supreme Court decisions during election years. 
E4: The president is more likely to respond to Supreme Court decisions when his job approval 
rating is high, and less likely to do so when it is lower.   
                                                 
51 A possible alternative measure would be inclusion in Congressional Quarterly’s (CQ) list of “important” cases. I 
declined to go this route, however, because of a possible endogeneity problem: the CQ list comes out well after the 
end of a Supreme Court term, and as such, it might be the case that some decisions make it onto the CQ list in whole 
or in part because the president took some action responding to the decision. So while word count is an imperfect 
measure for my purposes, it is at least wholly independent from the outcome of interest. 
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Political Context Factors 
E5: The president is more likely to respond to Supreme Court decisions when the national debt is 
small (or in surplus), and less likely to respond when the debt is larger.  
E6: The president is more likely to respond to Supreme Court decisions during times of unified 
government.  
 
Approach & Data 
In order to test the hypotheses outlined above I conduct Firth-logistic regression analyses 
of presidential responses to all Supreme Court cases formally decided from 1955 to 2001 
(N=5,620).52 The president’s agenda is typically measured in one of two ways: the content of 
speeches and written statements (such as State of the Union Addresses), or the content of 
executive orders (see, for example the Policy Agendas Project 2016; Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha 
2008, Flemming et al. 1999, etc.).  In this paper, I take the more common approach in the 
literature and measure the presidential agenda using written and spoken statements. Thus data for 
the dependent variables in this study—presidential mentions of Supreme Court cases—comes 
from Collins and Eshbaugh-Soha’s (2014) study of presidential rhetoric about Supreme Court 
decisions. They collected these data by keyword searching for the string “Supreme Court” in the 
Public Papers of the President database, available online at the American Presidency Project 
(2016). After locating presidential mentions of the Supreme Court, they determined whether the 
president referred to a specific case, and if so, identified the case mentioned. Only cases which 
were decided during the president’s tenure were counted (i.e. a president remarking on a case 
that occurred prior to his term in office would not be counted in this dataset). Further, they coded 
the tone of all of the presidential remarks in their dataset: negative mentions are those critical of 
the Court’s decisions, positive mentions praise or agree with decisions, while discussions in 
                                                 
52 This time period is a reflection of the available data: Collins and Eshbaugh-Soha’s (2014) presidential rhetoric 
data run from 1953 to 2013. Clark, Lax, and Rice’s (2015) media data run from 1955 to 2008. Collins (2008) amicus 
data however, run from 1946 to 2001. Thus 1955-2001 is the available window.  
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which the president takes no clear stance are coded as neutral. For extended discussion of this 
dataset and coding rules, see Collins and Eshbaugh-Soha (2014: 11-14).  
 The key independent variables in this study measure a decision’s legal and political 
importance, its salience, and the extent to which the issue is “mobilizable.” Following extensive 
literature in Law and Courts research, I utilize amicus participation to proxy political importance 
(Collins 2008; Hansford 2004; Epstein and Knight 1999; see Strother 2017a). Amicus 
participation by interest groups also indicates the extent to which “intense policy demanders” are 
interested in a given case, and thus the policy to which it is relevant (Cohen et al. 2008). Amicus 
participation also provides a reasonable indication of the extent to which an issue is mobilizable 
at that point in time, for the same reason. Data on amicus participation was obtained from 
Collins’ (2008) “Friends of the Supreme Court” dataset; the variable of interest takes on a value 
equal to the count of amicus briefs filed (for either party) for a given case. Collins’ data also 
includes a dummy variable indicating whether the office of the Solicitor General participated as 
amicus. 
Data on opinion length (a proxy for legal importance) was obtained from Black and 
Spriggs’ (2008) “Length of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions” data.53 Black and Spriggs’ opinion-
length data take values equal to the number of words in a given opinion; I divided the word 
counts by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation (so a 1-unit increase in the IV is equal to an additional 
1,000 words in the opinion). Salience data was obtained from Epstein and Segal’s (2000) case 
salience database.54 This is a dummy variable that takes on a “1” value if a case appeared on the 
front page of the New York Times the day after it was decided, and “0” otherwise.55 
                                                 
53 Available at https://ryancblack.org/webfiles/replication/opLength_NYT.zip 
54 http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php?s=5&i=2 
55 This measure is probably overly-conservative (e.g. Clark, Lax, and Rice 2015). All findings are robust to 
specification of salience as the number of new stories on that case appearing in the New York Times, Washington 
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 Other independent variables come from two sources: Collins and Eshbaugh-Soha’s 
(2014) dataset, and the Supreme Court Database56 (Spaeth et al. 2015). Collins and Eshbaugh-
Soha constructed several variables which capture important elements of the political 
environment that may influence presidential responses to Supreme Court decisions: their data 
includes variables on the ideological distance between a Court decision and the president’s 
policy preference, the president’s approval rating (which I have rescaled to vary between 0 and 
1), and a dummy indicating whether a rhetorical mention came during an election year.  
The Supreme Court Database (SCD) contains data on wide range of case-level variables. 
I utilize the SCD dummy variable indicating whether a decision invalidated a statute (declared it 
unconstitutional). I also utilize the SCD “minority votes” variable to operationalize judicial 
dissensus. This is a count variable equal to the number of justices dissenting from the opinion of 
the Court in a given case. This minority votes variable was also used to construct a “minimum 
winning coalition” variable which is equal to 1 when a decision was 5-4 or 4-3, and 0 otherwise.  
Data on the annual budget were collected from the White House Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB); the variable is equal to the national debt (or occasionally, surplus) in billions 
of dollars.57 Following Eshbaugh-Soha (2005), I lag the budget one year in all models. Finally, I 
generated a dummy variable for divided government, which is coded as “1” when the presidency 
                                                 
Post, and Los Angeles Times. I rely primarily on the Epstein and Segal measure to mitigate against temporality 
problems that might arise with reliance on the Clark et al. measure. That is, the Epstein and Segal measure only 
counts stories coming immediately after the decision, whereas the Clark et al. data counts stories appearing for a full 
year after the decision. As such, reliance on the Clark et al. measure might introduce serious endogeneity problems, 
as cases may receive coverage because the president responded to them per se, and not because of Court action in 
the case.  
Clark et al.’s data is available at: Tom S. Clark, Jeffrey R. Lax, and Douglas R. Rice. 2014. “Measuring the Political 
Salience of Supreme Court Cases.” Harvard Dataverse, V1: http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/29637 
56 Harold J. Spaeth, Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal, Theodore J. Ruger, and Sara C. Benesh. 2015. 
Supreme Court Database, version 2015 release 01. URL: http://Supremecourtdatabase.org  
57 All budget numbers are adjusted for inflation (2015 dollars). For original data see Table 1.1 at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/ 
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and at least one house of Congress are controlled by different political parties, and “0” when the 
presidency and both houses of Congress are controlled by the same party. 
Analysis & Findings 
 Presidents responded in rhetoric to 118 Supreme Court decisions in the sample (2.01 
percent of cases in sample). Figure 6.1 shows the frequency of presidential responses to cases 
over time. A full list of cases discussed by the president is presented in supplementary material at 
the end of this chapter. Presidents mentioned cases in anywhere from 1 to 31 separate 
appearances or statements for a total of 381 mentions.58  
Figure 6.1. Percentage of Cases Garnering Presidential Responses, by Year 
 
As noted above, I recoded Collins and Eshbaugh-Soha’s (2014) count data into a dummy 
variable and use Firth logistic regression to estimate the models (Firth 1993; Zorn 2005; 
Coveney 2015; Bell and Miller 2015).59 The Firth approach utilizes penalized maximum 
likelihood estimation to allow convergence to finite estimates with very sparse data (Coveney 
                                                 
58 President Obama criticized Citizens United v. FEC on 31 separate occasions, making that case a significant outlier 
in the dataset. Citizens United is omitted from the analyses because of constraints imposed by the data for some of 
the independent variables in the model.  
59 I also estimate rare events logit models using King, Tomz, and Zeng’s relogit package as a robustness check (King 
and Zeng 2001; King, Tomz, and Zeng 2003). These models are presented in the supplementary materials. 
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2015; Heinz and Schemper 2002). That is, estimates from standard logit will be biased when 
modeling sparse (or separated or quasi-separated) data because the maximum likelihood 
estimates tend toward infinity and thus become inestimable; the Firth approach corrects for this 
bias by adjusting the likelihood function by a fixed quantity: the Jeffreys (1946) prior. All 
models include president-level fixed effects.60  
Table 6.1 presents the full models: model one estimates the effects of the specified 
variables on all (any) presidential mentions of a Supreme Court decision, model two estimates 
the effects of those variables on positive/approving presidential mentions, model three considers 
only negative responses, model four only neutral mentions. As with standard logistic regression, 
the estimates presented in Table 6.1 are logged odds ratios. The models in Table 6.1 broadly 
support the hypotheses specified above: importance, salience, and mobilizability significantly 
increase the likelihood that a Supreme Court decision will influence the president’s agenda. 
Focusing first on model 1 we find that importance (measured as logged word count), salience 
(number of post-decision newspaper stories on the case), and mobilizability (number of interest 
groups that participated in the case as amicus curiae) all exhibit substantively large and highly 
significant influence on the likelihood that the case influences the president’s agenda, even when 
controlling for other agenda-related factors. Further, and consistent with expectations from the 
literature, we see that presidents are significantly more likely to respond to Supreme Court 
invalidations of statutes than decisions upholding statutes. Contrary to expectations, however, we 
find that presidents are actually more likely to respond to cases during times of divided 
                                                 
60 Additionally, I specify both the Firth and relogit models with random effects to ensure that the results were not 
being driven by the fixed effects, and the results do not change. That is, the fixed effects specification is not driving 
the finding.  
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government than during unified government. Further, presidential approval, the budget situation, 
and election year all fail to significantly influence the likelihood of a presidential response.  
Table 6.1. Predictors of Presidential Responses to Supreme Court Decisions, 1955-2001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Any Positive Negative Neutral 
Ideological Distance -0.28 -1.19** 1.54** -0.16 
 (0.23) (0.38) (0.54) (0.32) 
Unconstitutional 0.38 -0.56 1.16** 0.15 
 (0.29) (0.52) (0.42) (0.42) 
Importance (word count) 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.02 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Total number of amici 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.02 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Salient case 1.99*** 2.32*** 2.72*** 1.97*** 
 (0.26) (0.41) (0.50) (0.35) 
Presidential Approval -0.99 -0.68 -7.15* 0.69 
 (1.32) (1.94) (2.81) (1.88) 
Reelection Year 0.06 0.17 -0.26 -0.35 
 (0.31) (0.46) (0.58) (0.49) 
Divided Government 2.12** 3.45** 1.51 1.69 
 (0.73) (1.17) (1.01) (1.21) 
Previous Fisc. Yr. Budget -0.0007 -0.001 -0.0001 -0.0003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -7.37*** -11.44*** -4.61* -7.96*** 
 (1.08) (2.11) (1.91) (1.56) 
Observations 5,623 5,623 5,623 5,623 
Note: Table reports results from firth-logistic regression models of presidential responses to the U.S. Supreme 
Court: the dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the sitting president respondent to a Court decision. Fixed 
effects are omitted for presentation. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05,  
⁺ p<0.1 (two-tailed tests). 
 
 Models 2 through 4 provide some needed nuance to the findings just discussed. For 
example, we see that the ideological distance between the Court’s decision and the president’s 
preferred policy significantly influences the likelihood of both positive and negative responses, 
and in the expected directions. That is, presidents are more likely to respond negatively as the 
ideological distance grows, and less likely to respond positively as that distance grows. We see 
also that the observed effect of declarations of unconstitutionality on the presidential agenda is 
driven by negative attention: presidents are much more likely to respond to a decision negatively 
when the Court invalidated a statute (compared to when it did not), but are no more likely to 
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respond positively or in a neutral manner to such a decision. Further, we see that the effects of 
legal importance and public salience are consistent across all three types of presidential 
responses. Importantly, however, amicus participation (mobilizability) appears to significantly 
influence the probability that the president will respond positively to a decision, but has no effect 
on negative or neutral responses. Similarly, we see that presidential approval appears to constrain 
the president’s willingness to respond to cases he disapproves of (i.e. negative mentions of 
cases), but has no effect on positive or neutral mentions. Finally, we see that presidents are much 
more likely to comment positively on cases decided during divided government, but are no more 
likely to do so on negative or neutral cases.  
 An important objection may be raised at this point: it could be that the president responds 
to Supreme Court decisions in cases that were on his agenda before the Court decided the case.61 
That is, responding to a Supreme Court decision is not necessarily proof that the Court placed an 
issue on the presidential agenda; and it fact, it may be the case that the president only responds to 
Supreme Court decisions on issues that were already on his agenda. In order to examine this 
possibility, I use participation by the Solicitor General (SG) to proxy the presidential agenda pre-
intervention (intervention being the Supreme Court decision). To put it differently, the Solicitor 
General is essentially the litigating arm of the executive branch, thus cases in which he or his 
office participates are likely to be on the president’s agenda anyway.62 One thing that is 
                                                 
61 Additionally, one might worry about possible selection effects if the set of cases decided on the merits (i.e. the 
cases analyzed here) made it to the merits stage after being filtered by the executive. This appears not to be a 
problem: between 1970 and 1993, the SG participated at the cert stage in only 277 cases—and of those, it did so 
voluntarily (i.e. without invitation from the Court) in only 19 cases. Further, the SG’s recommendations at the cert 
stage matter, but can be trumped by legal considerations (Black and Owens 2010; Pacelle 2003).   
62 These are likely conservative estimates, because many cases in which the SG participates, it does so because the 
Court invites him to. That is, the Court routinely requests executive input on cases—and thus may well be putting 
some of these cases on the executive agenda before it decides on the merits (Johnson 2003). 
Data gathered by Rich Pacelle and colleagues indicates that the SG participates as amicus at the merits stage in 
about 29% of cases. In approximately 23% of the cases in which the SG participates, it does so at the invitation of 
the Court (or roughly 7% of all cases); in the remainder, the SG participates without any invitation from SCOTUS.  
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immediately clear is that the president is more than twice as likely to speak on a decision in a 
case in which the Solicitor General participated by filing an amicus brief (3.6% of cases, 
compared to 1.5% if SG did not participate; p=0.0001). This suggests that pre-decision 
importance to the executive significantly increases the likelihood of a response afterward.  
Table 6.2. Presidential Statements on Court Cases by SG Participation 
 (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Any, No SG Any + SG 
Ideological Distance 0.02 -0.91* 
 (0.28) (0.43) 
Unconstitutional 0.17 0.48 
 (0.36) (0.51) 
Importance (word count) 0.07*** 0.07** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Total number of amici 0.09*** 0.08** 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Salient case 1.93*** 2.16*** 
 (0.32) (0.47) 
Presidential Approval -0.45 -2.07 
 (1.60) (2.39) 
Reelection Year -0.12 0.57 
 (0.37) (0.56) 
Divided Government 2.32** 1.43 
 (0.87) (1.30) 
Previous Fisc. Yr. Budget -0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Constant -7.98*** -4.60* 
 (1.30) (1.93) 
Observations 4,529 1,094 
Note: Table reports results from firth-logistic regression models of presidential 
responses to the U.S. Supreme Court: the dependent variable takes on a value 
of 1 if the sitting president respondent to a Court decision. Annual effects are 
omitted for presentation. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** 
p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⁺ p<0.1 (two-tailed tests). 
 
Importantly, however, it also indicates that in a significant number of cases, Supreme Court 
decisions put issues on to the presidential agenda, in that they provoke responses to cases in 
which the SG did not participate. This being the case, I separate cases in which the SG 
                                                 
In an attempt to see whether invitations were biasing my findings, I estimated my models separately for SG 
participation with and without SCOTUS invitation. However, the president only responded to 3 cases in my dataset 
in which the SG participated at the Court’s request. See the supplementary materials for full results.  
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participated from those which it did not to see how the theorized factors may differ in their 
impact on the presidential agenda across these two contexts. Table 6.2 clearly indicates that the 
factors driving presidential response to cases are not significantly different between cases in 
which the SG participates and those in which he does not. The only significant difference 
between these types of cases is that presidents are more likely to respond to cases during divided 
government when the SG did not participate, but was not more likely to do so if the SG did 
participate.  
Table 6.3 breaks out presidential responses by tone and SG participation. With respect to 
the key hypotheses, we see first that the legal importance of a decision positively and 
significantly increases the likelihood of presidential response in all categories when the SG did 
not participate in the case. Put differently, these analyses strongly suggest that legal importance 
places decisions and judicial policies on the president’s agenda. The same pattern emerges in the 
influence of public salience and mobilizability: both factors significantly increase the probability 
of presidential responses when the SG did not participate, but have no effect when the SG did 
participate. As such, I argue that these analyses strongly support my hypotheses, in that they 
suggest these political and legal factors strongly influence the likelihood that the Court place 
cases on the president’s agenda. 
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  Table 6.3. Presidential Statements on Court Cases by Tone and SG Participation 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Positive Positive Negative Negative Neutral Neutral 
 No SG SG No SG SG No SG SG 
Ideological Distance -0.44 -1.93** 1.80** 0.73 -0.15 -0.35 
 (0.49) (0.65) (0.69) (0.76) (0.37) (0.66) 
Unconstitutional -1.28 -0.31 0.78 1.76* -0.15 0.58 
 (0.84) (0.70) (0.49) (0.78) (0.52) (0.68) 
Importance (word count) 0.03 0.06** 0.04⁺ -0.01 0.07*** 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Total number of amici 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.04 0.04 0.08** 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Salient case 2.77*** 2.02*** 2.95*** 1.76* 1.51*** 2.75** 
 (0.61) (0.56) (0.62) (0.86) (0.41) (0.91) 
Presidential Approval 0.56 -1.70 -9.91** -0.19 1.98 -2.55 
 (2.75) (2.86) (3.63) (4.55) (2.11) (3.97) 
Reelection Year 0.09 0.66 -0.42 0.91 -0.23 -0.88 
 (0.62) (0.69) (0.70) (0.91) (0.52) (1.19) 
Divided Government 5.50** 1.13 2.08 0.12 1.64 1.63 
 (1.93) (1.49) (1.17) (1.94) (1.29) (2.45) 
Previous Fisc. Yr. Budget -0.006* 0.002 -0.0005 0.0008 -0.001 -0.0003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Constant -14.33*** -5.37* -3.64 -5.51 -8.81*** -4.70 
 (2.93) (2.49) (2.41) (3.50) (1.73) (3.09) 
Observations 4,529 1,094 4,529 1,094 4,529 1,094 
Note: Table reports results from firth-logistic regression models of presidential responses to the U.S. Supreme Court: the dependent variable takes on a value of 1 
if the sitting president respondent to a Court decision. Annual effects are omitted for presentation. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05, ⁺ p<0.1 (two-tailed tests). 
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Discussion 
 I have argued that the Supreme Court’s role as an agenda setter in the American political 
system is poorly understood. In particular, I argue that influencing the agenda of other 
policymaking political institutions is one pathway through which the Supreme Court might 
significantly—if indirectly—influence politics and policy. In this chapter I have sought to 
demonstrate that the Supreme Court can and does significantly affect the president’s agenda in 
theoretically predictable ways: the political and legal importance, salience, and mobilizability 
significantly influences the probability that a president will respond to a given decision.  
 Important and salient cases are more likely to draw presidential responses because they 
are those most likely to affect the president’s ability to pursue his policy and reelection goals. 
Because the president’s agenda is necessarily limited—he can deal with only so many issues and 
problems at any given time—only important decisions will merit attention. In other words, 
because the modern president is expected to have answers to all important issues facing the 
nation, important, salient Court decisions often merit response. Similarly, interest group 
participation in a case indicates the extent to which politically active interests care about an 
issue, which indicates both the political importance of and the potential for group mobilization 
on that issue. The analyses presented above strongly support the theory outlined here.  
 This chapter makes three important contributions to our understanding of the Supreme 
Court in the American political system. For one, it is among the first empirical works to 
demonstrate that the Supreme Court influences the agenda of another key institutional actor in 
the US. Perhaps more importantly, it is the first to attempt to isolate the effect of Supreme Court 
decisions on the presidential agenda in particular. Second, by identifying key factors that predict 
Court influence over the presidential agenda, this chapter suggests numerous future studies; for 
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example, do the same factors—importance, salience, and mobilizability—condition the Court’s 
impact on the Congressional agenda? Finally, these findings point to the importance of 
understanding the interbranch agenda-setting effects of political action taken by all branches of 
government. 
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List of Cases Responded to by Sitting President
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Alternative Specification of Models from Chapter 6: 
 
Table S6.1. Presidential Statements on Supreme Court Cases, 1955-2001 
 (Rare-Event Logistic Regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Any Positive Negative Neutral 
Ideological Distance -0.23 -1.22 1.27* -0.06 
 (0.36) (0.67) (0.62) (0.33) 
Unconstitutional 0.73** 0.10 1.62** 0.67** 
 (0.25) (0.38) (0.52) (0.26) 
Importance (word count) 1.15*** 1.42** 1.10*** 0.91*** 
 (0.19) (0.48) (0.28) (0.21) 
Total number of amici 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.02 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) 
Salient case 0.22*** 0.04 0.13*** 0.10* 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) 
Presidential Approval -0.35 0.61 -4.54*** 0.83 
 (0.86) (1.17) (1.12) (0.90) 
Reelection Year 0.10 0.34 -0.07 -0.25 
 (0.19) (0.27) (0.26) (0.56) 
Divided Government 0.48 0.76 0.41 0.26 
 (0.47) (0.59) (0.30) (0.45) 
Previous Fisc. Yr. Budget -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Presidential Term -0.10 -0.02 0.20 -0.11* 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.12) (0.05) 
Constant -14.49*** -19.01*** -14.36*** -12.78*** 
 (1.86) (4.84) (2.76) (1.79) 
Observations 5,620 5,620 5,620 5,620 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on presidential term.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table S6.2. Presidential Statements on Court Cases by SG Participation 
(Rare-Event Logistic Regression) 
 (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Any No SG Any + SG 
Ideological Distance 0.03 -0.75* 
 (0.39) (0.38) 
Unconstitutional 0.57 1.03* 
 (0.41) (0.51) 
Importance (word count) 1.17*** 0.99** 
 (0.15) (0.33) 
Total number of amici 0.11*** 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Salient case 0.18* 0.29** 
 (0.08) (0.09) 
Presidential Approval -0.15 -0.42 
 (1.04) (1.37) 
Reelection Year 0.10 0.05 
 (0.34) (0.32) 
Divided Government 0.39 0.57 
 (0.55) (0.43) 
Previous Fisc. Yr. Budget -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Presidential Term -0.07 -0.23* 
 (0.05) (0.12) 
Constant -14.79*** -12.15*** 
 (1.57) (3.34) 
Observations 4,527 1,093 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on presidential term. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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  Table S6.3. Presidential Statements on Court Cases by Tone and SG Participation 
  (Rare-Event Logistic Regression) 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Positive Positive Negative Negative Neutral Neutral 
 No SG SG No SG SG No SG SG 
Ideological Distance -0.54 -1.64 1.11 0.72 -0.15 -0.29 
 (0.76) (0.98) (0.63) (0.50) (0.40) (0.60) 
Unconstitutional -0.30 0.41 1.52* 2.04* 0.32 1.27 
 (0.86) (1.04) (0.66) (0.85) (0.16) (0.66) 
Importance (word count) 0.88 1.31*** 1.24 0.25 0.87*** 0.72 
 (0.53) (0.26) (0.68) (0.29) (0.15) (0.53) 
Total number of amici 0.16*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07* 0.10*** 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) 
Salient case 0.04* 0.31* 0.21*** -0.00 0.14* 0.05 
 (0.02) (0.14) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) 
Presidential Approval 1.47 -1.28 -5.99** -0.18 1.39 -0.01 
 (1.15) (1.51) (1.82) (1.70) (1.13) (2.33) 
Reelection Year 0.44 0.17 0.05 0.48 -0.03 -0.72 
 (0.42) (0.27) (0.57) (1.07) (0.69) (0.72) 
Divided Government 0.55 0.95 0.87 -0.28 0.28 0.51 
 (1.12) (0.49) (0.67) (0.58) (0.55) (0.67) 
Previous Fisc. Yr. Budget -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Presidential Term -0.00 -0.11 0.10 0.13 -0.12 -0.36*** 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.16) (0.14) (0.06) (0.10) 
Constant -14.97** -16.29*** -15.04* -8.23*** -13.11*** -8.83 
 (5.38) (2.27) (6.33) (2.11) (1.50) (5.44) 
Observations 4,527 1,093 4,527 1,093 4,527 1,093 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on presidential term.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table S6.4. Presidential Statements on Court Cases by SG Participation and 
SCOTUS Invitation to Participate (Firth Logistic Regression) 
 (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES No SG SG, Invited SG, Not Invited 
Ideological Distance -0.18 -0.54 -0.43 
 (0.38) (1.54) (0.50) 
Unconstitutional 0.61 -0.11 0.32 
 (0.53) (1.68) (0.64) 
Importance (word count) 0.05** 0.06 0.09** 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) 
Total number of amici 0.16*** 0.04 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.14) (0.03) 
Salient case 1.87*** 0.88 2.19*** 
 (0.40) (1.21) (0.56) 
Presidential Approval -3.34 -4.01 -1.25 
 (2.24) (6.35) (3.07) 
Reelection Year -0.28 -0.04 1.05 
 (0.47) (1.44) (0.70) 
Divided Government 2.46* 0.39 0.68 
 (1.05) (4.23) (1.40) 
Previous Fisc. Yr. Budget -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Constant -5.67*** 0.07 -4.38 
 (1.58) (4.71) (2.49) 
Observations 2,149 188 604 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models include presidential fixed-effects (not shown).  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table S6.6. Presidential Responses when SG Wins and Loses 
 (16) (17) 
 Any 
SG Win 
Any 
SG Loss 
Ideological Distance -1.71* -0.78 
 (0.76) (0.94) 
Unconstitutional 0.20 1.36 
 (0.82) (0.97) 
Importance (word count) 0.07* 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Total number of amici 0.07* 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.06) 
Salient case 2.03*** 2.97* 
 (0.56) (1.36) 
Presidential Approval -4.37 6.41 
 (3.02) (6.94) 
Reelection Year 0.43 2.18 
 (0.79) (1.42) 
Divided Government 1.12 2.91 
 (1.75) (2.58) 
Previous Fisc. Yr. Budget 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Constant -2.17 -14.63 
 (2.38) (7.99) 
Observations 713 269 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table S6.7. Presidential Response Direction when SG Wins and Loses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Positive  
SG Win 
Positive 
SG Loss 
Negative 
SG Win 
Negative 
SG Loss 
Neutral 
SG Win 
Neutral 
SG Loss 
Ideological Distance -1.38 -1.47 -1.40 0.88 -1.54 -0.42 
 (0.78) (1.29) (1.56) (1.48) (1.44) (1.26) 
Unconstitutional -0.20 1.75 0.79 2.02 0.96 -1.43 
 (1.13) (1.31) (1.64) (1.18) (0.91) (2.48) 
Importance (word count) 0.10** 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 0.07 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.22) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Total number of amici 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.10) 
Salient case 2.11*** 1.59 0.08 1.57 2.22* 1.40 
 (0.63) (1.28) (1.64) (1.22) (1.02) (1.26) 
Presidential Approval -3.77 1.78 -2.15 4.49 -6.59 2.39 
 (3.36) (7.28) (7.12) (8.03) (5.84) (6.63) 
Reelection Year 0.57 0.51 0.38 1.97 -0.21 0.07 
 (0.85) (2.14) (1.47) (1.67) (1.55) (1.79) 
Divided Government 0.85 3.41 0.56 0.43 1.09 0.35 
 (1.93) (2.99) (2.75) (3.56) (3.03) (3.50) 
Previous Fisc. Yr. Budget 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -3.69 -8.43 -2.59 -8.67 -0.74 -5.81 
 (2.81) (6.47) (4.45) (9.28) (4.11) (5.28) 
Observations 713 269 713 269 713 269 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table S6.8. Logit Regression of Table 3 (for Marginal effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Positive Positive Negative Negative Neutral Neutral 
 No SG SG No SG SG No SG SG 
Ideological Distance -0.51 -2.19** 2.05** 0.99 -0.16 -0.38 
 (0.52) (0.72) (0.75) (0.89) (0.38) (0.75) 
Unconstitutional -1.62 -0.45 0.82 2.12* -0.22 0.64 
 (0.94) (0.76) (0.52) (0.90) (0.55) (0.77) 
Importance (word count) 0.03 0.08** 0.05 -0.01 0.07*** 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) 
Total number of amici 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.04 0.02 0.08** 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
Salient case 2.93*** 2.14*** 3.14*** 2.12* 1.52*** 3.24** 
 (0.65) (0.59) (0.66) (0.97) (0.42) (1.10) 
Presidential Approval 0.62 -1.62 -10.97** -0.64 2.07 -3.25 
 (2.86) (3.08) (3.82) (5.32) (2.16) (4.55) 
Reelection Year 0.00 0.64 -0.57 0.99 -0.30 -1.54 
 (0.66) (0.76) (0.77) (1.06) (0.54) (1.52) 
Divided Government 20.15 1.62 2.29 0.47 1.98 16.07 
 (2,421.23) (1.72) (1.24) (2.38) (1.45) (3,256.53) 
Previous Fisc. Yr. Budget -0.01* 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -26.45 -9.48** -3.90 -6.39 -9.43*** -19.63 
 (2,421.23) (2.89) (2.57) (3.31) (1.88) (3,256.53) 
Observations 2,706 1,059 3,162 743 4,529 965 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Chapter 7: 
Supreme Court Influence on the Party Agendas 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford (1856) was widely reviled by the 
emergent Republican Party. Republicans sought to repudiate the decision by winning the election 
of 1860 and then staffing courts (especially the Supreme Court) with judges who would overturn 
Dred Scott and restore their preferred interpretation of the Constitution. So central was this goal 
that it made its way onto the Republic Party Platform, which stated, “the new dogma that the 
Constitution…carries slavery into any or all of the territories…is a dangerous political heresy” 
and was “subversive of the peace and harmony of the country” (Republican Platform of 1860, 
quoted in Ross 2012: 324).  
In this chapter I move from Supreme Court influence on the presidential agenda to 
influence on the agendas the two major political parties. Every four years the Democratic and 
Republican parties articulate in their official platforms the interests and goals that will animate 
party activities until the next presidential election cycle. These platforms represent the policy 
goals of the party coalition, and also seek to bolster the coalition by appealing to groups not yet 
in the coalition (Maisel 1999; Schattschneider 1942). Importantly, these platforms provide 
significant insight into the consequences of elections, in that they provide a good window into 
the policy commitments of political elites (Maisel 1993; Fine 1994). As such, I argue that if 
some Supreme Court decisions are viewed as sufficiently important by political elites, those 
decisions may affect the policy and governance goals of the political parties. When they do, one 
place those changes may appear is in the official party platforms. In this chapter, I analyze all 
Democratic and Republican Party platforms from 1952 to 2016 in order to shed light on the 
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extent of Court influence over these official agendas. I find that important Supreme Court 
decisions regularly influence the substance of these official agendas. Further, I contend that the 
responses to Court decisions in these platforms frequently treat those decisions as “focusing 
events” around which the parties seek to mobilize their base, to attract new constituents, and 
when possible to use the event to enact relevant parts of their policy agendas.  
The Political Significance of Party Platforms 
 Political parties are commonly considered to be “indispensable elements” of democratic 
governance (APSA 1950). Parties are expected to compete for citizens’ votes on the bases of 
their proposed policies, then once elected, to carry out those policy commitments.63 On this view, 
voters reward parties for proposing favored policies, and punish parties for failing to live up to 
their promises.64 Party platforms, then, represent party elites’ specific pledges to take action on 
particular issues or policies. Platforms thus serve to help inform voters about the intentions of the 
parties, and provide a credible commitment from the party that voters can use to punish that 
party if it fails to live up to its promises.  
While there is little evidence to suggest that members of the electorate actually read—let 
alone critically evaluate—party platforms, platforms do provide meaningful insight into the 
consequences of elections (Pomper 1967; Maisel 1993; Froio, Beban, and Jennings 2016). 
Recent research has found that party control is strongly linked to institutional agendas 
(Baumgardner et al. 2009; Froio 2012), though there appears to be significant variation of this 
effect across policy domain (Froio, Beban, and Jennings 2016). Further, Budge and Hofferbert 
(1990) find that party platforms are strongly linked to post-election government outputs (see also 
Hofferbert and Budge 1992; King et al. 1993). That is, party platforms are indicative of the 
                                                 
63 This is the assumption, at least, in responsible party theories of democracy.  
64 This family of theories probably demands far too much of voters: see Achen and Bartels (2016).   
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policy commitments of party elites (e.g. Fine 1994). By indicating what parties intend to do 
when in power, platforms also provide an accessible shorthand for what coalitions the party 
seeks to attract (Conger 2010). For these reasons, the substance of party platforms is generally 
considered to be politically consequential.  
 Changes in party platforms tend to be slow and piecemeal, reflecting the evolutionary 
changes in party commitments in light of changes in the party elite, the commitments of the 
parties’ presidential candidates, and policy concerns of the general public. Even so, platforms 
can sometimes change more rapidly, such as in response to an exogenous event (a so-called 
“focusing event”; see Birkland 1998), an unusual or otherwise disruptive presidential 
nomination, or even heightened interparty electoral competition (Fine 2003). 
In sum, platforms represent both elite views of the policy priorities that the next 
administration and Congress must address, as well as their (i.e. elites’) perceptions of the issue 
priorities of their constituents (and those of constituent groups they hope to capture). Here I will 
explore an understudied influence on the parties’ policy commitments: Supreme Court 
decisions.65 That is, I will examine the platforms of both major parties in the US in order to 
ascertain the extent to which Supreme Court decisions have directly influenced the stated 
agendas of the parties.  
Approach & Data 
 The full text of all party platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties have been 
collected by Peters and Woolley as part of the American Presidency Project.66 Following 
Eshbaugh-Soha and Collins’ (2015) approach (outlined in chapter six), I keyword searched each 
platform from 1952-2016 for the terms “Supreme Court” and “constitution.” After locating each 
                                                 
65 As far as I can find, this is the first study focusing explicitly on Court influence on the party agendas. 
66 http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms.php 
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mention of the Supreme Court or constitution, I determined whether the platform referenced a 
specific case, and if so, identified the case. Occasionally the platform would reference a case by 
name, as in the following example from the 2008 Republican Party Platform: “We condemn the 
Supreme Court's disregard of homeowners' property rights in its Kelo decision...” More often 
these references to Court decisions are slightly less explicit, such as the 1956 Democratic Party’s 
official stance on Brown v. Board:  
“Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States relating to segregation in 
publicly supported schools and elsewhere have brought consequences of vast importance 
to our Nation as a whole and especially to communities directly affected. We reject all 
proposals for the use of force to interfere with the orderly determination of these matters 
by the courts.” 
 
Coding all thirty-four platforms revealed that the parties referred to forty-six unique cases for a 
total of seventy-four mentions (a few cases, like Brown v. Board and Citizens United v. FEC, 
were referenced numerous times by both parties). The full list of cases referred to in the parties’ 
platforms can be found in tables 7.1 and 7.2 in this chapter. 
 I first present summary data and historical trends to show how often the parties respond 
to the Court in their platforms, and also to uncover variation between the parties in such 
responses. In order to assess the substance of parties’ responses to various Court decisions over 
time, I selected four issue areas in which the parties have responded to multiple cases in their 
platforms: abortion, eminent domain, gun rights, and campaign finance. Following Keck (2014), 
I closely examine the content of the parties’ responses to the Court rulings, and draw on data 
from diverse sources to show how these cases and the responses to them altered the subsequent 
politics of these policy issues.  
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Analysis & Findings  
Summary Data & Trends 
In the thirty-four party platforms studied, the phrase “Supreme Court” appears 97 times: 
33 times in Democratic platforms and 64 times in Republican platforms. Figure 7.1 graphically 
depicts explicit mentions of the Court by each party over time.  
Fig 7.1. Platform Mentions of “Supreme Court” by Party, 1952-2016 
 
The term “constitution” appears 464 times: 127 times in Democratic platforms and 337 times in 
Republican platforms. While the majority of these references were fairly abstract—talks of 
“constitutional principles” or homage to constitutional government, etc.—some did directly 
implicate the Court and its work. Some of these mentions were calls for a constitutional 
amendment overturning some decision; others were promises to appoint justices that would 
interpret the constitution correctly, and so on.  
The data presented in figures 7.1 and 7.2 suggests that for much of the period studied, the 
parties were quite similar in terms of the frequency of their discussion of the constitution and the 
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Supreme Court in their stated agendas, but that recently, significant differences have emerged. 
Republican platforms began a substantial climb in the number of references to the constitution as 
the “Conservative Movement” increasingly captured the GOP in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Glenn 
and Teles 2009; Edwards 2002), while references in the DNC platforms remained essentially 
constant. The break between the parties in terms of explicit mentions of the Supreme Court came 
much later: in 2008 GOP platforms began to refer to the Court much more frequently did the 
DNC platforms, and the gulf between the parties on this front only grew in the next two election 
cycles.    
Fig 7.2. Platform Mentions of “Constitution” by Party, 1952-2016 
 
With these basic trends in references to the Supreme Court and the constitution in mind, I 
turn now to references to particular cases. First, it should be noted that only a fraction of the 
references to the constitution or the Court contain reference to specific cases. Second, patterns of 
reference to the Court broadly are mirrored in the patterns of reference to cases, as figures 7.3 
and 7.4 demonstrate graphically. Specifically, references to cases in the Democratic Party 
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platforms have been relatively stable over time, while such references in Republican platforms 
have steadily increased over the last twenty years. Indeed, in the most recent platforms, GOP 
references to cases outnumber Democratic references more than three to one.  
Figure 7.3 Number of Words in Party Platforms Over Time 
 
Note: Wordcount data from the American Presidency Project 
 
Figure 7.4 SCOTUS References per 1000 Words 
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The apparent rise in frequency, as well as the differences across the parties, in mentions 
of Supreme Court in the platforms may be a function of the breadth of the parties’ platforms. In 
order to control for this possibility, I present the overall length (in number of words) of the 
platforms in Figure 7.3, and the rate of mentions of the Court by each party (mentions per 1000 
words) in Figure 7.4. Figure 7.3 indicates a significant upward trend in the length—and thus, the 
breadth of coverage—of both parties’ platforms during the time period covered. Figure 7.4 
indicates that this growth does indeed seem to capture much of the rise in Supreme Court 
references: longer platforms, which cover more topics, are more likely to touch on Court 
decisions than shorter platforms. Even so, Figure 7.4 does indicate that Republicans seem to be 
more likely to reference the Court—and especially so during the last several election cycles. Put 
differently: while the parties’ general move towards longer and more detailed policy agendas in 
their official platforms explains some of the observed increase in references to the Supreme 
Court, it does not explain all of the observed variation.  
Among the references to cases in the data, there are some notable differences also in tone 
and the general policy motivations accompanying those references. That is, some cases were 
simply mentioned in passing, while others were expressly supported and others still were 
accompanied by calls to overturn or otherwise cut back against the decision. Thus to further 
parse the basic form of these case references, I coded each mention for its tone—being positive, 
negative, or neutral—again following the approach of Eshbaugh-Soha and Collins (2015). 
Negative mentions include references that are critical of or otherwise offer disagreement with a 
particular decision. For example, consider the Democratic party’s response to Zurcher v. 
Stanford Daily in its 1980 platform: “As we enter the 1980s, we must…shape legislation to 
overturn the Supreme Court Stanford Daily decision…” Positive references are coded as those in 
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which the platform expresses praise or agreement with the Court’s decisions. An example of this 
type of reference is seen in the GOP response to Elk Grove v. Newdow: “We condemn decisions 
by activist judges to deny children the opportunity to say the Pledge of Allegiance in its entirety, 
including ‘Under God,’ in public schools and encourage States to promote the pledge.”  
Finally, neutral references include references to cases that are devoid of the above 
indicators; that is, they are ambiguous, or perhaps expressly ambivalent. Consider for example 
the responses of both parties to Brown v. Board in their 1956 platforms: 
“Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States relating to 
segregation in publicly supported schools and elsewhere have brought 
consequences of vast importance to our Nation as a whole and especially to 
communities directly affected. We reject all proposals for the use of force to 
interfere with the orderly determination of these matters by the courts.” (DNC 
Platform 1956) 
 
And,  
 
“The Republican Party accepts the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that racial 
discrimination in publicly supported schools must be progressively eliminated. 
We concur in the conclusion of the Supreme Court that its decision directing 
school desegregation should be accomplished with ‘all deliberate speed’ locally 
through Federal District Courts. The implementation order of the Supreme Court 
recognizes the complex and acutely emotional problems created by its decision in 
certain sections of our country where racial patterns have been developed in 
accordance with prior and long-standing decisions of the same tribunal.” (GOP 
Platform 1956) 
 
These passages both explicitly accept the decision as legitimate and authoritative, but neither 
goes so far as to praise the decision or to call for clear legislative support. However, both parties 
include language in their 1960 platforms that are much more express in their agreement with the 
Brown decisions.  
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Fig 7.5. Platform References to SCOTUS Decisions by Party and Tone, 1952-2016 
Democratic Platform Case References 
 
 
 
Figures 7.5 and 7.6 depict the general trends of references to cases, as well as the tone of 
those references, in the Democratic and Republican platforms, respectively. Of the twenty-three 
case references in Democratic platforms, twelve are positive, five are negative, and six neutral. 
References in GOP platforms follow a decidedly different pattern, with twenty-one positive 
references, twenty-six negative, and three neutral. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Democratic 
platform is most negative towards the Court at the same time that the Republican hold on the 
federal judiciary is strongest. Tables 7.1 and 7.2, below, present complete lists of the cases 
mentioned in each platform, as well as the tone of those references.  Table 7.1 and Figure 7.6 
clearly indicate that Republican platforms routinely reference Supreme Court decisions, and that 
they have done so with increasing frequency over the last twenty years or so.  
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Fig 7.6. Platform References to SCOTUS Decisions by Party and Tone, 1952-2016 
 Republican Platform Case References 
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Table 7.1. GOP Platform Case References 
Year Positive Negative Neutral 
1952       
1956     Brown v. Board 
1960 Brown v. Board     
1964       
1968       
1972 US v. Nevada and California     
1976 Union Electric Co. v. EPA US v. Miller Roe v. Wade 
  Fisher v. US  
   Planned Parenthood v. Danforth   
1980  Roe v. Wade  
  Planned Parenthood v. Danforth  
   Bellotti v. Baird   
1984 US v. Leon     
1988       
1992 Comm. Workers of Am. v. Beck     
1996 Comm. Workers of Am. v. Beck Coker v. Georgia   
2000 Comm. Workers of Am. v. Beck Santa Fe Indep. Sch. V. Doe Dept of Commerce v. CNY 
  Stenberg v. Carhart  
   Boy Scouts of America v. Dale   
2004 Miller v. California Elk Grove Unified Sch. v. Newdow  
   Santa Fe Indep. Sch. v. Doe   
2008 DC v. Heller Kelo v. New London  
 Rumsfeld v. FAIR Roper v. Simmons  
 Gonzales v. Carhart House v. Bell   
2012 Comm. Workers of Am. v. Beck Kelo v. New London  
 Hosanna Tabor v. EEOC NFIB v. Sebelius  
 Citizens United v. FEC Elk Grove Unified Sch. v. Newdow  
 Wisc. Right to Life v. FEC   
 DC v. Heller   
 McDonald v. Chicago     
2016 DC v. Heller Roe v. Wade  
 McDonald v. Chicago Obergefell v. Hodges  
 Michigan v. EPA NFIB v. Sebelius  
 US v. Texas King v. Burwell  
  US v. Windsor  
  Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt  
  Kelo v. New London  
    Kennedy v. Louisiana   
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Democrats on the other hand, have only recently gone negative in their platforms: four of 
the five negative mentions of Supreme Court decisions came in their 2012 (Citizen’s United v. 
FEC) and 2016 (Shelby County v. Holder, Citizens United v. FEC, and Buckley v. Valeo) 
platforms.  
Table 7.2. DNC Platform Case References 
Year Positive Negative Neutral 
1952       
1956     Brown v. Board 
1960 Brown v. Board     
1964       
1968       
1972 Brown v. Board   
 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg   
1976 Brown v. Board   Roe v. Wade 
1980 Roe v. Wade Zurcher v. Stanford Daily  
 Brown v. Board     
1984    Bob Jones Univ. v. US  
1988       
1992       
1996 Roe v. Wade   
 Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton     
2000 Olmstead v. L.C.  Stenberg v. Carhart 
 Roe v. Wade  Hill v. Colorado 
2004     Cheney v. US Dist. Court 
2008 Boumediene v. Bush     
2012   Citizens United v. FEC   
2016 Obergefell v. Hodges Shelby County v. Holder  
  Citizens United v. FEC  
    Buckley v. Valeo   
 
Case Studies 
Abortion 
In finding a privacy-based right to abortion in its decision in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme 
Court laid the groundwork for a decades-long battle over both policy and constitutional meaning. 
In many ways, abortion has been the touchstone for the American “culture war” of the late 
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twentieth century. And while abortion politics predate Roe, that case clearly marks a major 
turning point in abortion politics.  
Rosenberg’s (2008) account of the battle over abortion would have us believe that 
litigation over abortion, culminating in Roe v. Wade, engendered a backlash which has led to 
retrenchment of abortion rights. Greenhouse and Siegel (2011), however, argue that energetic 
opposition to the liberalization of abortion laws was taking place at least a decade prior to Roe 
(see also Tribe 1990). A central point of Greenhouse and Siegel’s argument is that political 
conflict over abortion “engulf[ed] adjudication,” and thus that accounts of judicially centered 
backlash miss the point. Put differently, a growing body of scholarship suggests that “backlash” 
is endemic to the issue of abortion, not merely the judicial engagement of that issue (Greenhouse 
and Siegel 2011; Burns 2005; Garrow 1999; Tribe 1990).  
Greenhouse and Siegel’s account of the history of the debate around the criminal status of 
abortion suggests its contested nature. In the 1950s, some (mostly male) doctors, lawyers, and 
clergy began to suggest that in certain circumstances relating to the health of the mother, 
abortion should be decriminalized. In the 1960s, some states began to decriminalize abortions in 
certain tightly regulated circumstances (Garrow 1999; Ginsburg 1985). Catholics, and shortly 
thereafter, Republican Party strategists, began to mobilize against this liberalizing trend 
(Greenhouse and Siegel 2011). On this view, Roe is ultimately part-and-parcel of a larger story 
in which the Republican Party adopted an anti-abortion platform so as to attract social 
conservatives of many stripes into the Republican coalition, including traditionally Democratic 
Catholics. 
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The responses to Roe by both parties in their 1976 platforms are fairly tepid: both parties 
added abortion to their platforms for the first time, but the substance of each was lukewarm. The 
decision prompted the Republican Party to add the following passage to its 1976 platform:  
“The question of abortion is one of the most difficult and controversial of our time. It is 
undoubtedly a moral and personal issue but it also involves complex questions relating to 
medical science and criminal justice. There are those in our Party who favor complete 
support for the Supreme Court decision which permits abortion on demand. There are 
others who share sincere convictions that the Supreme Court's decision must be changed 
by a constitutional amendment prohibiting all abortions. Others have yet to take a 
position, or they have assumed a stance somewhere in between polar positions.” 
 
In short, the GOP discussed the Supreme Court’s intervention on the abortion issue without 
taking a firm substantive stance on the topic. The Democratic Party also adopted an official 
abortion plank on its platform: 
“We fully recognize the religious and ethical nature of the concerns which many 
Americans have on the subject of abortion. We feel, however, that it is undesirable to 
attempt to amend the U.S. Constitution to overturn the Supreme Court decision in this 
area.” 
 
Abortion had never before appeared on either of the parties’ platforms. Indeed, the text of these 
passages clearly suggest that abortion made it onto the platforms precisely because the Supreme 
Court spoke on the issue.  
 But in Roe the Court did more than simply weigh in on a contested political issue—it 
sought to resolve and end the contentious politics of abortion. Indeed, the modern Court 
explicitly recognizes what it was doing in Roe and the cases that follow it. In Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, the opinion of the Court states that sometimes “in the performance of its 
judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive 
controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases...” In such a case, “the Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their 
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national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”67 It is clear that 
the Court failed in this purpose. 
Figure 7.7. Public Approval of Abortion 
 
Data from Gallup: http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx 
The influence of Roe on mass opinion has been studied extensively. In his classic work 
on the Court, McCloskey (1960) argues that the Supreme Court rarely steps outside the 
mainstream of public opinion. Franklin and Kosaki (1989) argue, however, that when the Court 
rules on politically controversial cases this general rule is rather difficult to abide. Indeed, though 
such a decision may “establish the law of the land” it does not settle the debate; “It neither 
converts the opposition nor ends the controversy,” as Franklin and Kosaki put it (1989: 753). 
Regardless of the immediate impact of the decision in Roe on mass opinion, it is clear that public 
opinion was significantly divided on the issue in the 1970s. Figure 7.7 presents historical trends 
in support for abortion as measured by a series of nationally representative Gallup Poll surveys. 
                                                 
67 Planned Parenthood v. Casey (“majority troika” opinion) 505 U.S. 833 (1992) at p. 867.  
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The polls show that in the years following Roe the broad contours of public opinion suggest that 
a majority of Americans believe that abortion should be legal in some circumstances, but that 
large and enduring minorities of the population want to alter the state of the law to either ban 
abortion outright or to legalize it in all cases. Thus in one rather crude sense, Roe adopts the 
position of the median American. Relatedly, the data in Figure 7.7 suggest that around 20% of 
the population would have been strongly opposed to the decision no matter which way the Court 
decided the case. Perhaps even more tellingly, Luks and Salamone (2008) present historical data 
(also from Gallup) showing that from 1974 to 1985, explicit support for Roe varied between 47 
and 55 percent, while opposition to Roe varied between 45 and 48 percent, with opposition 
eclipsing support on one survey. 
 The foregoing discussion suggests a couple of key points. First, in Roe the Court 
attempted to “end” an intense debate over abortion, an issue which is fraught with moral, 
religious, and constitutional problems. In doing so, the Court consciously lifted the abortion 
debate from the realm of ordinary politics into the realm of constitutional politics. In doing so, it 
essentially raised the stakes—and thus the temperature—of the debate.68 In other words, for the 
roughly 40% of Americans who had strong views on abortion, the Roe decision made abortion a 
fundamental question of politics. The parties, seeking always to shore up their constituencies and 
to capture new ones, responded by beginning to clarify their positions—and to do so by mutually 
distancing themselves from each other (Greenhouse and Segal 2011; Keck and McMahon 2016). 
In other words, Roe contributed significantly to the polarization of the abortion issue.  
                                                 
68 As Balkin put it, “when a court seeks to protect [unenumerated] declaratory rights...it needs evidence that the 
rights in question have achieved a special status as fundamental” (2011: 209-210). Abortion rights certainly did not 
meet this threshold in 1973, and they may not even today—but this is a question of politics, not “fundamental law.” 
As Whittington notes, “[c]onstructions never leave the realm of politics; they do not become a higher law to be 
recognized and applied from above” (1999b: 15). That is, the unenumerated nature of the right to abortion means it 
will remain constitutionally contestable for as long as it remains ethically or morally contestable.  
217 
 
 This move is observable in parties’ post-Roe platforms, as they replace the rather 
ambivalent positions in their 1976 platforms with firmer—and divergent—positions in 1980. The 
Democratic platform simply states that “The Democratic Party supports the 1973 Supreme Court 
decision on abortion rights as the law of the land and opposes any constitutional amendment to 
restrict or overturn that decision.” The Republic Platform, in contrast, states: 
 “There can be no doubt that the question of abortion, despite the complex nature 
of its various issues, is ultimately concerned with equality of rights under the law. 
While we recognize differing views on this question among Americans in 
general—and in our own Party—we affirm our support of a constitutional 
amendment to restore protection of the right to life for unborn children. We also 
support the Congressional efforts to restrict the use of taxpayers' dollars for 
abortion.” 
 
Further, the 1980 GOP platform states “We protest the Supreme Court's intrusion into the family 
structure through its denial of the parent's obligation and right to guide their minor children.” 
This section is a clear reference to the Court’s decisions in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth 
(1976) and Bellotti v. Baird (1979), in which the Court built on Roe by invalidating a number of 
restrictions on abortion enacted by the states of Missouri and Massachusetts—in particular, the 
invalidation of the states’ requirement for parental consent if a woman under the age of 18 
sought an abortion.   
 In short, the parties had by 1980 clearly diverged on the issue of abortion, with the 
Democratic Party officially supporting constitutional protections for abortion rights, and the 
GOP officially calling for constitutional protection of a fetal right-to-life. By taking clear and 
divergent views on this heated political (and now, constitutional) question, the parties helped to 
sort the electorate along this salient dimension. This process would continue apace for at least 
two decades as states and interest groups worked to alter abortion policy around the country. The 
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constitutionalization of this issue in Roe, however, ensured that the Court would weigh in on 
these policy changes, creating further opportunity for position-taking by the parties.  
 Two more abortion decisions made it on to the parties’ platforms: Stenberg v. Carhart 
(2000) and Gonzales v. Carhart (2007), and the responses to each reflect what were by then the 
entrenched positions of the parties on the abortion question. In Stenberg v. Carhart, a sharply 
divided Court struck down Nebraska’s ban on partial-birth abortions as unconstitutional under 
Roe and Planned-Parenthood v. Casey. The official Republican Party stance on this decision was 
predictably negative: 
“The Supreme Court's recent decision, prohibiting states from banning partial-
birth abortions — a procedure denounced by a committee of the American 
Medical Association and rightly branded as four-fifths infanticide — shocks the 
conscience of the nation. As a country, we must keep our pledge to the first 
guarantee of the Declaration of Independence. That is why we say the unborn 
child has a fundamental individual right to life which cannot be infringed. We 
support a human life amendment to the Constitution and we endorse legislation to 
make clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections apply to unborn children. 
Our purpose is to have legislative and judicial protection of that right against 
those who perform abortions.” 
 
This response clearly attacks the Court’s ruling, but also explicitly lays out the GOP’s plan to 
fight it and similar decisions: passing abortion-restrictive legislation, appointing judges who will 
interpret the constitution correctly (i.e. who will protect the rights of unborn children), and, if 
possible, amending the constitution to explicitly protect the rights of the unborn. 
The Democrat’s official response was perhaps less bombastic, but at least equally clear in 
the partisan stakes of the Court’s abortion rulings. The Democratic platform states:  
“The Democratic Party stands behind the right of every woman to choose, 
consistent with Roe v. Wade, and regardless of ability to pay. We believe it is a 
fundamental constitutional liberty that individual Americans - not government - 
can best take responsibility for making the most difficult and intensely personal 
decisions regarding reproduction. This year's Supreme Court rulings show to us 
all that eliminating a woman's right to choose is only one justice away. That's why 
the stakes in this election are as high as ever.” 
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This passage does not explicitly support a right to partial-birth abortions (which the 
corresponding GOP platform explicitly attacks), but rather contends that the fact of 5-4 abortion 
decisions in cases like Stenberg v. Carhart and Hill v. Colorado (2000), suggest the precarious 
nature of judicial protection of abortion. By extension, the party argues, the stakes of elections 
are quite high: if Republicans win and appoint judges and justices, abortion rights are seriously 
threatened and thus the protection of abortion rights requires the election of Democrats, who will 
appoint pro-abortion judges.69  
 Finally, the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart (2007) drew praise from the 
Republican Party, because it upheld a federal ban on some types of partial-birth abortions. The 
2008 GOP platform states “We have made progress. The Supreme Court has upheld prohibitions 
against the barbaric practice of partial-birth abortion.” The platform goes on to celebrate other 
progress made on this front, including legislation protecting infants born alive during abortions, 
and states extending health-care coverage to prenatal infants.  
 One thing the foregoing study makes clear is that the Court can influence politics and 
policy not only by “creating” issues or moving issues up the political agenda, but can also do so 
by “constitutionalizing” issues. By that I mean that the Court, because it speaks in terms of 
fundamental law, can and does increase stakes of political contests. When abortion policy is left 
to elective politics, there is certainly much at stake for people affected by those policies, but 
when a policy decision is made by the Supreme Court the tenor of the popular debate necessarily 
changes from “regular” politics to the absolutes of constitutional (fundamental) rights and 
wrongs. Thus the Court’s decision in Roe had the downstream effect of incentivizing the parties 
                                                 
69 See Keck and McMahon (2016) however, for a perspective on why “Roe still stands” after decades of Republican 
ascendance in state legislatures and dominance of the federal courts.  
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to capture intense partisans of this particular issue, which has had major and wide-range effects 
over the last 50-plus years. This move has been so successful that today, stances on abortion are 
one of the key “litmus tests” for elites in both parties—perhaps especially those being considered 
for federal judgeships.  
 Additionally, the intense partisan rancor surrounding questions of abortion has allowed 
parties to continually use the issue to mobilize their respective bases. As noted above, in recent 
platforms, the GOP has reminded voters that the only way to secure the rights of the unborn is to 
elect pro-life (implied Republican) legislators, who will in turn appoint pro-life judges. 
Democrats, on the other hand, have used recent 5-4 decisions protecting abortion rights as 
evidence that protections for abortion hang on a single vote, and thus that their continued 
protection depends on voters choosing pro-choice (Democratic) legislators who will appoint pro-
choice judges.  
In sum, the parties have both responded multiple times to changes in abortion policy 
initiated by the Supreme Court. The Court’s first major foray into this issue—Roe v. Wade—
remains controversial today. Both parties tip-toed around Roe in their first platform after that 
case (1976), but by 1980, the parties had taken firm, oppositional stances on the issue. Response 
to subsequent cases, such as Planned Parenthood v. Danforth and Hill v. Colorado further 
highlight how the parties’ stances on abortion have changed over time—and how they have been 
shaped in important part by decisions made by the Supreme Court. 
Eminent Domain 
 The Court’s infamous 2005 decision in Kelo v. New London (which is discussed at length 
in chapter 3), put eminent domain on the political agenda around the country. The decision was 
extremely unpopular and received extensive news coverage. Sustained media attention to the 
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case itself was undoubtedly a key contributing factor to the heightened attention to eminent 
domain more generally after the Kelo decision was announced (see chapter three). Substantial 
media attention to an unpopular policy, I have argued, created a situation in which electorally 
minded representatives in Congress and in state legislatures had incentive to score points with 
their constituents by attacking the decision, and possibly by introducing legislation to curb its 
potential impact.  
 Eminent domain, as a policy issue, is typically bundled with issues like property taxes, 
zoning regulations, and the like under the broader issue header of “property rights”—and is 
almost always considered a “conservative” issue. This is especially true in American politics 
since the so-called “Conservative movement” of the 1970s (Teles 2010). Indeed, a significant 
“property rights movement” was a defining force within the broader conservative turn during 
that time (Hatcher 2002). It is worth noting that this is true despite the fact that eminent domain 
abuses disproportionately harm poorer, socially disadvantaged populations in urban areas 
(Carpenter and Ross 2009).  
 It should come as no surprise, then, that the litigation in Kelo was supported, and 
eventually led, by a libertarian-leaning public interest law firm called the Institute for Justice (IJ). 
After Kelo was decided, property rights groups including IJ, the Pacific Legal Foundation, and 
the Castle Coalition mobilized to stymie the decision’s impact by exploiting the opportunity 
created by the unusually large (and almost wholly negative) amount of media coverage the 
decision received. Nor should it come as any surprise that anti-takings reform efforts post-Kelo 
were typically led by Republicans (although such measures often had substantial bi-partisan 
support).  
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 At the national level, we see that the Republican Party included discussion of Kelo and 
cognate property rights issues in each of its platforms since that decision was handed down. In 
2008, the GOP included the following passage in its platform:  
“At the center of a free economy is the right of citizens to be secure in their 
property. Every person has the right to acquire, own, use, possess, enjoy, and 
dispose of private property. That right was undermined by the Supreme 
Court's Kelo decision, allowing local governments to seize a person's home or 
land, not for vital public use, but for transfer to private developers. That 5-to-4 
decision highlights what is at stake in the election of the next president, who may 
make new appointments to the Court. We call on state legislatures to moot 
the Kelo decision by appropriate legislation, and we pledge on the federal level to 
pass legislation to protect against unjust federal takings. We will enforce the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to ensure just compensation whenever 
private property is needed to achieve a compelling public use. We urge caution in 
the designation of National Historic Areas, which can set the stage for widespread 
governmental control of citizens’ lands.” 
 
Here the party not only condemned the decision itself, but expressly called for actions from both 
its elites and the rank-and-file members. To the rank-and-file it issues a reminder about the 
importance of voting for (Republican) executives and legislators who will appoint judges that 
will defend property rights. To the elite, it calls for legislation to curb “unjust” takings and to 
otherwise reform contemporary eminent domain practices. Importantly, the platform specifically 
promises that Republicans in Congress will “pass legislation to protect against unjust federal 
takings.” As I note in chapter three, the House has voted in favor of such legislation multiple 
times, but all such bills have died in committee in the Senate.  
 Though the Supreme Court has not issued another decision in the Kelo line (i.e. on 
express physical takings with respect to the meaning of public use), Kelo has continued to appear 
in the GOP platforms. In 2012 the party states: 
“The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment—"nor shall private property be 
taken for public use without just compensation"—is a bulwark against tyranny; 
for without property rights, individual rights are diminished. That is why we 
deplore the Supreme Court's Kelo v. New London decision, allowing local 
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governments to seize a person's home or land, not for vital public use, but for 
transfer to private developers. We call on State legislatures to moot the impact of 
the Kelo decision in their States by appropriate legislation or constitutional 
amendments. Equally important, we pledge to enforce the Takings Clause in the 
actions of federal agencies to ensure just compensation whenever private property 
is needed to achieve a compelling public use. This includes the taking of property 
in the form of water rights in the West and elsewhere and the taking of property 
by environmental regulations that destroy its value.” 
 
This passage indicates a strategic shift had occurred since the initial GOP response in the 2008 
platform. Note, for example, the absence of any promise for federal legislation—wise in light of 
the failure to pass any such law even during the period of heightened attention to the issue in the 
immediate aftermath of Kelo. Republicans instead emphasize the importance of state-level 
legislative and constitutional innovation to “moot the impact” of the Court’s decision.  
By 2016, most states had already taken political action on takings: 44 states had revised 
their policies, including ten that amended their constitutions, in an effort to “reduce the impact” 
of Kelo (Somin 2015; Beienburg 2014; Strother 2016). As such, the 2016 GOP platform 
reflected the relative success of the anti-takings wave of activism that Kelo generated: 
“The Framers of our government knew, from history and experience, that when 
private property is not secure, freedom is at risk. That is why the Fifth 
Amendment declares that private property may not be ‘taken for public use 
without just compensation.’ The Supreme Court's Kelo decision undermined this 
safeguard by allowing local governments to seize a person's home or land not 
only for vital public use, but also for ‘public purpose,’ which thus allowed the 
government to seize it for transfer to private developers or other private entities. 
We call on any state legislatures that have not already done so to nullify the 
impact of Kelo within their jurisdiction by legislation or state constitutional 
amendments declaring that private property may be taken only for true public use, 
and we join House Republicans in supporting the Private Property Rights 
Protection Act.” 
 
In this passage, the GOP implicitly recognizes this success, by calling only upon “any state 
legislatures that have not already done so” to take action to secure property rights against Kelo-
esque takings. Very importantly, however, the 2016 platform renews the promise of 2008 (but 
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omitted in 2012) for federal protection against such takings, in the form of the pledge to support 
the Private Property Rights Protection Act (see chapter three for discussion of that Act’s history 
in earlier sessions of Congress).70 
 In sum, the Court’s decision in Kelo v. New London spurred the Republican Party to 
officially reaffirm its support for property rights, and to promise legislative action to curb the 
potential impacts of that decision. It should be noted that the Democratic party has not included 
any such reference to Kelo in its subsequent platforms, which likely indicates Democratic party 
elites’ recognition that “property rights” are an issue that is “owned” by the Republican party 
(see generally Petrocik 1996). Further, the nearly unanimous public opposition to the Kelo 
decision means it would be politically unwise for the DNC to adopt an oppositional stance to that 
of the Republicans. 
 The House of Representatives has passed several bills aimed at improving property 
rights protections, but so far all of these have failed to pass the Senate. State legislatures have 
been extremely successful, however, in re-writing their own laws of eminent domain to restrict 
the scope of that power. Thus Kelo, by incentivizing legislators to take up the issue of eminent 
domain, directly led to dozens of reform measures around the country despite the fact that Kelo 
did not mark any substantial change in federal law. Put differently, Kelo demonstrates that Court 
decisions can draw significant public attention even when they do not cause major changes in 
law or policy (see also chapter five above), and that cases can create political opportunity 
structures (Andersen 2006) which policy entrepreneurs can exploit to push their favored policies 
during these windows of opportunity.  
 
                                                 
70 As of this writing, the Republican-controlled 115th Congress has not yet introduced a new version of the PPRPA. 
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Gun Rights 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in D.C. v. Heller was its first major decision concerning 
the Second Amendment in almost 70 years.71 The facts of the case were straightforward: the city 
of Washington, District of Columbia had since 1976 completely banned the possession of usable 
handguns, including those kept in the home for the purpose of self-defense. Brian Doherty 
summarizes the city’s regulatory scheme concisely:  
“According to D.C. codes 7-2502.01, 7-2502.02, 7-2507.02, as well as 22-4504 
and 22-4515, it was illegal to have a handgun without registering it, and you 
couldn’t register it if you didn’t already own it before the law was passed in 1976; 
it was illegal to have a long gun in your home in any condition other than 
unloaded and disassembled or trigger-locked; and if you had a registered 
handgun, even carrying it around your house could get you a year in jail and a 
$1,000 fine.” (Doherty 2008: 40) 
 
Dick Heller, a D.C. resident and a trained and licensed special police officer for the city, wanted 
to keep a gun in his home for personal protection. Heller sued, alleging that D.C.’s policy 
violated the right to bear arms enshrined in the Second Amendment.   
 A closely divided Court ultimately ruled in Heller’s favor. The five-member majority 
held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected 
with service in a militia, and to use that firearm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-
defense within the home. More specifically, the Heller decision consists of three core holdings: 
1) The Second Amendment protects an individual right; 2) that right is not unlimited; and 3) the 
handgun ban and trigger-lock requirements of D.C. are effectively prohibitory, and are thus 
unconstitutional. This decision was the first by the Court to construe the scope of the Second 
                                                 
71 The most recent case to directly address the scope of the 2nd Amendment before Heller was U.S. v. Miller (1939). 
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Amendment, and thus was certain to be a “landmark” decision regardless of the outcome of the 
case.72  
Figure 7.8. Public Opinion on Gun Rights and Gun Control 
 
Note: graphic depicts the percentage of the general public saying it is more important to “control gun ownership” 
(Gun Control series), and to “Protect the right of Americans to own guns” (Gun Rights series), respectively. 
(Source: Pew Research Center). 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the nation’s close division on questions of gun rights and 
gun control, the response to the Heller decision was polarized. Figure 7.8 shows graphically that 
support for gun rights has increased significantly over the past decade and a half—however, 
figure 7.9 makes clear that this basic upward trend masks important partisan differences. That is, 
figure 7.9 shows that rank-and-file Democrats are increasingly opposed to protections for gun 
                                                 
72 The Court had decided only four Second Amendment cases before Heller: United States v. Cruikshank (1876), 
Presser v. Illinois (1886), Miller v. Texas (1894), and United States v. Miller (1939). In U.S. v. Cruikshank the Court 
decided, five votes to four, that the First Amendment right to assemble, and the Second Amendment right to bear 
arms, “has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government.” That is, in Cruikshank, the Court 
declined to incorporate either amendment against state governments. Presser v. Illinois affirmed Cruikshank, this 
time holding that the Second Amendment does not preclude state governments from forbidding “bodies of men to 
associate together as military organizations, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns”, most explicitly, 
because the Second Amendment is a “limitation only upon the power of congress and the national government, and 
not upon that of the state.” In Miller v. Texas the Court held that a Texas law forbidding the “carrying of weapons” 
does not necessarily deny citizens the “benefit of any of these [Second Amendment] provisions.” Further, the Court 
again affirmed that “these amendments [the Second and Fourth] operate only upon the Federal Power,” and again 
declined to consider whether either Amendment could be applied against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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owners, while at the same time Republicans have become increasingly opposed to any efforts to 
control gun ownership.  
Figure 7.9. Growing Partisan Gap in Attitudes on Guns 
 
Note: graphic depicts proportion of respondents, among registered voters who voted for the Democratic and 
Republican candidate in each election, respectively, who say that it is “more important to control gun ownership 
than to protect gun rights” (Source: Pew Research Center).  
 
In this polarized partisan climate, it is little surprise that the responses of the parties to the 
Heller decision were quite different. In their 2008 platform, the Republican party celebrated 
Heller as a needed affirmation of a basic right:  
“We uphold the right of individual Americans to own firearms, a right which 
antedated the Constitution and was solemnly confirmed by the Second 
Amendment. We applaud the Supreme Court's decision in Heller affirming that 
right, and we assert the individual responsibility to safely use and store firearms. 
We call on the next president to appoint judges who will similarly respect the 
Constitution. Gun ownership is responsible citizenship, enabling Americans to 
defend themselves, their property, and communities.” 
 
It goes on to note that the GOP is “astounded that four justices of the Supreme Court believe that 
individual Americans have no individual right to bear arms to protect themselves and their 
families.” In these passages, Republican elites are sending a clear signal not only of the party’s 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Dem Voters Rep Voters
228 
 
stance, but also draw a stark difference between their stance and that of the (liberal) Court 
minority.  
The Democratic response to Heller in its official platform, however, was not particularly 
hostile. The DNC pays homage to the Second Amendment and to America’s tradition of gun 
ownership. However, it goes on to note that, 
“[Democrats] believe that the right to own firearms is subject to reasonable 
regulation, but we know that what works in Chicago may not work in Cheyenne. 
We can work together to enact and enforce commonsense laws and improvements 
– like closing the gun show loophole, improving our background check system, 
and reinstating the assault weapons ban, so that guns do not fall into the hands of 
terrorists or criminals. Acting responsibly and with respect for differing views on 
this issue, we can both protect the constitutional right to bear arms and keep our 
communities and our children safe.” 
 
In other words, the immediate Democratic response is actually mostly consistent with the 
majority ruling in Heller—it acknowledges an important right, but also notes that that right is 
subject to reasonable regulation. The DNC of course goes further than the Court would do in 
laying out some particular types of regulation that it views as necessary. Moreover, and despite 
their different tones, there is nothing inconsistent in the expressed views of the GOP and the 
DNC in their 2008 platforms.  
 It is after Heller, and after the 2008 elections, that we see public opinion on gun rights 
and gun control begin to significantly diverge along partisan lines (see figure 7.9). In subsequent 
Democratic Platforms (i.e. 2012 and 2016), there is no reference to Heller, nor to guns or the 
Second Amendment. The GOP, however, significantly expands its discussion of gun rights, and 
increasingly condemns Democratic-backed regulatory schemes.73 In its 2012 platform, the 
Republican party again signals its views on the importance of the right to bear arms: “We uphold 
                                                 
73 By 2012, the Supreme Court had decided another important Second Amendment case, McDonald v. City of 
Chicago (2010). The primary effect of this decision was to incorporate the right to bear arms as outlined in Heller to 
apply to the states via the 14th Amendment.  
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the right of individuals to keep and bear arms, a right which antedated the Constitution and was 
solemnly confirmed by the Second Amendment. We acknowledge, support, and defend the law 
abiding citizen's God-given right of self-defense.” But it goes further also, in outlining specific 
policies pursuant to the exercise of this fundamental right that it favors and opposes: 
“We support the fundamental right to self-defense wherever a lawabiding citizen 
has a legal right to be, and we support federal legislation that would expand the 
exercise of that right by allowing those with state-issued carry permits to carry 
firearms in any state that issues such permits to its own residents. Gun ownership 
is responsible citizenship, enabling Americans to defend their homes and 
communities. We condemn frivolous lawsuits against gun manufacturers and 
oppose federal licensing or registration of law-abiding gun owners. We oppose 
legislation that is intended to restrict our Second Amendment rights by limiting 
the capacity of clips or magazines or otherwise restoring the ill-considered 
Clinton gun ban.” 
 
This tactic is carried on its 2016 platform as well, where the GOP continues to express support 
for national concealed carry reciprocity legislation and opposition to restrictions on magazine 
capacity or “popular and common modern rifle[s]” which are frequently referred to as “assault 
weapons” by gun control advocates.  
There is one major addition to the 2016 Republican platform, however: an explicit appeal 
to constituents to consider the importance of a pro-Second Amendment Supreme Court. The 
passage states: “We salute the Republican Congress for defending the right to keep and bear 
arms by preventing the President from installing a new liberal majority on the Supreme Court. 
The confirmation to the Court of additional anti-gun justices would eviscerate the Second 
Amendment's fundamental protections.” Here the GOP praises Senate Republicans for refusing 
to vote on outgoing President Barack Obama’s Supreme Court nominee Merrick Garland. In 
doing so, the platform also strongly hints at the importance of the 2016 election for the future of 
gun rights, especially as it concerns the vacancy on the high Court left by Justice Scalia’s passing 
in early 2016.  
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In summary, the Court’s landmark decision in D.C. v. Heller prompted both parties to 
include discussions of gun rights and gun control issues in their 2008 platforms. For Democrats, 
this is the only time in the entire sample (1952-2016) that any such discussion occurs, while 
Republicans maintain attention to gun rights and gun control in their 2012 and 2016 platforms. 
Both parties use their platforms to outline policy proposals in line with their views—and public 
opinion polling suggests that these correspond with shifts in mass preferences on such policies 
among their respective constituents. Additionally, the GOP in 2016 makes explicit mention of 
the importance of appointing pro-gun rights justices to the Supreme Court, doing so in light of an 
existing vacancy. This strategy hints at the importance of voting for pro-gun candidates for 
elective office, especially presidents who will nominate pro-gun justices, and Senators who will 
confirm those pro-gun nominees. In other words, the GOP here reminds its constituents that the 
future security of their cherished right to bear arms depends on voting for Republicans.  
Campaign Finance 
 The controversy at issue in Citizens United v. FEC concerned a conservative non-profit 
organization called Citizens United who wanted to air a film critical of Democratic presidential 
hopeful Hillary Clinton (titled Hillary: The Movie). The funding and airing of such a film was a 
violation of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA; also known as the McCain-
Feingold Act). In relevant part, BCRA forbade “electioneering communication” expenditures by 
corporations and unions in the 30 days before a primary election or 60 days before a general 
election. Citizens United filed suit alleging that the portions of BCRA limiting “electioneering” 
communications—including their film Hillary—were constitutionally invalid restrictions of free 
speech. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia upheld BCRA against this 
challenge. 
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The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the First 
Amendment’s protections for free speech prohibit the government from restricting independent 
political expenditures by nonprofit corporations. In doing so the Court overruled its prior opinion 
in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), as well as parts of McConnell v. FEC 
(2003).74 The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, notes that the dissemination of 
speech requires money, and thus that limitations on spending are tantamount to limitations on 
speech. Further, the Court held that the First Amendment protects the speech rights not only of 
individuals, but also of associations of individuals—thus concluding that the Constitution does 
not permit prohibitions on speech based on the corporate identity of the speaker.  
The Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC (2010) was controversial, to say the least 
(Levitt 2010; Teachout 2011). Many on the political left, in particular, viewed the decision as an 
assault on democracy and an invitation to corruption at best, and plutocracy at worst. Law 
professor Erwin Chemerisnky (2011) for example, described Citizens United as part of a 
“Conservative assault on the constitution.” While some on the political right also expressed 
concerns about the decision’s implications, many celebrated the decision as a crucial step 
towards more robust protection of political speech (e.g. Epstein 2011).  
The decision also garnered responses from both parties in their subsequent platforms. In 
light of the above, the substance of these responses was perhaps predictable. In its 2012 platform 
the Democratic Party had this to say about Citizens United: 
“Our political system is under assault by those who believe that special interests 
should be able to buy whatever they want in our society, including our 
government. Our opponents have applauded the Supreme Court's decision 
in Citizens United and welcomed the new flow of special interest money with 
open arms. In stark contrast, we believe we must take immediate action to curb 
                                                 
74 Austin held that a state law prohibiting corporations from using to support or oppose candidates did not violate the 
First Amendment. The portion of McConnell v. FEC that was overruled held that disclosure requirements as to all 
“electioneering communications” were constitutional.  
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the influence of lobbyists and special interests on our political institutions.” 
 
In short, the DNC describes Citizens United as an assault on our very political system, one that 
puts “special interests” ahead of regular people. The GOP’s official response could hardly be 
more different. In its 2012 platform, the Republican party states: 
“The rights of citizenship do not stop at the ballot box. They include the free 
speech right to devote one's resources to whatever cause or candidate one 
supports. We oppose any restrictions or conditions that would discourage 
Americans from exercising their constitutional right to enter the political fray or 
limit their commitment to their ideals. As a result, we support repeal of the 
remaining sections of McCain-Feingold, support either raising or repealing 
contribution limits, and oppose passage of the DISCLOSE Act or any similar 
legislation designed to vitiate the Supreme Court's recent decisions protecting 
political speech in Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election 
Commission and Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.” 
 
Here the GOP not only lauds the Court’s recent campaign finance and corporate speech decisions 
(and does so by name), but it calls for legislative action to further deregulate those activities.  
 Public opinion on this cluster of issues (campaign finance, corporate/union speech, etc.) 
is difficult to pin down. This is the case, at least in part, because the problems presented by these 
issues are both technically complex and normatively fraught, and because there are multiple 
viable solutions to those problems put forth by a range of political and policy elites (e.g. Primo 
2002).75 A Washington Post-ABC Poll in the weeks after Citizens United found that a large 
majority of Americans opposed the decision, with 65% reporting they were “strongly” opposed. 
Importantly, this basic finding was true across partisan divisions with 85% of Democrats 
opposed, 81% of Independents opposed, and 76% of Republicans opposed (Eggen 2010). Polling 
by Gallup in 2013 revealed that many Americans of all political persuasions favored significant 
                                                 
75 Public opinion is notoriously difficult to study in “hard” (complex or technical) issue areas—and indeed, a 
significant body of research suggests that public opinion may not be particularly meaningful in those areas due to 
limitations in people’s interest in and attention to such issues (Carmines and Stimson 1980; Johnston and Wronski 
2015).  
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campaign finance reform, including restrictions on fundraising, as figure 7.10 graphically 
demonstrates.  
Figure 7.10. Public Opinion on Federal Restriction on Campaign Fundraising 
 
Note: Question wording: Would you vote for or against a law that would put a limit on the amount of money 
candidates for the U.S. House and Senate can raise and spend on their political campaigns?” (Source: Gallup, June 
15-16, 2013).  
 
 However, further polling suggests that campaign finance is not a high-salience issue, nor 
one that many voters view as one that should be prioritized by Congress (e.g. Saad 2013; Saad 
2006). So while it seems from the polling that Democrats should have the upper hand on this 
issue, it may well be the case that the low priority of issue to many voters is making it difficult to 
push for effective (and probably popular) reforms. Moreover, the technical nature of the issue, 
combined with its intermittent salience, makes it an issue ripe for elite opinion leadership. That 
is, it is the sort of issue on which elites may be able to move public opinion—for Republican 
elites, this means an opportunity to sway Republican voters toward the GOP’s announced 
position by reframing the issue as concerning free speech and anti-political correctness. Whether 
such efforts will be successful remains to be seen.  
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 By 2016 the Democratic Party had become more explicit in their calls to overturn 
Citizens United: 
“Democrats support a constitutional amendment to overturn the Supreme Court's 
decisions in Citizens United and Buckley v. Valeo. We need to end secret, 
unaccountable money in politics by requiring, through executive order or 
legislation, significantly more disclosure and transparency—by outside groups, 
federal contractors, and public corporations to their shareholders. We need to 
amplify the voices of the American people through a small donor matching public 
financing system. We need to overhaul and strengthen the Federal Election 
Commission so that there is real enforcement of campaign finance laws. And we 
need to fight to eliminate super PACs and outside spending abuses.” 
 
Democratic party elites clearly ramped up their rhetoric, but did so building on the same themes 
laid out in the 2012 platform: the heart of their opposition to Citizens United and Buckley, they 
claim, is a desire to “amplify the voices of the American people.”  
 The GOP platform, in contrast, became vaguer on this issue in 2016 compared to 2012. 
The platform states that: 
“Limits on political speech serve only to protect the powerful and insulate 
incumbent officeholders. We support repeal of federal restrictions on political 
parties in McCain-Feingold, raising or repealing contribution limits, protecting 
the political speech of advocacy groups, corporations, and labor unions, and 
protecting political speech on the internet. We likewise call for an end to the so-
called Fairness Doctrine, and support free-market approaches to free speech 
unregulated by government.” 
 
The policy positions taken in the two platforms GOP are largely the same, but here the party 
does not explicitly praise the Court’s recent campaign finance decisions, nor does it make 
promises about specific policy commitments should the GOP control government after the 
election.   
 To be sure, the politics of campaign finance were contentious long before the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Citizens United. However, like in the cases of Roe and Heller, discussed above, 
Citizens United seems to have elevated the salience of the underlying issue, and to have raised 
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the stakes of the political contest. That is, post-Citizens United, proponents of campaign finance 
face a major uphill battle in light of the constitutional protections now afforded corporate 
campaign expenditures and the like. Whereas before simple legislation would have sufficed, 
today proponents—mostly Democrats—need stronger medicine: they must amend the 
constitution or play the slow game of constitutional change by shifting the balance of power on 
the Supreme Court toward their favor. Republicans (at least those opposed to heavier regulation 
of campaign related speech) now have the metaphorical high ground and can simply play 
defense: because of the massive hurdles facing many proponents of reforms, Republicans need 
only to passively defend the status quo to maintain their preferred policy.  
Discussion 
 The foregoing analyses suggest that important Supreme Court decisions can and do 
regularly influence the policy commitments of America’s major political parties. Moreover, I 
show that Court influence on the parties’ agendas has become more common over time—and 
that the effect is considerably more pronounced on the Republican party than on the Democratic 
party. To be clear, I am not making the claim that Roe v. Wade put abortion on the national 
policy agenda for the first time, nor that the push for expanding gun rights began after D.C. v. 
Heller. Rather, I argue here that important Supreme Court decisions pushed these issues to the 
fore of political debate—they moved the issues up the agenda, if you will—and in doing so, 
fundamentally altered the politics of those issues. I have focused here on the Court’s influence on 
the policy commitments of the parties in four issue areas: abortion, eminent domain, gun 
rights/gun control, and campaign finance.  
 The foregoing analyses suggest that some Supreme Court decisions work as “focusing 
events” for the parties (Birkland 1998). Focusing events are sudden, relatively rare events with 
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politically consequential (and usually potentially harmful) implications. These focusing events 
make issues or problems suddenly salient; they “highlight problems to which government or 
other institutions might respond” and in doing so “change the dominant issues on the agenda in a 
policy domain” (Birkland 1998: 53-54). In the context of Supreme Court decisions, this means 
that a decision makes the larger policy or issue to which it speaks more salient, and often, more 
controversial. Thus Court decisions can simultaneously raise the profile and the stakes of an 
ongoing policy debate.  
In the policy domain of abortion, for example, I have argued that the Court’s decision to 
constitutionalize an unenumerated right in Roe raised the stakes of the ongoing public debate on 
that topic. By “raised the stakes” I mean that after Roe, political discourse on abortion policy 
necessarily revolved around questions of fundamental rights and supreme law. With the stakes of 
winning and losing thus raised, the Court’s decision incentivized intense partisans to pour 
increasing resources (and ever-increasing vitriol) into this policy debate. This in turn 
incentivized the parties to capture these intense partisans and the resources they were willing to 
expend on that policy (see generally Cohen et al. 2008). Shadows of this—though undoubtedly 
to a lesser extent (yet, at least)—can be seen in the post-Heller politics around gun rights and gun 
control. However, there has always been a constitutional or fundamental rights aspect to these 
debates, given the Second Amendment explicitly protects a right to bear arms (even if the 
question regarding to whom this right applies has long been debated). The Court’s decision in 
Heller, by explicitly affirming a broad-based individual and fundamental right to bear arms 
changed the political landscape of ongoing policy debates over guns.  
 In other words, public opinion on two of the issues captured in the case studies, abortion 
and gun control, is significantly divided and increasingly partisan. Public opinion on the other 
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two issues, however, suggests that one party should dominate policy development: the 
Republican party’s stated preference strongly reflects overwhelming public sentiment on eminent 
domain, as does the Democratic party’s position on campaign finance reform. Taken together, 
the findings suggest that the parties’ responses to Supreme Court decisions are largely strategic. 
The parties use Supreme Court decisions, like anything else, to attempt to energize their partisans 
and to try to capture new constituents. Thus in response to abortion decisions, Democrats are 
reminded by their party elite that Republican electoral success would be fatal to continued 
protection of abortion rights; Republicans, in contrast, reminded their rank-and-file that 
Democratic victories at the polls will ensure continued destruction of lives of unborn (or more 
recently, “preborn”) infants. When public opinion is more monolithic—as it is on eminent 
domain and campaign finance—a rather different reaction is observed. The party on the “right 
side” of public opinion is presented by a focusing case with an opportunity to enact its agenda, as 
Republicans did on eminent domain after Kelo. In summary, I argue that some Supreme Court 
decisions cause the parties to focus scarce resources on some particular policy issue. The parties’ 
responses will be shaped by their strategic goals: they will seek to attach preexisting policy goals 
to the newly salient event or problem (Kingdon 1984), and will attempt to mobilize their base 
and/or to capture new partisans on the basis of their position on that issue or policy (Birkland 
1998; Brewer and Stonecash 2009).  
Finally, the research presented here suggests that the level of success the parties have 
enjoyed in translating their stated preferences on these issues into policy changes is starkly 
different: eminent domain policies have been heavily revised around the country post-Kelo, 
while campaign finance policy has only been marginally (and minimally) adjusted since Citizens 
United. This difference in success is likely attributable primarily to the ability of state 
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legislatures to innovate policy on eminent domain, and their (obvious) inability to revise federal 
campaign finance laws. That is, if we restrict policy development post-decision to the federal 
level, we see that not much has changed in either policy area (due to partisan gridlock, or for 
whatever other reason). And while federal campaign finance policy must be changed at the 
national level if it is going to be changed at all, eminent domain policy can be (and has been) 
changed significantly at the state level. As such, I contend that the uneven success of the parties 
at translating their ownership of these two policy areas into policy changes more in line with 
prevailing opinion is attributable to increased opportunity to innovate policy by shifting from 
federal into state venues on the one issue (eminent domain) but not the other (campaign finance).  
Conclusion 
Party platforms are a key site for party elites to espouse their policy commitments and 
appeal to their constituents on the bases of those policies. Importantly, these platforms have been 
shown to represent credible policy commitments of party elites, and do in fact meaningfully 
predict subsequent behavior by the party who captures government in the ensuing election. In 
this chapter, I have argued that the Supreme Court routinely influences the substance of the 
policy commitments of America’s major parties.  
It is clear from the above analysis that one major purpose of official party responses to 
the Supreme Court’s decisions are to score easy political points among their base by reaffirming 
their pre-existing commitments to some right that has recently been protected (or attacked) in a 
Supreme Court decision. The parties also use these decisions to mobilize “intense policy 
demanders” on a given issue, such as abortion. That is, Supreme Court decisions can be used by 
party elites to remind rank-and-file members of the party that the protection of their political 
preferences requires electoral support of the party. Occasionally, the Supreme Court raises the 
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profile of an issue to a previously unknown height; when this happens, the shape of public 
opinion significantly influences the incentives of the parties. When public opinion on an issue is 
divided, the decision can provide an opportunity for the parties to try to capture members of the 
public on the different sides of the issue by taking oppositional positions, as they did in the years 
following Roe (Greenhouse and Siegel 2011). When public opinion is fairly one-sided on such 
an issue, the party whose position is favored by the public will seek to use the opportunity 
offered by the case to enact its agenda on that issue, while the other party will seek to minimize 
its association with the “other” (widely unpopular) position.  
 In summary, I have argued that the Supreme Court can and does influence the official 
agendas of America’s two major political parties. As is true of the presidential and public 
agendas, I argue that Supreme Court influence on the party agendas is relatively rare in terms of 
the proportion of cases decided that have such an effect, but is also routine in that at least a 
couple of decisions have this affect in each agenda cycle (in the case at hand, every four years 
when the parties construct new platforms). Influence on the party agendas, I have argued, is 
politically consequential because the platforms are good indications of the policies that the party 
in power will go on to pursue while in office. Moreover, these cases have powerfully shaped 
politics because they have provided both parties with ammunition to mobilize their constituents 
around issues. Because Supreme Court decisions effect not only “low” policy but also the state 
of the constitution-in-practice, they provide parties with an opportunity to emphasize the 
important ramifications for some policy (abortion, gun rights, etc.) at stake after the Court 
renders a decision on that policy. As a result, Supreme Court decisions can make policy debates 
more contentious, which fuels partisan politicking on those issues and thus ensures that said 
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issue(s) will remain salient and contested. Ultimately, this influence on the party agendas points 
to another indirect pathway of Supreme Court influence on public policy.  
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Chapter 8: 
Discussion and Conclusion:  
Supreme Court Power and Impact in American Politics 
 
 In the foregoing chapters I have advanced two key arguments. First, if we want to 
understand the Supreme Court’s role in our political system, we must conceptualize judicial 
impact as all policy-relevant outcomes of judicial action. Second, I have argued that a clearly 
articulated theory of judicial power—distinguished from the broader concept of impact—should 
be the foundation of any theory of judicial impact. To this end, I argued that the nature of 
Supreme Court power is the power to interpret the law. I contend that the power to interpret the 
law is fundamentally a policymaking power: fleshing out provisions of the constitution (or even 
statutes or prior judgments) to apply them to concrete cases, and doing so with authority and 
precedential value, inescapably means that Supreme Court interpretation can and does directly 
alter policy on the ground.  
This power operates in the “first face,” as the compliance literature demonstrates, when it 
requires other actors to alter their behavior, such as by requiring public school principals to stop 
leading mandatory readings of scripture after Abington v. Schempp. In chapter three I showed 
that focus on the Court’s interpretive power allows us to significantly expand the scope of the 
compliance approach, and in doing so, shed new light on the Court’s impact on policy and 
politics in the United States.  
The second face of the Court’s power can be seen when the Court influences the 
decisions of other institutions or precludes certain kinds of challenges from hearing, by 
restricting standing, for example. As I showed in chapters two and three, the Court’s decisions in 
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Employment Division v. Smith, City of Boerne v. Flores, and a few other of its federalism 
decisions in the 1990s effectively precluded Congress from passing the Religious Liberty 
Protection Act. Finally, the Court’s power to interpret the law operates in the third face when it 
shapes individuals’ or groups’ opinions, identities, and decisions to participate in politics. While 
I have not spent much time on this aspect of the Court’s power in this dissertation, such effects 
can clearly be seen in the long literatures in sociolegal studies and judicial legitimation. 
Importantly, it should be noted that a single decision can do all of these things simultaneously—
and that the effects of power operations in one face interact with operations in another face.  
I have argued that existing empirical (as well as some more interpretive) literatures—
those concerning judicial impact, interbranch politics and policymaking, coordinate construction, 
judicial legitimation, and sociolegal studies—map on to the three faces of power reasonably 
well. One goal of this dissertation has been to synthesize these disparate perspectives and 
approaches to judicial power and impact. Each of these literatures has offered important and 
unique contributions, but each is limited by its respective (and narrow) focus. Power and impact, 
being large, broad concepts, must be cast to capture all of the effects of judicial action that so 
many scholars have ably highlighted over the last several decades.  
 In support of these arguments developed in chapter two, I examined a different aspect of 
judicial power or judicial impact in each of the next several chapters. In chapter three, I 
presented five case studies in which I examined the policy effects of the Court’s interpretive 
power. In order to strengthen my argument, I selected cases in which the conventional 
compliance approach could tell little or nothing about the effects of the Court’s decisions. This 
approach allowed me to highlight the utility of my theory in direct comparison to its chief rival. 
In that chapter I showed that the Court’s power is more robust is often appreciated by scholars 
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working in the impact tradition. Further, these studies demonstrated that the “compliance” 
approach to the study of judicial impact is fundamentally limited in two ways: it can only speak 
to a subset of the Court’s decisions, and even for decisions to which it can be applied, the 
compliance approach can tell only a partial story of case impact. Finally, they showed that 
Supreme Court decisions can have a huge range of impacts on politics and policy: they can 
increase the salience of an issue, they can provoke Congressional or presidential responses, they 
can spur interest group or mass activism, and more. 
 In chapter four I utilized two complementary quantitative approaches to test an 
observable implication of my theory. To briefly recap, I reasoned that if the Court’s power is 
fundamentally interpretive, and if the majority of its decisions are implemented by lower federal 
courts over which SCOTUS has significant hierarchical control, then its decision-making should 
not be much constrained by Congress or the American public. In other words, I argue that my 
theory implies a higher degree of judicial independence than is typically suggested in the 
literature. I test this idea using two complementary methods and sets of data: first, I use a time-
series approach (a generalized error-correction model) to examine the influence of the public and 
of Congress on the aggregate output of the Court between 1945 and 2000; second, I take a closer 
look by utilizing a logistic regression to estimate the influence of Congress and the public at 
large on a sample of more than 6,000 Supreme Court merits decisions. Both sets of analyses 
support my theory: the Court is largely unconstrained by either Congress or the mass public in 
the majority of its decisions. Indeed, I find that the Court is only significantly influenced by 
Congress when it is hearing constitutional challenges to federal statutes, and is only significantly 
constrained by the public at large when it is deciding highly salient cases that must be 
implemented by non-court actors. Together, these two contexts account for less than 15% of the 
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Court’s cases; in the rest of the Court’s work, I find no evidence of constraint. In other words, I 
find that the Court exercises significant independent authority over policy except when it is 
directly taking on Congress, or when it issues an order that cannot be carried out by Courts in 
some very salient case—but as I showed in chapter three, the Court can still significantly 
influence policy in this context, just not unrestrainedly. 
 With these findings regarding judicial power in hand, I turn in the next part of the study 
to the Supreme Court’s indirect influence in the political system. This second part of the 
dissertation is designed to more systematically examine some of the indirect effects of judicial 
decisions discussed in the case studies presented in chapter three. Here I focus especially on the 
Court’s role as a political agenda setter because this is an aspect of the Court’s influence that is 
both especially important and especially understudied. First, in chapter five, I examined the 
influence of the Supreme Court’s decisions on the public political agenda, defined as the mix of 
issues that the public at large views as deserving policymakers’ attention at a given time. To do 
so, I gathered data on media coverage of a range of issues that the Supreme Court had spoken on 
in at least one important case. I then conducted Box-Tiao intervention analyses to see whether 
those Court decisions significantly altered media attention to the larger issues concerned by a 
given case (abortion or free speech, for example). I found that the Supreme Court regularly and 
significantly influences media attention to issues by deciding important cases on those issues—
however, I did not find any clear pattern among these interventions. In other words, while I have 
shown that the Court influences the public agenda far more often than existing work suggests, I 
have not been able to identify any case-level or contextual variables that predict this effect. Even 
so, my findings indicate that the Supreme Court regularly causes shifts in public attention to 
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various issues in politics, and in doing so, directly affects the distribution of incentives for 
policymakers and indirectly influences subsequent politics on those issues.  
I then turn my attention to the “policymaking agenda.” In chapter six I focus in particular 
on the agenda of the president. I begin with the president because the president is often 
considered America’s “agenda-setter-in-chief” because items on his agenda are especially likely 
to receive formal attention from policymakers, and because presidents have historically been 
uniquely successful among America’s institutional actors at translating their agenda into policy 
change. Here I specified Court influence on the presidential agenda as presidential references to 
Court decisions in his written and spoken statements. I then conducted regression analyses to test 
the influence of various theorized factors of decisions and their political context on the likelihood 
that the president will respond. As expected, I find that the legally and politically important 
decisions are especially likely to draw presidential attention—and that this is especially true for 
those cases that drew significant interest group attention and thus are highly “mobilizable.” 
These findings indicate that Supreme Court decisions can directly influence the political agenda 
of the president—and in theoretically predictable ways—and in doing so, indicate another 
indirect pathway by which the Court regularly and substantially influences public policy.  
Finally, in chapter seven, I examine the Court’s influence on the official agendas of 
America’s two major political parties. To do so, I analyzed the platforms of each party, finding 
that the Court regularly influences the content of those policy statements. Influence on the party 
agendas, I argued, is politically consequential because the platforms are good indications of the 
policies that the party in power will go on to pursue while in office. Moreover, the cases that 
affected the party agendas have powerfully shaped subsequent politics because they have 
provided the parties with ammunition to mobilize their constituents around issues. Further, 
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because Supreme Court decisions affect not only routine public policy but also the state of the 
constitution-in-practice, they can fuel partisan politicking on those issues and thus ensure that the 
issue(s) will remain salient and contested. Ultimately, this influence on the party agendas points 
to another indirect pathway of Supreme Court influence over public policy. 
Taken together, chapters five, six, and seven demonstrate that the Supreme Court 
significantly shapes issue attention among the public and America’s other political institutions: 
in other words, that it regularly and powerfully shapes the American political agenda. By 
describing these pathways of indirect policy influence, these chapters contribute to our 
understanding of the Court’s role in American politics. 
 In summary, this dissertation advances a broadened conceptualization of judicial impact 
and a new theory of judicial power. I argue that judicial impact should be conceptualized as all 
policy-relevant effects of judicial decisions. This very broad conceptualization is rendered 
tractable by anchoring it to an appropriately capacious theory of judicial power. I argue that the 
nature of the Court’s power is interpretive: it has the power to authoritatively interpret the law, 
and to bind lower courts to adhere to its interpretations. This power gives the Supreme Court 
significant ability to directly make policy that is enforced in courts around the country. Judicial 
impact, then, comes from the policy consequences of this power, but also from the myriad 
indirect effects these binding interpretations have in American politics. For example, decisions 
can lead to direct policy responses from Congress (such as the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act), the president (such as George W. Bush’s Executive Order on Eminent Domain), and state 
legislatures (such as the numerous states that enacted new death penalty statutes after Furman v. 
Georgia). Moreover, I have shown that the Supreme Court routinely influences the political 
agenda of the public and some of America’s governing institutions, and thus that the indirect 
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policy effects described in chapter three are not artefacts of case selection. Put differently, I have 
shown that the Supreme Court frequently shapes public policy via the indirect route of agenda 
influence.  
 These findings have significant implications for long standing debates in Public Law 
beyond the impact and power literatures that I have discussed throughout this manuscript. For 
one, the present research casts further doubt on the infamous “backlash thesis,” which holds that 
activists seeking social change should eschew the courts and focus on lobbying legislators and 
grassroots politicking instead. This argument was most famously made by Gerald Rosenberg, 
who argued that court decisions like Brown and Roe were not only inefficacious, but that 
apparently rights-advancing decisions could result in counterproductive “backlashes” (Rosenberg 
2008; Klarman 2004). These accounts generally suggest that Court decisions that preempt 
legislative reform—going too far too fast, as it were—can provoke rather than resolve major 
political conflicts (e.g. Ginsburg 1985; see generally Price and Keck 2014). This project adds to 
the many voices who have shown that Court decisions can and do produce fruit for reform-
minded activists (e.g. McCann 1994; Andersen 2006; Keck 2009; Keck 2014).  
But perhaps more importantly, my research suggests that one reason that many scholars 
have fixated on backlash is that they have mistakenly divorced litigation and its direct results 
from the larger story of policy development of which judicial action is only part. Put differently, 
the backlash thesis may be largely misstated: first, such studies typically treat the relevant court 
decision as the first event in a series (which is rarely true); second, these studies typically do not 
consider the larger political context in which the observed backlash occurs. Major Supreme 
Court decisions such as Brown v. Board, Roe v. Wade, and more recently, numerous same-sex 
marriage cases, have been described as causing counterproductive backlashes (Klarman 2004; 
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Rosenberg 2008; Klarman 2012, etc.). However, these cases all had significant pro-reform 
outcomes as well (Keck 2009; Hall 2011). Even in cases in which the responses where rather 
more monolithic (and negative), such as Furman v. Georgia and Kelo v. New London, 
subsequent policy developments were mixed (Strother 2016; Somin 2015). In sum, the research 
presented in this dissertation strongly indicates that judicial politics are American politics: the 
Supreme Court and its decisions are part-and-parcel of the American policymaking process 
(Silverstein 2009; Keck 2014). Its decisions can significantly alter public policy directly through 
its ability to authoritatively interpret the law, and indirectly, by spurring subsequent 
politicking—in and out of courts—on the questions on which it speaks. 
Which leads to the other major debate in Public Law scholarship toward which this 
dissertation contributes: the so-called “countermajoritarian difficulty.” There has been much 
hand wringing among scholars who worry that judicial policymaking is fundamentally 
undemocratic, even anti-democratic (e.g. Bickel 1962; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Waldron 2006; 
see generally Friedman 2009 and Martens 2007). Many scholars, however, have suggested that 
this problem may be overstated because judicial review can be and frequently is used for 
majoritarian or pro-democratic ends (Marshall 1989; Graber 1993; Whittington 2005; Crowe 
2011), and because pure “majoritarianism” is not the only object of a liberal democratic polity 
(Hall 2016; Lemieux and Watkins 2009). The research presented here contributes to this work in 
two ways. First, the analyses presented in chapter four show that the Supreme Court is much less 
constrained in its decisions on the merits of cases than is often thought. Indeed, constraint 
appears to operate in only two rather narrow contexts: judicial review of federal statutes, and 
highly salient lateral decisions. This finding is important in itself as it suggests that the one type 
of case that scholars have most worried about (cases carrying the potential for judicial 
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invalidation of democratically enacted policies) presents the primary context in which the Court 
is responsive to the will of Congress. Further, it is important to note that this finding does not 
suggest that the Court is generally unconstrained; rather, it suggests that if the Court is 
constrained, those constraints act at a different stage of the judicial process. There is good reason 
to suspect that external constraints operate much more strongly on the justices at the agenda-
setting stage (i.e. when deciding whether to grant cert) than at the merits stage. Unpacking this 
possibility is a promising avenue for future research.  
Second, and more generally, the research here points to another avenue by which courts 
may reinforce democracy. I have shown that Court decisions, especially important or “landmark” 
decisions, frequently precipitate more politics. That is, major Court decisions can actually spur 
heightened democratic participation on issues. They do this by increasing public attention to 
issues and by drawing the attention of elected officials to those issues. Even in the event that the 
Supreme Court issues a decision that is apparently countermajoritarian, such as Kelo v. New 
London, that decision can have significant pro-democracy outcomes (from the standpoint of 
normative democratic theory) by informing citizens about the state of policy and inducing them 
to become engaged for some period of time, even if only on the one issue.   
* * * 
 In the introduction to this dissertation I likened the modern impact literature to the pre-
constitutional debate over the power of the Supreme Court between Publius and Brutus. Publius 
famously claimed that the Court has “neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must 
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments”  and 
as such was the “least dangerous” branch to the security of liberty (Rossiter 2003: 464). Brutus, 
on the other hand, worried that “the supreme court under this constitution would be exalted 
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above all other power in the government, and subject to no control. …There is no power above 
them that can correct their errors or control their decisions” (quoted in Ketcham 1986: 304-307). 
Hamilton’s argument of a fundamentally weak Court is echoed in most studies in the compliance 
literature; Brutus’ argument of a fundamentally powerful—even unrestrained—Court is echoed 
in much modern scholarship concerning the “countermajoritarian difficulty,” even if that position 
has not received much empirical support. Here I have argued that the Supreme Court is much 
more powerful than Hamilton (and most compliance studies) suggested: it has the power to 
authoritatively shape public policy in every decision that it issues. The political battle over the 
late Justice Scalia’s seat on the Court was not in vain, and the fact that it was Neil Gorsuch rather 
than Merrick Garland who ultimately took that seat will have profound implications for the 
development of law and policy in the United States. 
This is not to say that Brutus had it right, however: the Court is only one policymaking 
institution, and its power is checked by the others. The Court’s policy announcements are 
authoritative, but they are not necessarily final. For these reasons, the multifarious effects of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions on public policy—direct and especially indirect—deserve more 
attention than they typically receive if we want to understand the full scope, as well as the 
limitations, of the Supreme Court’s role in the American political system.  
 
  
251 
 
References 
Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do 
Not Produce Responsive Government. Princeton University Press. 
Ackerman, Bruce. 2014. We the People, Volume III: The Civil Rights Revolution. Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press. 
Adamczyk, Amy, John Wybraniec, and Roger Finke. 2004. “Religious Regulation and the 
Courts: Documenting the Effects of Smith and RFRA.” Journal of Church and State 
46(2): 237-262. 
Albertson, Bethany, and Shana Kushner Gadarian. 2015. Anxious Politics: Democratic 
Citizenship in a Threatening World. Cambridge University Press. 
American Presidency Project. 2016. Party Platforms. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms. 
(accessed June 8, 2016). 
Andersen, Ellen Ann. 2006. Out of the Closets and Into the Courts: Legal Opportunity Structure 
and Gay Rights Litigation. University of Michigan Press. 
Anzia, Sarah F., and Molly C. Jackman. 2013. “Legislative Organization and the Second Face of 
Power: Evidence from U.S. State Legislatures.” Journal of Politics 75(1): 210-224. 
Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. 1962. “Two Faces of Power.” The American Political 
Science Review 56(4): 947-952. 
Bailey, Michael A., Brian Kamoie, and Forrest Maltzman. 2005. “Signals from the Tenth Justice: 
The Political Role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court Decision Making.” 
American Journal of Political Science 49(1): 72-85.  
Bailey, Michael A., and Forrest Maltzman. 2011. The Constrained Court: Law, Politics, and the 
Decisions Justices Make. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
252 
 
Baldwin, David A. 1989. Paradoxes of Power. New York: Basil Blackwell. 
Balkin, Jack. 2011. Living Originalism. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Barnes, Jeb. 2007. “Bringing the Courts Back In: Interbranch Perspectives on the Role of Courts 
in American Politics and Policy Making.” Annual Review of Political Science 10: 25-43. 
Barnes, Jeb. 2004. Overruled? Legislative Overrides, Pluralism, and Contemporary Court-
Congress Relations. Stanford University Press. 
Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. 2005. “Power in International Politics.” International 
Organization 59(1): 39-75. 
Barnett, Randy E. 2004a. Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty. Princeton 
University Press. 
Barnett, Randy E. 2004b. “The Original Meaning of the Judicial Power.” Supreme Court 
Economic Review 12(1): 115-138. 
Bartels, Brandon L. 2011. “Choices in Context: How Case-Level Factors Influence the 
Magnitude of Ideological Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court.” American Politics 
Research 39(1): 142-175.  
Bartels, Brandon L., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. “Explaining Processes of Institutional Opinion 
Leadership.” The Journal of Politics 71(1): 249-261.  
Baum, Lawrence, and Lori Hausegger. 2004. “The Supreme Court and Congress: Reconsidering 
the Relationship.” In Making Policy, Making Law: An Interbranch Perspective (eds. 
Mark C. Miller and Jeb Barnes). Georgetown University Press. 
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in 
Politics and in Political Science. Princeton University Press. 
253 
 
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 2009. Agendas and Instability in American Politics, 
2nd ed. University of Chicago Press. 
Baumgartner, Frank R., Christian Breunig, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Bryan D. Jones, Peter B. 
Mortensen, Michiel Nuytemans, and Stefaan Walgrave. 2009. “Punctuated Equilibrium 
in Comparative Perspective.” American Journal of Political Science 53(3): 603-620.  
Baumgartner, Frank R., Suzanna L. DeBoef, and Amber E. Boydstun. 2008. The Decline of the 
Death Penalty and the Discovery of Innocence. Cambridge University Press.  
Becker, Theodore L., and Malcolm M. Feeley, eds. 1973. The Impact of Supreme Court 
Decisions, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press.  
Behr, Roy L. and Shanto Iyengar. 1985. “Television News, Real-World Cues, and Changes in 
the Public Agenda.” Public Opinion Quarterly 49(1): 38-57. 
Beienburg, Sean. 2014. “Contesting the U.S. Constitution through State Amendments: The 2011 
and 2012 Elections.” Political Science Quarterly 129(1): 55-85. 
Bell, Mark S., and Nicholas L. Miller. 2015. “Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on 
Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(1): 74-92. 
Benesh, Sara C., and Malia Reddick. 2002. “Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower 
Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent.” Journal of Politics 64(2): 
534-550. 
Bennett, Daniel. 2017. Defending Faith: The Politics of the Christian Conservative Legal 
Movement. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. 
Berkowitz, Dan. 1992. “Who Sets the Media Agenda? The Ability of Policymakers to Determine 
News Decisions.” In Public Opinion, The Press, and Public Policy (J. David Kennamer, 
ed.). Westport, CT: Praeger. 
254 
 
Berkowitz, Dan. 1990. “Refining the Gatekeeping Metaphor for Local Television.” Journal of 
Broadcasting and Electronic Media 34(1): 55-68. 
Berkowitz, Dan. 1987. “TV News Sources and News Channels: A Study in Agenda-Building.” 
Journalism Quarterly 64(3): 508-513.   
Bickel, Alexander M. 1962. The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of 
Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Birkby, Robert. 1973. “The Supreme Court and the Bible Belt: Tennessee Reaction to the 
“Schempp” Decisions.” In The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions, ed. by Theodore L. 
Becker and Malcolm M. Feeley (Oxford University Press): 110-118.  
Birkland, Thomas A. 1998. “Focusing Events, Movilization, and Agenda Setting.” Journal of 
Public Policy 18(1): 53-74. 
Black, Ryan C., and James F. Spriggs II. 2008. “An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. 
Supreme Court Opinions.” Houston Law Review 45(3): 623-682. 
Black, Ryan C., Maron W. Sorenson, and Timothy R. Johnson. 2013. “Toward an Actor-Based 
Measure of Supreme Court Case Salience: Information Seeking and Engagement during 
Oral Argument.” Political Research Quarterly 66(4): 804-818. 
Black, Ryan C., and Ryan J. Owens. 2010. “Solicitor General Influence and Agenda Setting on 
the U.S. Supreme Court.” Political Research Quarterly 64(4): 765-778. 
Black, Ryan C., and Ryan J. Owens. 2009. “Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The Collision 
of Policy and Jurisprudence.” The Journal of Politics 71(3): 1062-1075. 
Blackstone, Bethany. 2013. “An Analysis of Policy-Based Congressional Responses to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Constitutional Decisions.” Law & Society Review 47(1): 199-228.  
255 
 
Blackstone, Bethany, and Greg Goelzhauser. 2014. “Presidential Rhetoric Toward the Supreme 
Court.” Judicature 97(4): 179-187. 
Box, George E.P., and George C. Tiao. 1975. “Intervention Analysis with Applications to 
Economic and Environmental Problems.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 
70(349): 70-79. 
Box, George E.P., and Gwilym M. Jenkins. 1976. Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and 
Control, revised edition. San Franscisco: Holden-Day. 
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., John R. Freeman, Matthew P. Hitt, and Jon C.W. Pevehouse. 2014. 
Time Series Analysis for the Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press. 
Boydstun, Amber E. 2013. Making the News: Politics, the Media, and Agenda Setting. 
University of Chicago Press. 
Brent, James. 2003. “A Principal-Agent Analysis of the U.S. Courts of Appeals Responses to 
Boerne v. Flores.” American Politics Research 31(5): 557-570. 
Brent, James. 1999. “An Agent and Two Principles: U.S. Court of Appeals Responses to 
Employment Divisions, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act.” American Politics Quarterly 27(2): 236-266. 
Brewer, Mark D., and Jeffrey M. Stonecash. 2009. Dynamics of American Political Parties. 
Cambridge University Press.  
Breyer, Stephen G. 1995. “Judicial Independence in the United States.” St. Louis University Law 
Journal 40: 989.  
Brigham, John. 1987a. The Cult of the Court. Temple University Press. 
Brigham, John. 1987b. “Right, Rage, and Remedy: Forms of Law in Political Discourse.” 
Studies in American Political Development 2: 303-316. 
256 
 
Brigham, John, and Christine B. Harrington. 1989. “Realism and Its Consequences: An Inquiry 
into Contemporary Sociological Research.” International Journal of the Sociology of 
Law 17(1): 41-62. 
Brutus XV. 1788. Reprinted in The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention 
Debates (Ralph Ketcham, ed.). New York: Signet Classics. 1986.  
Bryan, Amanda C., and Christopher D. Kromphardt. 2016. “Public Opinion, Public Support, and 
Counter-Attitudinal Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court.” Justice System Journal 37(4): 
298-317.  
Bryan, Amanda C., and Eve M. Ringsmuth. 2016. “Jeremiad or Weapon of Words? The Power 
of Emotive Language in Supreme Court Dissents.” Journal of Law and Courts 4(1): 159-
185. 
Budge, Ian, and Richard I. Hofferbert. 1990. “Mandates and Policy Outputs: U.S. Party 
Platforms and Federal Expenditures.” American Political Science Review 84(1): 111-131. 
Bumiller, Kristin. 1992. The Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of Victims. Johns 
Hopkins University Press.  
Burns, Gene. 2005. The Moral Veto: Framing Contraception, Abortion, and Cultural Pluralism 
in the United States. Cambridge University Press. 
Busch, Andrew E. 2007. The Constitution on the Campaign Trail: The Surprising Political 
Career of America’s Founding Document. Rowman & Littlefield. 
Bybee, Keith J. 2010. All Judges Are Political—Except When They Are Not: Acceptable 
Hypocrisies and the Rule of Law. Stanford University Press. 
Bybee, Keith J. 2007. Bench Press: The Collision of Courts, Politics, and the Media. Stanford 
University Press. 
257 
 
Caldeira, Gregory A. and James L. Gibson. 1992. “The Etiology of Public Support for the 
Supreme Court,” American Journal of Political Science 36(3): 635-664. 
Caldeira, Gregory A. and John R. Wright. 1988. “Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the 
U.S. Supreme Court.” American Political Science Review 82(4): 1109-1127.  
Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2006. Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public. University 
of Chicago Press. 
Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2001. “The President’s Legislative Influence from Public Appeals.” 
American Journal of Political Science 45(2): 313-329.  
Canon, Bradley C., and Charles A. Johnson. 1999. Judicial Policies: Implementation and 
Impact, 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
Caplan, Lincoln. 1988. The Tenth Justice: The Solicitor General and the Rule of Law. New 
York: Vintage Press. 
Cardozo, Benjamin N. 1921. The Nature of the Judicial Process. Yale University Press. 
Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1980. “The Two Faces of Issue Voting.” American 
Political Science Review 74(1): 78-91.  
Carpenter, Dick M., and John K. Ross. 2009. “Testing O’Connor and Thomas: Does the Use of 
Eminent Domain Target Poor and Minority Communities?” Urban Studies 46(11): 2447-
2461.  
Casillas, Christopher, Peter K. Enns, and Patrick C. Wohlfarth. 2011. “How Public Opinion 
Constrains the U.S. Supreme Court.” American Journal of Political Science 55(1): 74-88. 
Casper, Jonathan D. 1976. “The Supreme Court and National Policy Making.” American 
Political Science Review 70(1): 50-63.  
258 
 
Chemerinsky, Erwin. 2011. The Conservative Assault on the Constitution. New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
Chong, Dennis, and James N. Druckman. 2007. “Framing Theory.” Annual Review of Political 
Science 10: 103-126. 
Christenson, Dino P., and David M. Glick. 2015. “Issue-Specific Opinion Change: The Supreme 
Court and Health Care Reform.” Public Opinion Quarterly 79(4): 881-905. 
Christiansen, Matthew R., and William N. Eskridge, Jr. 2014. “Congressional Overrides of 
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011.” Texas Law Review 92: 
1317-1541.  
Clark, John A., and Kevin T. McGuire. 1996. “Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Flag.” 
Political Research Quarterly 49(4): 771-781. 
Clark, Tom S. 2009. “The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy.” 
American Journal of Political Science 53(4): 971-989. 
Clark, Tom S., Jeffrey R. Lax, and Douglas Rice. 2015. “Measuring the Political Salience of 
Supreme Court Cases.” Journal of Law and Courts 3(1): 37-65. 
Cohen, Jeffrey E. 1995. “Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda.”  American Journal of 
Political Science 39(1): 87-107. 
Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2008. The Party Decides: Presidential 
Nominations Before and After Reform. University of Chicago Press.  
Collins, Paul M. 2011. “Cognitive Dissonance on the U.S. Supreme Court.” Political Research 
Quarterly 64(2): 362-376. 
Collins, Paul M., Jr. 2008. Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision 
Making. Oxford University Press. 
259 
 
Collins, Paul M. Jr. 2004. “Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation.” Law and Society Review 38(4): 807-832. 
Collins, Paul M. Jr., and Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha. 2014. “Targeting the Court with Presidential 
Appeals.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association. Washington, D.C.  
Collins, Todd A., and Christopher A. Cooper. 2012. “Case Salience and Media Coverage of 
Supreme Court Decisions: Toward a New Measure.” Political Research Quarterly 65(2): 
396-407. 
Conger, Kimberly H. 2010. “Party Platforms and Party Coalitions: The Christian Right and 
State-Level Republicans.” Party Politics 16(5): 651-668. 
Cortner, Hanna J. 1976. “Case Analysis of Policy Implementation: The National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969.” Natural Resources Journal 16: 323-338. 
Coveney, Joseph. 2015. “FIRTHLOGIT: Stata Module to Calculate Bias Reduction in Logistic 
Regression.” Statistical Software Components.  
Crowe, Justin. 2012. Building the Judiciary: Law, Courts, and the Politics of Institutional 
Development. Princeton University Press. 
Dahl, Robert A. 1957a. “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy-Maker.” Journal of Public Law 6: 279-295. 
Dahl, Robert A. 1957b. “The Concept of Power.” Behavioral Sciences 2(3): 201-215. 
Doherty, Brian. 2009. Gun Control on Trial: Inside the Supreme Court Battle Over the Second 
Amendment. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute Press.   
Druckman, James N. and Lawrence R. Jacobs. 2015. Who Governs? Presidents, Public Opinion, 
and Manipulation. University of Chicago Press.  
260 
 
Druckman, James N. and Justin W. Holmes. 2004. “Does Presidential Rhetoric Matter? Priming 
and Presidential Approval.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34(4): 755-778. 
Easton, David. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley.  
Edwards, George C. III, and Andrew Barrett. 2000. “Presidential Agenda-Setting in Congress.” 
In Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era (Jon R. Bond and 
Richard Fleischer, eds.). Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
Edwards, George C. III, and B. Dan Wood. 1999. “Who Influences Whom? The President, 
Congress, and the Media.” American Political Science Review 93(2): 327-344.  
Edwards, Lee. 2002. The Conservative Revolution: The Movement that Remade America. New 
York: The Free Press. 
Eggen, Dan. 2010. “Poll: Large majority opposes Supreme Court’s decision on campaign 
financing.” Washington Post, February 17, 2010. Accessed online at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html 
Engel, Stephen M. 2013. “Frame Spillover: Media Framing and Public Opinion of a Multifaceted 
LGBT Rights Agenda.” Law & Social Inquiry 38(2): 403-441. 
Engel, Stephen M. 2011. American Politicians Confront the Court: Opposition Politics and 
Changing Responses to Judicial Power. Cambridge University Press. 
Enns, Peter K. 2016. Incarceration Nation: How the United States Became the Most Punitive 
Democracy in the World. Cambridge University Press. 
Enns, Peter K., Nathan J. Kelly, Takaaki Masaki, and Patrick C. Wohlfarth. 2016. “Don’t 
Jettison the General Error Correction Model Just Yet: A Practical Guide to Avoiding 
Spurious Regression with the GECM.” Research and Politics 3(2): 1-16.  
Enns, Peter K., and Patrick C. Wohlfarth. 2013. “The Swing Justice.” Journal of Politics 75(4): 
1089-1107.  
261 
 
Epps, Garrett. 1998. “To An Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Division v. 
Smith.” Arizona State Law Journal 30(4): 953-1021. 
Epstein, Lee, and Andrew D. Martin. 2010. “Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? 
Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why). University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Constitutional Law 13(2): 263-281. 
Epstein, Lee, and Jack Knight. 1999. “Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The Informational 
Role of Amici Curiae.” In Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist 
Approaches (Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman, eds.). University of Chicago 
Press. 
Epstein, Lee, and Jeffrey A. Segal. 2005. Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial 
Appointments. Oxford University Press. 
Epstein, Lee, and Jeffrey A. Segal. 2000. “Measuring Legal Salience.” American Journal of 
Political Science 44(1): 66-83. 
Epstein, Lee, and Joseph F. Kobylka. 1992. The Supreme Court and Legal Change: Abortion 
and the Death Penalty. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 
Epstein, Richard A. 2011. “Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right that Big 
Corporations Should Have but Do Not Want.” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 
34(2): 639-661. 
Eshbaugh-Soha, Matthew. 2005. “The Politics of Presidential Agendas.” Political Research 
Quarterly 58(2): 257-268.  
Eshbaugh-Soha, Matthew, and Jeffrey S. Peake. 2004. “Presidential Influence Over the Systemic 
Agenda.” Congress & the Presidency 31(2): 161-181. 
262 
 
Eshbaugh-Soha, Matthew, and Paul M. Collins, Jr. 2015. “Presidential Rhetoric and Supreme 
Court Decisions.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 45(4): 633-652.  
Eskridge, William N. Jr. 1991. “Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions.” 
Yale Law Journal 101: 331-455. 
Feeley, Malcolm, and Edward Rubin. 1998. Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How 
the Courts Reformed America’s Prisons. Cambridge University Press. 
Ferejohn, John, and Charles Shipan. 1990. “Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy.” Journal 
of Law, Economics, and Organization 6: 1-20. 
Fine, Terri Susan. 2003. “Party Platforms as Tools of Presidential Agenda Setting.” White House 
Studies 3(2): 199-213. 
Fine, Terri Susan. 1994. “Lobbying from Within: Government Elites and the Framing of the 
1988 Democratic and Republican Party Platforms.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 24(4): 
855-863. 
Firth, David. 1993. “Bias Reduction of Maximum Likelihood Estimates.” Biometrika 80(1): 27-
38. 
Fisher, Louis. 1988. Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process. Princeton 
University Press.  
Flemming, Roy B., B. Dan Wood, and John Bohte. 1999. “Attention to Issues in a System of 
Separated Powers: The Macrodynamics of American Policy Agendas.” Journal of 
Politics 61(1): 76-108. 
Flemming, Roy B., John Bohte, and B. Dan Wood. 1997. “One Voice Among Many: The 
Supreme Court’s Influence on Attentiveness to Issues in the United States, 1947-1992. 
American Journal of Political Science 41(4): 1224-1250. 
263 
 
Fontana, David, and Donald Braman. 2012. “Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash? Evidence from 
a National Experiment.” Columbia Law Review 112(4): 731-799. 
Franklin, Charles H., and Liane C. Kosaki. 1989. “Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme 
Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion.” American Political Science Review 83(3): 751-
771. 
Friedman, Barry. 2009. The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme 
Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.  
Froio, Caterina, Shaun Bevan, and Will Jennings. 2016. “Party Mandates and the Politics of 
Attention: Party Platforms, Public Priorities and the Policy Agenda in Britain.” Party 
Politics DOI: 10.1177/1354068815625228 
Frymer, Paul. 2003. “Acting When Elected Officials Won’t: Federal Courts and Civil Rights 
Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions, 1935-1985.” The American Political Science Review 
97(3): 483-499. 
Garrow, David J. 1999. “Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical Perspective.” 
Albany Law Review 62(3): 833-852. 
Gaventa, John. 1982. Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in the Appalachian 
Valley. University of Illinois Press.  
Gibson, James L., Gregory A. Caldeira, and Lester Kenyatta Spence. 2003. “The Supreme Court 
and the U.S. Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?” British 
Journal of Political Science 33(4): 535-556. 
Gibson, James L., Gregory A. Caldeira, and Vanessa A. Baird. 1998. “On the Legitimacy of 
National High Courts.” American Political Science Review 92(2): 343-358. 
264 
 
Gibson, James L., and Michael J. Nelson. 2014. “The Legitimacy of the US Supreme Court: 
Conventional Wisdoms and Recent Challenges Thereto.” Annual Review of Law and 
Social Science 10: 201-219. 
Gibson, James L., Milton Lodge, and Benjamin Woodson. 2014. “Losing, but Accepting: 
Legitimacy, Positivity Theory, and the Symbols of Judicial Authority.” Law & Society 
Review 48(4): 837-866.  
Giles, Michael W., Bethany Blackstone, and Richard L. Vining. 2008. “The Supreme Court in 
American Democracy: Unraveling the Linkages between Public Opinion and Judicial 
Decision Making.” Journal of Politics 70(2): 293-306. 
Gillman, Howard. 2002. “How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: 
Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891.” American Political Science Review 
96(3): 511-524. 
Gillman, Howard. 1992. The Constitution Besieged: The Rise & Demise of Lochner Era Police 
Powers Jurisprudence. Duke University Press.  
Ginsburg, Ruth Bader. 1985. “Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. 
Wade.” North Carolina Law Review 63: 375-386. 
Glick, David. 2009. “Conditional Strategic Retreat: The Court’s Concession in the 1935 Gold 
Clause Cases.” Journal of Politics 71(3): 800-816. 
Goldman, Jerry. 2005. “The Canon of Constitutional Law Revisited.” Law and Politics Book 
Review 15(8): 648-656. 
Gould, Jon B. 2005. Speak No Evil: The Triumph of Hate Speech Regulation. University of 
Chicago Press. 
265 
 
Gould, Jon B., and Scott Barclay. 2012. “Mind the Gap: The Place of Gap Studies in Sociolegal 
Scholarship.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 8: 323-335.  
Graber, Doris A. 2010. Mass Media and American Politics (8th edition). Washington, D.C.: CQ 
Press. 
Graber, Mark A. 1993. “The Non-Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the 
Judiciary.” Studies in American Political Development 7: 35–73. 
Greenhouse, Linda. 1996. “Telling the Court’s Story: Justice and Journalism at the Supreme 
Court.” Yale Law Journal 105(6): 1537-1561. 
Greenhouse, Linda, and Reva B. Siegel. 2011. “Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions 
About Backlash.” The Yale Law Journal 120: 2028-2087. 
Grossmann, Matt. 2014. Artists of the Possible: Governing Networks and American Policy 
Change Since 1945. Oxford University Press.  
Grossmann, Matt. 2013. “The Variable Politics of the Policy Process: Issue-Area Differences 
and Comparative Networks.” Journal of Politics 75(1): 65-79. 
Grossmann, Matt, and Brendon Swedlow. 2015. “Judicial Contributions to US National Policy 
Change since 1945.” Journal of Law and Courts 3(1): 1-35. 
Guttmacher Report on Public Policy, The. 2001. “Anthrax Threats, Continued Violence Promp 
Renewed Attention to Clinic, Client Protection.” (December 2001). Accessed via 
webarchive:  https://web.archive.org/web/20041218035202/ 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/04/6/gr040613.pdf 
Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson. 2014. “After the ‘Master Theory’: Downs, Schattschneider, 
and the Rebirth of Policy-Focused Analysis.” Perspectives on Politics 12 (Sept.): 643-62. 
266 
 
Hall, Matthew E.K. 2016. “Judicial Review as a Limit on Government Domination: Reframing, 
Resolving, and Replacing the (Counter)Majoritarian Difficulty.” Perspectives on Politics 
14(2): 391-409. 
Hall, Matthew E.K. 2015. “Testing Judicial Power: The Influence of the U.S. Supreme Court on 
Federal Incarceration.” American Politics Research 43(1): 83-108. 
Hall, Matthew E.K. 2014. “The Semiconstrained Court: Public Opinion, the Separation of 
Powers, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Fear of Nonimplementation.” American Journal 
of Political Science 58(2): 352-366.  
Hall, Matthew E.K. 2011. The Nature of Supreme Court Power. Cambridge University Press. 
Hall, Matthew E.K., and Jason H. Windett. 2015. “Understanding Judicial Power: Divided 
Government, Institutional Thickness, and High-Court Influence on State Incarceration.” 
Journal of Law & Courts 3(1): 167-191.  
Hall, Matthew E.K., and Joseph Daniel Ura. 2015. “Judicial Majoritarianism.” Journal of 
Politics 77(3): 818-832. 
Hall, Matthew E.K. and Ryan C. Black. 2013. “Keeping the Outliers in Line? Judicial Review of 
State Laws by the U.S. Supreme Court.” Social Science Quarterly 94(2): 395-409. 
Hanley, John, Michael Salamone, and Matthew Wright. 2012. “Reviving the Schoolmaster: 
Reevaluating Public Opinion in the Wake of Roe v. Wade” Political Research Quarterly 
65(2): 408-421.  
Hansford, Thomas G. 2004. “Information Provision, Organizational Constraints, and the 
Decision to Submit an Amicus Curiae Brief in a U.S. Supreme Court Case.” Political 
Research Quarterly 57(2): 219-230. 
267 
 
Hanson, Roger A. and Robert E. Crew, Jr. 1973. “The Policy Impact of Reapportionment.” Law 
& Society Review 8(1): 69-94. 
Harvey, Anna, and Barry Friedman. 2009. “Ducking Trouble: Congressionally Induced Selection 
Bias in the Supreme Court’s Agenda.” Journal of Politics 71(2): 574-592. 
Harvey, Anna, and Barry Friedman. 2006. “Pulling Punches: Congressional Constraints on the 
Supreme Court’s Constitutional Rulings, 1987-2000.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 
31(4): 533-562.  
Hatcher, Laura J. 2002. “Green Metaphors: Language, Land, and Law in Takings Debates.” In 
Law and Geography: Current Legal Issues, Volume 5 (Jane Holder and Carolyn 
Harrison, eds.). Oxford University Press.  
Heinze, Georg, and Michael Schemper. 2002. “A Solution to the Problem of Separation in 
Logistic Regression.” Statistics in Medicine 21(16): 2409-2419. 
Hettinger, Virginia A., and Christopher Zorn. 2005. “Explaining the Incidence and Timing of 
Congressional Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 
30(1): 5-28. 
Hill, Kim Quaile. 1998. “The Policy Agendas of the President and Mass Public: A Research 
Validation and Extension.” American Journal of Political Science 42(4): 1328-1334. 
Hofferbert, Richard I., and Ian Budge. 1992. “The Party Mandate and the Westminster Model: 
Election Programmes and Government Spending in Britain, 1948-85.” British Journal of 
Political Science 22(2): 151-182.  
Holmes, Lisa M. 2008. “Why ‘Go Public’? Presidential Use of Nominees to the US Courts of 
Appeals.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 38(1): 110-122.  
268 
 
Holmes, Lisa M. 2007. “Presidential Strategy in the Judicial Appointment Process: ‘Going 
Public’ in Support of Nominees to the US Courts of Appeals.” American Politics 
Research 35(5): 567-594.  
Horowitz, Donald L. 1977. The Courts and Social Policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
Horvit, Beverly, Adam J. Schiffer, and Mark Wright. 2008. “The Limits of Presidential Agenda 
Setting: Predicting Newspaper Coverage of the Weekly Radio Address.” The 
International Journal of Press/Politics 13(1): 8-28. 
Howard, Robert M. and Amy Steigerwalt. 2012. Judging Law and Policy. Routledge Press.  
Ignagni, Joseph, and James Meernik. 1994. “Explaining Congressional Attempts to Reverse 
Supreme Court Decisions.” Political Research Quarterly 47(2): 353-371. 
Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald R. Kinder. 2010. News that Matters: Television and American 
Opinion, updated edition. University of Chicago Press. 
Jaros, Dean, and Robert Roper. 1980. “The U.S. Supreme Court: Myth, Diffuse Support, 
Specific Support, and Legitimacy.” American Politics Quarterly 8(1): 85-105. 
Jeffreys, Harold. 1946. “An Invariant Form for the Prior Probability in Estimation Problems.” 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering 
Sciences 186(1007): 453-461.  
Johnson, Timothy R. 2003. “The Supreme Court, the Solicitor General, and the Separation of 
Powers.” American Politics Research 31(4): 426-451. 
Johnson, Timothy R. and Jason M. Roberts. 2004. “Presidential Capital and the Supreme Court 
Confirmation Process.” Journal of Politics 66(3): 663-683. 
269 
 
Johnson, Tyler, and Erica Socker. 2012. “Actions, Factions, and Interactions: Newsworthy 
Influences on Supreme Court Coverage.” Social Science Quarterly 93(2): 434-463. 
Johnston, Christopher D., and Julie Wronski. 2015. “Personality Dispositions and Political 
Preferences Across Hard and Easy Issues.” Political Psychology 36(1): 35-53.  
Jones, Bryan D., and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2005. The Politics of Attention: How Government 
Prioritizes Problems. University of Chicago Press. 
Jones, Bryan D., and Michelle Wolfe. 2010. “Public Policy and the Mass Media: An Information 
Processing Approach.” In Public Policy and the Media: The Interplay of Mass 
Communication and Political Decisionmaking (Koch-Baumgarten and Voltmer, eds.). 
New York: Routledge. 
Keck, Thomas M. 2014. Judicial Politics in Polarized Times. University of Chicago Press. 
Keck, Thomas M. 2009. “Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on 
LGBT Rights.” Law & Society Review 43(1): 151-185. 
Keck, Thomas M. 2007. “Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate 
Federal Statutes?” American Political Science Review 101(2): 321-338. 
Keck, Thomas M. 2004a. The Most Activist Court in History: The Road to Modern Judicial 
Conservatism. University of Chicago Press. 
Keck, Thomas M. 2004b. “Does the Court Follow the Election Returns?” Reviews in American 
History 32: 602-604.  
Keck, Thomas M., and Kevin J. McMahon. 2016. “Why Roe Still Stands: Abortion Law, the 
Supreme Court, and the Republic Regime.” Studies in Law, Politics, and Society 70: 33-
83. 
270 
 
Keck, Thomas M., and Logan Strother. 2016. “Judicial Impact.” In Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia of Politics (William R. Thompson, ed.). DOI: 
10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.103 
Keith, Linda Camp. 2008. The U.S. Supreme Court and the Judicial Review of Congress: Two 
Hundred Years in the Exercise of the Court’s Most Potent Power. New York: Peter Lang 
Publishing, Inc.  
Kelly, Amita. 2016. “McConnell: Blocking Supreme Court Nomination ‘About a Principle, Not 
A Person.’” NPR Politics, March 16, 2016, online. Accessed at: 
http://www.npr.org/2016/03/16/470664561/mcconnell-blocking-supreme-court-
nomination-about-a-principle-not-a-person 
Kelly, Erin, and Frank Dobbin. 1999. “Civil Rights Law at Work: Sex Discrimination and the 
Rise of Maternity Leave Policies.” American Journal of Sociology 105(2): 455-492.  
Kernell, Samuel. 1997. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, 3rd ed. 
Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.  
Ketcham, Ralph, ed. 1986. The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention 
Debates. New York: Signet Classics. 
Ketcham, Ralph. 1984. Presidents Above Party: The First American Presidency, 1789-1829. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.  
King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. 2001. “Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data.” Political 
Analysis 9(2): 137-163.  
King, Gary, Michael Laver, Richard I. Hofferbert, Ian Budge, and Michael D. McDonald. “Party 
Platforms, Mandates, and Government Spending.” American Political Science Review 
87(3): 744-750. 
271 
 
King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Langche Zeng. 2003. “ReLogit: Rare Events Logistic 
Regression.” Stata version accessed at http://j.mp/o0qWkS 
Kingdon, John W. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. London: Scott, Foresman, 
and Co. 
Klarman, Michael J. 2012. From the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash, and the Struggle for 
Same-Sex Marriage. Oxford University Press. 
Klarman, Michael J. 2004. From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle 
for Racial Equality. Oxford University Press. 
Klarman, Michael J. 1994. “How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis.” The 
Journal of American History 81(1): 81-118. 
Lax, Jeffrey R. 2003. “Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy: Discretion, 
Reputation and the Rule of Four.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 15(1): 61-86.  
Lemieux, Scott E., and David J. Watkins. 2009. “Beyond the ‘Countermajoritarian Difficulty’: 
Lessons from Contemporary Democratic Theory.” Polity 41(1): 30-62. 
Levitt, Justin. 2010. “Confronting the Impact of Citizens United.” Yale Law & Policy Review 
29(1): 217-234. 
Light, Paul. 1999. The President’s Agenda, 3rd ed. Baltimore: Johns-Hopkins University Press. 
Lindquist, Stefanie A., and Rorie Spill Solberg. 2007. “Judicial Review by the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts: Explaining Justices’ Responses to Constitutional Challenges.” 
Political Research Quarterly 60(1): 71-90. 
Linos, Katerina, and Kimberly Twist. 2016. “The Supreme Court, the Media, and Public 
Opinion: Comparing Experimental and Observational Methods.” Journal of Legal Studies 
45(2): 223-254. 
272 
 
Llewellyn, Karl. 1931. “Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound.” Harvard 
Law Review 44(8): 1222-1264.  
Lovett, John, Shaun Bevan, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2015. “Popular Presidents Can Affect 
Congressional Attention, for a Little While.” Policy Studies Journal 43(1): 22-43. 
Lowi, Theodore J. 1986. The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press. 
Lukes, Steven. 1974. Power: A Radical View. London: Macmillan. 
Lund, Christopher C. 2010. “Religious Liberty after Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs.” South 
Dakota Law Review 55: 466-497. 
Maisel, L. Sandy. 1999. Parties and Elections in American: The Electoral Process, 3rd ed. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.  
Maisel, L. Sandy. 1993. “The Platform-Writing Process: Candidate-Centered Platforms in 1992.” 
Political Science Quarterly 108(4): 671-698. 
Maltese, John Anthony. 1995. “Speaking Out: The Role of Presidential Rhetoric in the Modern 
Supreme Court Confirmation Process.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 25(3): 447-455.  
Maltzman Forrest, James F. Spriggs, and Paul J. Wahlbeck. 2000. Crafting Law on the Supreme 
Court: The Collegial Game. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Mangrum, R. Collin. 1998. “State Aid to Students in Religiously Affiliated Schools: Agostini v. 
Felton.” Creighton Law Review 31: 1155-1208. 
March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1976. Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations. Bergen, 
NO: Universitetsforlaget.  
273 
 
Marshall, Bryan W., Brett W. Curry, and Richard L. Pacelle, Jr. 2014. “Preserving Institutional 
Power: The Supreme Court and Strategic Decision Making in the Separation of Powers.” 
Politics & Policy 42(1): 37-76.  
Marshall, Thomas R. 2009. Public Opinion and the Rehnquist Court. State University of New 
York Press. 
Marshall, Thomas R. 1989. Public Opinion and the Supreme Court. Boston: Unwin-Hyman. 
Martens, Allison M. 2007. “Reconsidering Judicial Supremacy: From the Counter-Majoritarian 
Difficulty to Constitutional Transformations.” Perspectives on Politics 5(3): 447-459. 
Martin, Andrew D., and Kevin M. Quinn. 2002. “Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo for the US Supreme Court, 1953-1999.” Political Analysis 10(2): 
134-153.  
Mathewson, Joe. 2011. The Supreme Court and the Press: The Indispensable Conflict. Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Matland, Richard E. 1995. “Synthesizing the Implementation Literature: The Ambiguity-Conflict 
Model of Policy Implementation.” Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory: J-PART. 5(2): 145-174.  
May, Peter J., and Soren C. Winter. 2009. “Politicians, Managers, and Street-Level Bureaucrats: 
Influences on Policy Implementation.” Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 19(3): 453-476. 
Mayhew, David R. 2004. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 
1946—002, 2nd ed. Yale University Press.  
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. Yale University Press. 
274 
 
Mazmanian, Daniel, and Paul A. Sabatier. 1983. Implementation and Public Policy. Glenview, 
IL: Scott, Foresman, & Co. 
McCann, Michael W. 1999.  “How the Supreme Court Matters in American Politics: New 
Institutionalist Perspectives” in The Supreme Court in American Politics: New 
Institutionalist Approaches, (Howard Gillman and Cornell Clayton, eds.). University 
Press of Kansas. Pp. 63-97. 
McCann, Michael W. 1996. “Causal versus Constitutive Explanations (or, On the Difficulty of 
Being so Positive...) Law & Social Inquiry 21(2): 457-482. 
McCann, Michael W. 1994. Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal 
Mobilization. University of Chicago Press. 
McCann, Michael W. 1992. “Reform Litigation on Trial.” Law & Social Inquiry 17(4): 715-743. 
McCann, Michael W., and Tracey March. 1996. “Law and Everyday Forms of Resistance: A 
Socio-Political Assessment.” Studies in Law, Politics and Society 15: 207-236. 
McCloskey, Robert G. 1994. The American Supreme Court, 2nd ed. University of Chicago Press. 
McCombs, Maxwell. 2014. Setting the Agenda: Mass Media and Public Opinion, 2nd ed. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
McCombs, Maxwell. 2005. “A Look at Agenda-Setting: Past, Present and Future.” Journalism 
Studies 6(4): 543-557. 
McCombs, Maxwell E., and Donald L. Shaw. 1972. “The Agenda-Setting Function of the Mass 
Media.” Public Opinion Quarterly 36(2): 176-187. 
McCubbins, Matthew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. “Structure and Process, 
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies.” 
Virginia Law Review 75(1): 431-482. 
275 
 
McGuire, Kevin T. 1994. “Amici Curiae and Strategies for Gaining Access to the Supreme 
Court.” Political Research Quarterly 47(4): 821-837. 
McGuire, Kevin T., and Barbara Palmer. 1996. “Issues, Agendas, and Decision Making on the 
Supreme Court.” American Political Science Review 90(4): 853-865. 
McGuire, Kevin T., and James A. Stimson. 2004. “The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New 
Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences.” Journal of Politics 
66(4): 1018-1035. 
Meernik, James, and Joseph Ignagni. 1997. “Judicial Review and Coordinate Construction of the 
Constitution.” American Journal of Political Science 41(2): 447-467. 
Meinhold, Stephen S. and Steven A. Shull. 1998. “Policy Congruence between the President and 
the Solicitor General.” Political Research Quarterly 51(2): 527-537. 
Melnick, Shep R. 1994. Between the Lines: Interpreting Welfare Rights. Brookings Press.  
Mishler, William, and Reginald S. Sheehan. 1996. “Public Opinion, The Attitudinal Model, and 
Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective.” Journal of Politics 
59(4): 1114-1142. 
Mishler, William, and Reginald S. Sheehan. 1993. “The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian 
Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions.” American 
Political Science Review 87(1): 87-101. 
Moe, Terry. 1985. “The Politicized Presidency.” In New Directions in American Politics (John 
E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds.). Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Mondak, Jeffery J. 1994. “Policy Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: The Sources and Contexts 
of Legitimation.” Political Research Quarterly 47(3): 675-692. 
276 
 
Mondak, Jeffery J. 1992. “Institutional Legitimacy, Policy Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court.” 
American Politics Quarterly 20(4): 457-477. 
Monroe, Alan D. 1983. “American Party Platforms and Public Opinion.” American Journal of 
Political Science 27(1): 27-42.  
Morton, Linda P. 1986. “How Newspapers Choose the Releases They Use.” Public Relations 
Review 12(1): 22-27. 
Murphy, Walter F., and Joseph Tanenhaus. 1968. “Public Opinion and the United States 
Supreme Court: Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of Regime 
Changes.” Law & Society Review 2(3): 357-384. 
Nagel, Jack. 1975. The Descriptive Analysis of Power. Yale University Press. 
National Abortion Federation. 2014. “Legal Remedies to Address Clinic Violence and 
Harassment: A Handbook for NAF Members.” 
https://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/Legal_Remedies.pdf 
Nemacheck, Christine L. 2007. Strategic Selection: Presidential Nomination of Supreme Court 
Justices from Herbert Hoover Through George W. Bush. Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press. 
Niebuhr, Gustav. 1993. “Disparate Groups Unite Behind Civil Rights Bill on Religious 
Freedom.” The Washington Post, Oct. 16, 1993, pA7.  
O’Brien, David M. 2005. Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics, 7th ed. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co.  
O’Brien, Kevin J. 1996. “Rightful Resistance.” World Politics 49(1): 31-55. 
Owens, Ryan J. 2011. “An Alternative Perspective on Supreme Court Agenda Setting in a 
System of Shared Powers.” Justice System Journal 32(2): 183-204. 
277 
 
Owens, Ryan J. 2010. “The Separation of Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting.” 
American Journal of Political Science 54(2): 412-427. 
Pacelle, Richard L., Jr. 2015. The Supreme Court in a Separation of Powers System: The 
Nation’s Balance Wheel. New York: Routledge.  
Pacelle, Richard L. 2006. “Amicus Curiae or Amicus Presidentis? Reexamining the Role of the 
Solicitor General in Filing Amici.” Judicature 89(6): 317-325. 
Pacelle, Richard L. 2003. Between Law and Politics: The Solicitor General and the Structuring 
of Race, Gender, and Reproductive Rights Litigation. College Station, TX: Texas A&M 
University Press.  
Pacelle, Richard L., Jr., Bryan W. Marshall, and Brett W. Curry. 2007. “Keepers of Covenants or 
Platonic Guardians? Decision Making on the U.S. Supreme Court.” American Politics 
Research 35(5): 694-725.  
Patric, Gordon. 1957. “The Impact of a Court Decision: Aftermath of the McCollum Case.” 
Journal of Public Law 6: 455. 
Peabody, Bruce (ed.). 2011. The Politics of Judicial Independence: Courts, Politics, and the 
Public. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Peake, Jeffrey S. 2001. “Presidential Agenda Setting in Foreign Policy.” Political Research 
Quarterly 54(1): 69-86. 
Peake, Jeffrey S., and Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha. 2008. “The Agenda-Setting Impact of Major 
Presidential TV Addresses.” Political Communication 25(1): 113-137. 
Perry, H.W., Jr. 1991. Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court. 
Harvard University Press. 
278 
 
Petrocik, John R. 1996. “Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study.” 
American Journal of Political Science 40(3): 825-850. 
Pickerill, J. Mitchell. 2004. Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The Impact of Judicial 
Review in a Separated System. Duke University Press. 
Pomper, Gerald M. 1967. “‘If Elected, I Promise’: American Party Platforms.” Midwest Journal 
of Political Science 11(1): 318-352.  
Pomper, Gerald M., and Susan S. Lederman. 1980. Elections in America: Control and Influence 
in Democratic Politics, 2nd ed. New York: Longman.  
Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll 
Call Voting. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Pound, Cuthbert W. 1922. “The Judicial Power.” Harvard Law Review 35(7) 787-796. 
Pound, Roscoe. 1908. “Mechanical Jurisprudence.” Columbia Law Review 8(8): 605-623. 
Powe, Lucas A., Jr. 2009. The Supreme Court and the American Elite, 1789-2008. Harvard 
University Press. 
Pralle, Sarah B. 2006. “Timing and Sequence in Agenda-Setting and Policy Change: A 
Comparative Study of Lawn Care Pesticide Politics in Canada and the U.S.” Journal of 
European Public Policy 13(7): 987-1005. 
Pressman, Jeffrey, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1973. Implementation. University of California Press. 
Primo, David M. 2002. “Public Opinion and Campaign Finance.” The Independent Review 7(2): 
207-219. 
Prior, Markus. 2007. Post-Broadcast Democracy: How Media Choice Increases Inequality in 
Political Involvement and Polarizes Elections. Cambridge University Press. 
279 
 
Pritchard, David. 1992. “The News Media Agenda and Public Policy Agenda.” In Public 
Opinion, The Press, and Public Policy (J. David Kennamer, ed.). Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Raskin, Jamin B., and Clark L. LeBlanc. 2001. “Disfavored Speech About Favored Rights: Hill 
v. Colorado, The Vanishing Public Forum and the Need for an Objective Speech 
Discrimination Test.” American University Law Review 51(2): 179-228. 
Richardson, James T. 1995. “Legal Status of Minority Religions in the United States.” Social 
Compass 42: 249.  
Rochefort, David A. and Roger W. Cobb (eds.). 1994. The Politics of Problem Definition: 
Shaping the Policy Agenda. University Press of Kansas. 
Rosenberg, Gerald N. 2008. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 2nd ed. 
University of Chicago Press. 
Rosenberg, Gerald N. 1996. “Positivism, Interpretivism, and the Study of Law.” Law & Social 
Inquiry 21(2): 435-455.  
Rosenberg, Gerald N. 1992. “Hollow Hopes and Other Aspirations: A Reply to Feeley and 
McCann.” Law & Social Inquiry 17(4): 761-778. 
Rosenberg, Gerald N. 1991. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 
University of Chicago Press. 
Ross, Mary Massaron, and Kristen Tolan. 2006. “Legislative Responses to Kelo v. City of New 
London and Subsequent Court Decisions—One Year Later.” Journal of Affordable 
Housing & Community Development Law 16(1): 52-85. 
Ross, William G. 2012. “The Supreme Court as an Issue in Presidential Campaigns.” Journal of 
Supreme Court History 37(3): 322-334.  
Rossiter, Clinton, ed. 2003. The Federalist Papers. New York: Signet Classics. 
280 
 
Rutledge, Paul E., and Heather A. Larsen Price. 2014. “The President as Agenda Setter-in-Chief: 
The Dynamics of Congressional and Presidential Agenda Setting.” Policy Studies 
Journal 42(3): 443-464. 
Saad, Lydia. 2013. “Half in U.S. Support Publicly Financed Federal Campaigns.” Gallup News 
Service, June 24, 2013. http://www.gallup.com/poll/163208/half-support-publicly-
financed-federal-campaigns.aspx 
Saad, Lydia. 2006. “Americans Dubious Congress Can Curb Corruption.” Gallup News Service, 
May 8, 2006. http://www.gallup.com/poll/22699/Americans-Dubious-Congress-Can-
Curb-Corruption.aspx 
Sabatier, Paul A. 1988. “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of 
Policy-Oriented Learning Therein.” Policy Sciences 21(2/3): 129-168. 
Salokar, Rebecca Mae. 1992. The Solicitor General: The Politics of Law. Philadelphia, PA: 
Temple University Press. 
Sarat, Austin. 1985. “Legal Effectiveness and Social Studies of Law: On the Unfortunate 
Persistence of a Research Tradition.” Legal Studies Forum IX(1): 23-31. 
Schattschneider, E.E. 1975 [1960]. The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in 
America (2nd ed.). London: Wadsworth.  
Schattschneider, E.E. 1942. Party Government. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.  
Scheingold, Stuart A. 1974. The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political 
Change. Yale University Press. 
Seeburger, Richard H., and R. Stanton Wettick, Jr. 1973. “Miranda in Pittsburgh—A Statistical 
Study.” In The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions (Theodore L. Becker and Malcolm M. 
Feeley, eds.). Oxford University Press.  
281 
 
Segal, Jeffrey A. 1997. “Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and 
Courts.” American Political Science Review 91(1): 28-44. 
Segal, Jeffrey A. 1990. “Supreme Court Support for the Solicitor General: The Effect of 
Presidential Appointments.” The Western Political Quarterly 43(1): 137-152. 
Segal, Jeffrey A. 1988. “Amicus Curiae Briefs by the Solicitor General during the Warren and 
Burger Courts: A Research Note.” The Western Political Quarterly 41(1): 135-144. 
Segal, Jeffrey A., and Albert D. Cover. 1989. “Ideological Values and the Votes of US Supreme 
Court Justices.” American Political Science Review 83(2): 557-565.  
Segal, Jeffrey A., and Chad Westerland. 2005. “The Supreme Court, Congress, and Judicial 
Review.” North Carolina Law Review 83(5): 1323-1352.  
Segal, Jeffrey A., Chad Westerland, and Stefanie A. Lindquist. 2011. “Congress, the Supreme 
Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model.” 
American Journal of Political Science 55(1): 89-104.  
Segal, Jeffrey A., and Harold J. Spaeth. 2002. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 
Revisited. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Sigal, Leon. 1973. Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking. 
Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.  
Sill, Kaitlyn L., Emily T. Metzgar, and Stella M. Rouse. 2013. “Media Coverage of the U.S. 
Supreme Court: How Do Journalists Assess the Importance of Court Decisions.” Political 
Communication 30(1): 58-80. 
Silverstein, Gordon. 2009. Law’s Allure: How Law Shapes, Constrains, Saves, and Kills Politics. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Silverstein, Helena. 2007. Girls on the Stand: How Courts Fail Pregnant Minors. NYU Press. 
282 
 
Sisk, Gregory C., and Michael Heise. 2012. “Ideology ‘All the Way Down’? An Empirical Study 
of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts.” Michigan Law Review 110: 
1201-1261. 
Slotnick, Elliot E., and Jeffrey A. Segal. 1998. Television News and the Supreme Court: All the 
News that’s Fit to Air? Cambridge University Press. 
Soloski, John. 1989. “Sources and Channels of Local News.” Journalism Quarterly 66(4): 864-
870. 
Somin, Ilya. 2015. The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent 
Domain. University of Chicago Press. 
Somin, Ilya. 2009. “The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo.” 
Minnesota Law Review 93: 1200-1278. 
Songer, Donald R., Jeffrey A. Segal, and Charles M. Cameron. 1994. “The Hierarchy of Justice: 
Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions.” 
American Journal of Political Science 38(3): 673-696. 
Staszak, Sarah. 2015. No Day in Court: Access to Justice and the Politics of Judicial 
Retrenchment. Oxford University Press.  
Stephenson, Donald Grier. 1999. Campaigns & The Court: The U.S. Supreme Court in 
Presidential Elections. Columbia University Press.  
Stimson, James A. 1999. “Party Government and Responsiveness.” In Democracy, 
Accountability, and Representation (Adam Przeworski and Susan C. Stokes, eds.), pp. 
197-221. Cambridge University Press.  
Straubhaar, Joseph, Robert LaRose, and Lucinda Davenport. 2009. Media Now: Understanding 
Media, Culture, and Technology. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
283 
 
Strother, Logan. 2017a. “How Expected Political and Legal Impact Drive Media Coverage of 
Supreme Court Cases.” Political Communication. Early access: 
https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2017.1306817 
Strother, Logan. 2017b. “The National Flood Insurance Program: A Case Study in Policy 
Failure, Reform, and Retrenchment.” Policy Studies Journal. Early access: DOI: 
10.1111/psj.12189 
Strother, Logan. 2016. “Beyond Kelo: An Experimental Study of Public Opposition to Eminent 
Domain.” Journal of Law and Courts 4(2): 339-375.  
Tamanaha, Brian Z. 2006. Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law. Cambridge 
University Press.  
Tarrow, Sidney G. 2011. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 
Revised and Updated Third Edition. Cambridge University Press. 
Teachout, Zephyr. 2011. “The Historical Roots of Citizens United v. FEC: How Anarchists and 
Academics Accidentally Created Corporate Speech Rights.” Harvard Law & Policy 
Review 5: 163-187. 
Teles, Steven M. 2010. The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of 
the Law. Princeton University Press.  
Thayer, James Bradley. 1898. A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Tribe, Laurence H. 1990. Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 
Turk, Judy VanSlyke. 1986. “Public Relations Influence on the News.” Newspaper Research 
Journal 7(1): 15-27. 
284 
 
Tyler, Tom R., and Kenneth A. Rasinski. 1991. “Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, 
and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson.” 
Law & Society Review 25(3): 621-630. 
Ura, Jospeh Daniel. 2009. “The Supreme Court and Issue Attention: The Case of 
Homosexuality.” Political Communication 26: 430-446. 
Uribe, Alicia, James F. Spriggs II, and Thomas G. Hansford. 2014. “The Influence of 
Congressional Preferences on Legislative Overrides of Supreme Court Decisions.” Law 
& Society Review 48(4): 921-945. 
Van Meter, Donald S., and Carl E. Van Horn. 1975. “The Policy Implementation Process: A 
Conceptual Framework.” Administration and Society 6(4): 445-488.  
Wald, Michael, Richard Ayres, David W. Hess, Mark Schantz, and Charles H. Whitebread. 
1967. “Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda.” Yale Law Journal 76(8): 
1519-1648. 
Waldron, Jeremy. 2006. “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review.” The Yale Law Journal 
115: 1346-1406. 
Wasby, Stephen L. 1970. The Impact of the United States Supreme Court: Some Perspectives. 
Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press.  
Westerland, Chad, Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron, and Scott Comparato. 
2010. “Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.” American 
Journal of Political Science 54(4): 891-905.  
Whittington, Keith E. 2005. “‘Interpose Your Friendly Hand’: Political Supports for the Exercise 
of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court.” American Political Science 
Review 99(4): 583-596. 
285 
 
Whittington, Keith E. 1999a. Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, 
and Judicial Review. University Press of Kansas. 
Whittington, Keith E. 1999b. Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional 
Meaning. Harvard University Press. 
Williams, Richard. 2016. “Analyzing Rare Events with Logistic Regression.” Manuscript 
available at: http://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/ Version: April 5, 2016. 
Wlezien, Christopher. 2005. “On the Salience of Political Issues: The Problem with ‘Most 
Important Problem.’” Electoral Studies 24: 555-579. 
Wohlfarth, Patrick C. 2009. “The Tenth Justice? Consequences of Politicization in the Solicitor 
General’s Office.” Journal of Politics 71(1): 224-237. 
Wolfe, Michelle, Bryan D. Jones, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2013. “A Failure to Communicate: 
Agenda Setting is Media and Policy Studies.” Political Communication 30: 175-192.  
Yalof, David Alistair. 1999. Pursuit of Justices: Presidential Politics and the Selection of 
Supreme Court Nominees. University of Chicago Press. 
Yates, Jeff. 2002. Popular Justice: Presidential Prestige and Executive Success in the Supreme 
Court Albany: State University of New York Press.  
Yates, Jeff, Andrew B. Whitford. 2005. “Insitutional Foundations of the President’s Issue 
Agenda.” Political Research Quarterly 58(4): 577-585. 
Yates, Jeff, Andrew B. Whitford, and William Gillespie. 2005. “Agenda Setting, Issue Priorities 
and Organizational Maintenance: The US Supreme Court, 1955-1994.” British Journal of 
Political Science 35(2): 457-368. 
Zemans, Frances Kahn. 1983. “Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of Law in the Political 
System.” American Political Science Review 77(3): 690-703. 
286 
 
Zilis, Michael A. 2015. The Limits of Legitimacy: Dissenting Opinions, Media Coverage, and 
Public Responses to Supreme Court Decisions. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan 
Press. 
Zorn, Christopher. 2005. “A Solution to Separation in Binary Response Models.” Political 
Analysis 13(2): 157-170.  
 
 
  
287 
 
Cases Cited  
 
Abington School District v. Schempp 374 U.S. 203 (1963) 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 515 U.S. 200 (1995) 
Agostini v. Felton 521 U.S. 203 (1997) 
Aguilar v. Felton 473 U.S. 402 (1985) 
Alden v. Maine 527 U.S. 706 (1999) 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 494 U.S. 652 (1990) 
Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186 (1962) 
Beck v. Alabama 447 U.S. 625 (1980) 
Belotti v. Baird 428 U.S. 132 (1976) 
Berman v. Parker 348 U.S. 26 (1954) 
Bowsher v. Synar 478 U.S. 714 (1986) 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (I) 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (II) 349 U.S. 294 (1955) 
Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1 (1976) 
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah 508 U.S. 520 (1993) 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
City of Boerne v. Flores 521 U.S. 507 (1997) 
City of Chicago v. Eychaner 389 Ill. Dec. 411 (2015) 
City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (2006) 
City of Richmond v. Croson 488 U.S. 469 (1989) 
Coker v. Georgia 433 U.S. 584 (1977) 
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150 (1984) 
Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 497 U.S. 261 (1990) 
Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education 175 U.S. 528 (1899) 
Cutter v. Wilkinson 544 U.S. 709 (2005) 
District of Columbia v. Heller 554 U.S. 570 (2008) 
Dred Scott v. Sandford 60 U.S. 393 (1857) 
Elk Grove v. Newdow 542 U.S. 1 (2004) 
Employment Division v. Smith 494 U.S. 872 (1990) 
Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238 (1972) 
Godfrey v. Georgia 446 U.S. 420 (1980) 
Gonzales v. Carhart 550 U.S. 124 (2007) 
Grand Rapids v. Ball 473 U.S. 373 (1985) 
Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153 (1976) 
Harris v. McRae 448 U.S. 297 (1980) 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 467 U.S. 229 (1984) 
Hill v. Colorado 530 U.S. 703 (2000) 
Hill v. City of Lakewood 911 P.2d 670 (1995) 
Kelo v. City of New London 545 U.S. 469 (2005) 
Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 
Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602 (1971) 
Lockett v. Ohio 438 U.S. 586 (1978) 
Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803) 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission 540 U.S. 93 (2003) 
288 
 
McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316 (1819) 
McDonald v. Chicago 561 U.S. 742 (2010) 
Miller v. Texas 153 U.S. 535 (1894) 
Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
New York Times Company v. United States 403 U.S. 713 (1971) 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth 428 U.S. 52 (1976) 
Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 (1896) 
Presser v. Illinois 116 U.S. 252 (1886) 
Printz v. United States 521 U.S. 898 (1997) 
Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533 (1964) 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia 448 U.S. 555 (1980) 
Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620 (1996) 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1 (1973) 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida 517 U.S. 44 (1996) 
Shelby County v. Holder 570 U.S. ___ (2013) 
Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398 (1963) 
South Dakota v. Dole 483 U.S. 203 (1987) 
State v. Cline, 39 A.2d 270 (1979) 
State v. Waddell, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973) 
Stenberg v. Carhart 530 U.S. 914 (2000) 
Texas v. Johnson 491 U.S. 397 (1989) 
Thomas v. Review Board 450 U.S. 707 (1980) 
United States v. Carolene Products 304 U.S. 144 (1938) 
United States v. Cruikshank 92 U.S. 542 (1876) 
United States v. Eichman 496 U.S. 310 (1990) 
United States v. Lopez 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
United States v. Miller 307 U.S. 174 (1939) 
United States v. United States District Court 407 U.S. 297 (1972) 
Vacco v. Quill 521 U.S. 793 (1997) 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Betty Dukes, et al. 564 U.S. 388 (2011) 
Washington v. Glucksberg 521 U.S. 702 (1997) 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 492 U.S. 490 (1989) 
Whittaker v. County of Lawrence 674 F.Supp. 2d 668 (2009) 
Wickard v. Filburn 317 U.S. 111 (1942) 
Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission 551 U.S. 449 (2007) 
Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 204 (1972) 
Woodson v. North Carolina 428 U.S. 280 (1976) 
You Vang Yang, Ia Kue Yang v. William Q. Sturner, 728 F.Supp, 845 (1990) 
You Vang Yang, Ia Kue Yang v. William Q. Sturner, 750 F.Supp. 558 (1990) 
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily 436 U.S. 547 (1978) 
 
 
289 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
Logan Strother 
 
Department of Political Science   573-470-6306 
100 Eggers Hall                   lrstroth@syr.edu 
Syracuse, NY 13244 syr.academia.edu/LoganStrother 
 
ACADEMIC POSITIONS 
 
Visiting Scholar, Harry S Truman School of Public Affairs, University of Missouri  2015- 
 
Instructor, Graduate Assistant, Department of Political Science, Syracuse University 2012- 
Graduate Research Associate, Campbell Public Affairs Institute 2013- 
 
EDUCATION 
 
Ph.D. candidate, Political Science, Maxwell School, Syracuse University  June 2017 
 Dissertation: “Impact: Supreme Court Power and Influence in American Politics” 
 Committee: Thomas Keck (Chair), Keith Bybee, Shana Gadarian, Sarah Pralle 
 
M.A. Political Science, Southern Illinois University May 2012 
 
B.A. History, Teacher Education, Missouri University of Science & Technology May 2010 
 Summa cum Laude 
Research and Teaching Interests: American Constitutional Law and Development, Public Policy, Public 
Opinion and Mass Behavior, Environmental and Disaster Policy and Politics 
 
RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS 
 
Peer-Reviewed Articles 
 
Strother, Logan. “How Expected Political and Legal Impact Drive Media Coverage of Supreme 
Court Cases.” Forthcoming at Political Communication. Early access: 
https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2017.1306817 
 
Strother, Logan. “The National Flood Insurance Program: A Case Study in Policy Failure, Reform, 
and Retrenchment.” Forthcoming at Policy Studies Journal. Early access: DOI: 
10.1111/psj.12189 
 
Strother, Logan, Spencer Piston, and Thomas Ogorzalek. 2017. “Pride or Prejudice? Racial 
Prejudice, Southern Pride, and White Support for the Confederate Battle Flag.” Du Bois Review 
14(2).  
 
Strother, Logan. 2016. “Beyond Kelo: An Experimental Study of Public Opposition to Eminent 
Domain.” Journal of Law and Courts 4(2): 339-375.  
 
 
290 
 
Hatcher, Laura J., Logan Strother, Randolph Burnside and Donald Hughes. 2012. “The USACE and 
Post-Katrina New Orleans: Demolitions and Disaster Clean-Up,” Journal of Applied Social 
Science 6(2): 176-190. 
 
Book Chapters 
 
Keck, Thomas M., and Logan Strother. 2016. “Judicial Impact.” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia 
of Politics (William R. Thompson, ed.). DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.103 
 
Book Reviews 
 
Strother, Logan. 2016. “Review of Ilya Somin’s The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. New London and the 
Limits of Eminent Domain.”  Law and Politics Book Review 26(2): 35-38.  
 
Strother, Logan. 2016. “Review of Patrick S. Roberts’ Disaster and the American State: How 
Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Public Prepare for the Unexpected.” Risk, Hazards & Crisis in 
Public Policy 7(2): 104-109.  
 
Other Publications 
 
Strother, Logan. 2017. “Congress’ U-turn on flood insurance reform shows that lawmaking power 
can very quickly go from free rein to very constrained.” USAPP-American Politics and Policy 
Blog at the London School of Economics’ United States Centre, January 4, 2017. 
 
Strother, Logan. 2016. “Trump’s Border Wall Would Become A Lot More Unpopular if He Tried to 
Build It.” The Monkey Cage at The Washington Post, October 12, 2016. 
 
Piston, Spencer, and Logan Strother. 2015. “White Support for the Confederate Flag Really is about 
Racism, not Southern Heritage.” The Monkey Cage at The Washington Post, July 1, 2015. 
 Featured at Vox.com “Southern whites who know basic facts about the Civil War don’t 
support the Confederate flag.” By Dara Lind. July 6, 2015.   
 
Strother, Logan. 2013. “Preserving the Least Dangerous Branch: A Case Against a Politicized 
Confirmation Process for Supreme Court Nominees.” In American Government. ABC-CLIO 
Online.  
 
Hatcher, Laura J., Logan Strother, and Randolph Burnside. 2012. “Old Man River, the Corps, and 
Levees: The Meaning of Private Property Rights in a Flood Control System.” Law & Courts 
Newsletter 22(1): 33-35. 
 
Selected Working Papers 
 
Strother, Logan. “The Rarely Constrained Court: Case Salience and the Operation of External 
Constraints on the US Supreme Court.” (under review) 
 
Hatcher, Laura J., Logan Strother, and Randolph Burnside. “Support for Public Use of Private 
Property: A Case Study on the Bird’s Point-New Madrid Floodway.” (under review) 
 
 
291 
 
Glennon, Colin, and Logan Strother. “The Public Rhetoric of Supreme Court Justices.” (revising for 
submission) 
 
GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS 
 
EXTERNAL 
Southern Political Science Association Prestage-Cook Travel Award, 2017 $300 
Dan Searle Freedom Trust Humane Studies Fellowship, 2016-2017 $5,000 
Mercatus Center Policy Research Seminar Travel Grant, 2016 $399 
CKF Dissertation Research Grant, 2016 $5,000 
IHS Summer Research Fellowship, Summer 2016 $5,000 
Dan Searle Freedom Trust Humane Studies Fellowship, 2015-2016 $5,000 
Dan Searle Freedom Trust Humane Studies Fellowship, 2014-2015 $2,000 
 
INTERNAL 
Michael O. Sawyer Summer Fellowship, 2017  $1,875 
Roscoe Martin Dissertation Research Award (Syracuse University), 2015 $1,000 
Summer Research Grant (Syracuse University), 2015 $800 
Graduate Student Organization Travel Grant (Syracuse University), 2015, 2016 $300/year 
Conference Travel Grant (Syracuse University), 2012—2016  $500/year 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
 
Syracuse University 
 
Instructor: PSC 121 – American National Government Summer 2015 
Teaching Assistant: PSC 121 – American National Government (Chris Faricy) Spring 2015 
Teaching Assistant: PSC 121 – American National Government (Shana Gadarian) Fall 2014 
Teaching Assistant: PSC 325 – Constitutional Law II (John Hanley)  Spring 2014 
Teaching Assistant: PSC 324 – Constitutional Law I (John Hanley) Fall 2013 
Grader: PSC 324 – Constitutional Law I (Tom Keck) Fall 2012 
 
Southern Illinois University 
 
Teaching Assistant: POLS 330 – Judicial Process (Laura Hatcher) Fall 2011 
 
Missouri University of Science & Technology 
 
Student teacher: history, Newburg (MO) Jr.-Sr. High School Spring 2010 
Student teacher: history and sociology, Dixon (MO) High School Spring 2010 
 
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE 
 
Syracuse University 
 
Research Assistant: Spencer Piston Summer 2017 
Research Assistant: Shana Gadarian AY 2016-2017 
Research Assistant: Spencer Piston AY 2015-2016 
 
292 
 
Research Assistant: Shana Gadarian Summer 2015 
Research Assistant: Spencer Piston Summer 2015 
Research Assistant: Shana Gadarian Summer 2014 
 
Southern Illinois University 
 
Research Assistant: Laura Hatcher & Randy Burnside Spring 2012 
Research Assistant: Robert Clinton AY 2010-2011 
 
HONORS AND AWARDS          
 
Jeffrey M. Stonecash Award (Department of 
Political Science, Syracuse University, 
best paper on American Politics), 2017 
Syracuse University Graduate Fellowship, 
2015-2016 
Jeffrey M. Stonecash Award (Department of 
Political Science, Syracuse University, 
best paper on American Politics), 2015 
Jeffrey M. Stonecash Award (Department of 
Political Science, Syracuse University, 
best paper on American Politics), 2014 
Syracuse University Graduate Fellowship, 
2012-2013 
MS&T 2009-2010 Outstanding History 
Major of the Year  
Phi Kappa Phi National Honor Society 
Phi Alpha Theta National History Honor 
Society    
Phi Eta Sigma Honor Society  
MS&T History & Political Science 
         Departmental Scholarship 
MS&T Dean’s List 
Missouri Bright Flight Scholarship 
MS&T Excellence Scholarship 
MS&T Curator’s Scholarship 
MS&T Alumni Endowment Scholarship 
Louis T. Sicka Scholarship 
William S. Rankin Scholarship   
Douglas Educator’s Scholarship   
MS&T Academic Scholar’s List  
 
296 
 
CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION 
 
“Supreme Court Influence on Public Issue Attention.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the American Political Science Association. San Francisco, CA. September 2017. 
[scheduled] 
 
“Supreme Court Policy Legitimation: Testing the Mechanisms of Court-Motivated Opinion 
Change and Policy Acceptance.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association (with Shana Gadarian). Chicago, IL. April 2017.  
 
“The Rarely Constrained Court?” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern 
Political Science Association. New Orleans, LA. January 2017. 
 
“The Supreme Court and the ‘Policymaking Agenda.’” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the American Political Science Association. Philadelphia, PA. September 2016.  
 
“The Supreme Court and the National Political Agenda.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the Law & Society Association. New Orleans, LA. June 2016.  
 
“Compliance and Impact in Supreme Court Decisions Rejecting Constitutional Challenges.” 
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Political Science Association. 
Chicago, IL. April 2016.  
 
“Judicial Power in ‘Restraint’.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political 
Science Association. San Diego, CA. March 2016 
 
“Divided by Skin Color: The Influence of Skin Tone and Racialized News Messages on Latino 
Partisanship.” Paper prepared for presentation at Toronto Political Behaviour Workshop 
(with Spencer Piston), Toronto, ON. November 2015. 
 
“Proposed Use, Property Taken, and Ownership: An Experimental Study of Public Opposition to 
Eminent Domain.” Poster presented at the Conference on Empirical Legal Studies. St. Louis, 
MO. October 2015. 
 
“The Land Below the Levee: Disputing Land Use in a Floodway.” Paper prepared for 
presentation at the annual meeting of the Law and Society Association (with Laura Hatcher). 
Seattle, WA. June 2015.  
 
“Judicial Power in ‘Restraint’.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the New England 
Political Science Association. New Haven, CT. April 2015 
 
“Reconsidering Backlash.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political 
Science Association. Washington, D.C. August 2014.  
 
“Reconsidering Backlash.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the New England Political 
Science Association. Woodstock, VT. April 2014.  
 
297 
 
 
“Unpacking Public Attitudes Toward Eminent Domain: An Exploratory Study.” Paper presented 
at the annual meeting of the Law & Society Association. Boston, MA. June 2013. 
 
“Lessons from Kelo v. New London: Public Opinion, Constitutional Law, and the Value of 
Backlash.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the New York State Political Science 
Association. Syracuse, NY. April 2013. 
 
“The Land Below the Levees: Disputing Land Use in the Bird’s Point-New Madrid Floodway.” 
Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Law and Society Association 
(with Laura Hatcher). Honolulu, HI. June 2012. 
 
“Cleaning Up New Orleans: The Corps, the Courts, and the Plight of the Lower Ninth Ward.” 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Law, Property, and Society. 
Washington, D.C. March 2012. 
 
“The Land Below the Levees: Disputing Land Use in the Bird’s Point-New Madrid Floodway.” 
Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Association for Law, Property 
and Society (with Laura Hatcher). Washington D.C. March 2012. 
 
“Cleaning Up New Orleans: The Corps, the Courts, and the Plight of the Lower Ninth Ward.” 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. New 
Orleans, LA. January 2012. 
 
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS 
 
American Political Science Association  2012-present 
 Law & Courts Section   2012-present 
Policy Studies Section   2015-present 
Law & Society Association   2012-present 
Midwest Political Science Association  2016-present 
Southern Political Science Association  2016-present 
Western Political Science Association  2016-present 
Society for Empirical Legal Studies  2016-present 
 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Invited participant, Institute for Humane Studies & Liberty Fund Advanced Topics in Liberty 
Seminar: “Liberty, the Welfare State, and the New Deal.” Arlington, VA. April 2017.  
 
Invited participant, Mercatus Center Policy Research Seminar. Philadelphia, PA. September 2016. 
 
Future Professoriate Program, Syracuse University, 2014-2016 
 
Invited participant, Liberty Fund & CKF Public Policy and Liberty Colloquium. Arlington, VA. 
February 2016. 
 
298 
 
 
Invited participant, Institute for Humane Studies & Liberty Fund Advanced Topics in Liberty 
Seminar: “Liberty and Responsibility in the American Anti-Slavery Movement.” Arlington, VA. 
September 2015.  
 
DEPARTMENT SERVICE 
 
Syracuse University 
Undergraduate Honors Thesis Committees: 
Carolee Lantigua, Spring 2017 
Brianna Fernandez, Spring 2016 
Eric Lyons, Spring 2014 
Shaun Loughlin, Spring 2013 
 
Organizer, Graduate Professional Development Seminar, AY 2014-2015 
 
Political Science Research Workshop (PSRW) Discussant 
 
Southern Illinois University 
Hospitality Committee – Academic year 2011-2012 
 
